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The doctoral dissertation/master's thesis ofCheryl Ann Shumate.....entitled
"From the Disinterested to the Joiners: American Youth Propensity to Enlist
in the United States Military"

submitted to the department/program of.....Government.....in partial
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in the Graduate School of Georgetown University has been read and approved by the Committee:

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For the Dean

FROM THE DISINTERESTED TO THE JOINERS: AMERICAN
YOUTH PROPENSITY TO ENLIST IN THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY

A Dissertation
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Government

By

Cheryl Ann Shumate, M.A.

Washington, D. C.
August 26, 1999

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FROM THE DISINTERESTED TO THE JOINERS: AMERICAN YOUTH PROPENSITY TO ENLIST IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

Cheryl Ann Shumate, M.A.

Mentor: James I. Lingle, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

There is a growing awareness within the Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress that personnel issues are becoming the most daunting challenges for the U.S. military. The proclivity of American youth to join the military has steadily declined. This research focuses on the Post-Cold War era, a time of relative prosperity for the United States. Yet, the U.S. military has found itself increasingly deployed in support of peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and traditional military missions around the world. These increased deployments coupled with declining youth propensity to join the military appear to threaten the viability and quality of the future U.S. military.

This research employs the annual Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) to investigate the motivations, sources, and influencers of youth proclivity to join the military. Further, specific youth attitudes are investigated to determine their impact of likely youth propensity. Various statistical measures such as chi-square tests, Somer's *d*

statistics, and OLS regressions are used to determine the impact of various exogenous variables on likely youth propensity.

These findings suggest that American youth are attracted to military service principally through a self-selection process in which certain aspects of military service resonate with youth. These unique aspects of military service include duty to country, leadership, teamwork, and physical challenges. Additionally, the major agents of influence in this self-selection process remain family members, followed closely by peers. Further, this research found that youth are more willing to join if the missions of the military directly benefit the United States.

These findings suggest recruitment strategies for the military in which the unique aspects of military service are highlighted. Further, this research suggests that DoD needs to maintain its linkages with civil society in order to prevent the further isolation of the military and increase its appeal among American youth.

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Introduction

Chapter One

There is a growing awareness within the Department of Defense and Congress that personnel issues are becoming the most daunting challenges for the U.S. military. Since 1990, Congress, the Department of Defense, and the media have become increasingly concerned about the lack of proclivity of American youth to join the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). According to the 1990 Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS), approximately 24.6% of American youth, when asked their likelihood of joining the military over the next several years, responded 'probably' or 'definitely'.¹ By 1997, the percentage of American youth responding 'probably' or 'definitely' to joining the military had dropped to 10.2%.² The rate for women declined from 15 percent to 12 percent during the same time frame.³

Additionally, the Army, Navy, and Air Force are increasingly experiencing recruitment shortfalls. For example, the Navy failed to fill 6,900 positions in 1998, the Army missed their recruitment goals by 2,300 for the first quarter of 1999, and the Air Force missed their recruitment goals in 1998 by approximately 680.⁴ In 1999, the Air

¹ The data for this dissertation were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center, 1600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA, 22209. A full description of the YATS survey is contained in Chapter Two.

² YATS survey, 1997.

³ Ibid., 62.

⁴ Dana Priest, "Services Combat Recruit Shortfall," Washington Post (February 17, 1999): 1.

Force expects to miss its recruitment goal of 33,800 by over 2,500 recruits.⁵ Each of the services have approached these personnel shortages in different ways. The Navy recently announced they would lower the number of non-high school graduates accepted into the Navy, increase the number of recruiters and recruiting stations, and increase its advertising budget from \$58 million to \$70 million.⁶ In 1997, the Army, which has already lowered their required number of high school graduates, reduced its recruiting goals when it could not find enough high-quality recruits.⁷ The Air Force, for the first time in its history, is buying television advertisements as well as increasing the number of its' recruiters, and offering new enlistment bonuses.⁸

In addition to problems of recruitment, there are concerns about the quality of recent military recruits. For example, "about one third of recruits fail to complete their first term of enlistment, an attrition rate that concerns Congress because of its cost. Senator Dirk Kempthorne, R-Idaho, the personnel subcommittee chairman, said the services lose \$390 million per year because so many recruits fail to meet their military obligations."⁹ Further, military officials observe a difference in the attitudes and actions

⁵ Sig Christenson, "AF Recruiting May Miss By 2,500," San Antonio Express-News (July 2, 1999): 6.

⁶ Dana Priest, 1.

⁷ "A Daunting Challenge," Air Force Times (March 23, 1998): 29. This is not the only instance of the military services not meeting their recruitment goals. In 1994, the U.S. Marine Corps failed to meet its recruiting goals for the first time in fifteen years. (See Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer, The Next War, Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1998, p. xxi.) Also, the Annual Secretary of Defense's Reports to the President and the Congress over the last five years specifically outline the recruitment difficulties of the individual services.

⁸ Steven Lee Myers, "Air Force Will Advertise On TV to Stem Lag In Recruiting," New York Times, (February 10, 1999): 17.

⁹ Rick Maze, "Recruiters: It's Too Easy For People To Get Out," Air Force Times (March 16, 1998): 4.

of those who sign up for military service.¹⁰ ³ They see evidence of a new type of recruit who does not respond well to training and fails to take military values and commitments seriously.¹¹ Those recruits who make it through basic training and stay to fulfill their military commitment are more likely to place "self before service" and to disparage team endeavors than older military personnel.¹²

While it is unlikely that Congress will reinstate the military draft in the near future, these personnel problems will likely have far reaching implications for the viability and quality of the future U.S. military. Recruiting and reenlistment activities are central to the survival of the AVF. This dissertation is aimed at unraveling the motivations, sources, and influences of youth proclivity to join the military. What motivates some young people to select military service, while others do not? Who are the agents of influence and which are the most significant in terms of youth propensity to serve in the military? What are youth opinions concerning military service? Do these youth value service to country? Do they value personal freedom? How do these values impact their likely propensity? Finally, are there correlations between specific youth attitudes toward foreign policy and their propensity to join the military?

One may wonder why these questions are pertinent to political scientists. Eliot Cohen argues that military organizations are fundamentally political and institutional

¹⁰ Diana Owen and Cheryl Shumate, "Generation X and the Military," (Paper presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Norfolk, VA, Nov. 6, 1997): 1-2.

¹¹ Rick Maze, "Recruit Quality Concerns Senator," Air Force Times (April 21, 1997): 8.

¹² Bryant Jordan, "Generation X," Air Force Times (July 14, 1997): 12-14.

organizations and that "military service is at once a subject for scholarly inquiry and a political issue of the first order."¹³ Cohen highlights three primary reasons why political science scholars should be concerned with military service. First, issues of recruitment and military service have a direct and obvious bearing on the ability of a state to exercise its military power in the world arena. Secondly, the issue of military service raises the fundamental question of citizenship and the responsibility of citizens to the state.¹⁴ Thus, this area of analysis fits squarely within the well-established research tradition of political socialization. Additionally, the issue of conscription has been periodically one of intense political debate within the United States, specifically during the Civil War, the 1940s and the 1960s.¹⁵ For these reasons, the issues surrounding military service are political in nature. Further, understanding the motivations of youth propensity and the key influencers are crucial as these young people are the sole source of recruits for the future U.S. military. In addition, an examination of youth attitudes will provide some insight into their likely propensity to enlist in the military. Finally, public support of the U.S. military is essential for the legitimacy of this institution and its ability to defend our national interests. Before proceeding to the complete research design for this dissertation, a review of previous research in this area as well as the theoretical underpinnings of likely youth propensity and military service is necessary.

¹³ Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers The Dilemma of Military Service, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985): 16.

¹⁴ Ibid., 19.

¹⁵ For example, see William Bowman, Roger Little and G. Thomas Sicilia, The All-Volunteer Force After A Decade Retrospect and Prospect (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986).

Previous Research

The likelihood of American youth volunteering for military service has been investigated from a variety of perspectives. The most in-depth analysis was conducted almost thirty years ago, a time in which the U.S. was struggling with the Vietnam War, a military draft system that was increasingly unpopular with the American public, and political leaders debating the possibilities of returning to an all-volunteer armed forces.¹⁶ The Youth In Transition (YIT) Project, a longitudinal study of young men, began in 1966 with among its many purposes "the examination of various background and school factors relating to the development of occupational plans and later occupational attainments."¹⁷ Volume five of this project specifically examined "the reasons why some young men choose to enlist after high school rather than take a civilian job or continue their education."¹⁸ A broad conceptual framework including several theories

¹⁶ Several books capture the historical and political issues surrounding the draft including George O. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993); Martin Anderson, ed., Registration and the Draft Proceedings of the Hoover-Rochester Conference on the All-Volunteer Force, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970); Martin Anderson and Barbara Honegger, eds., The Military Draft Selected Readings on Conscription (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982); Jason Berger, ed., The Military Draft (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1981); and Sol Tax, ed., The Draft A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967). A historical examination of the U.S. military experience with an all-volunteer force can be found in Robert K. Griffith Jr., Men Wanted for the U.S. Army America's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army Between the World Wars (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982). Finally, the complete arguments against ending the military draft can be found in Harry A. Marmion, The Case Against a Volunteer Army (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971).

¹⁷ Jerome Johnston and Jerald G. Bachman, Youth in Transition, Volume V, Young Men and Military Service (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1972): 2. This study collected data at four distinct points: one each in tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades, and one a year after high school. The initial sample included 2213 boys. This study was conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan with the support of the U.S. Department of Defense.

¹⁸ Ibid., 1.

of choice behavior were employed with a special emphasis on "an individual's self-concept as a determinant of choice behavior."¹⁹

This study examined the demographic characteristics of these young men, their school performance, their attitudes toward work and war, as well as their position on three factors central to an enlistment decision: "self-perceived 'fit' with service life, vocational indecision at the end of high school, and status with respect to the draft."²⁰ The authors discovered that "it does not appear that there is a single 'military type,' enlistees are not characterized by any particular 'profile' of background, ability or personality which sets them clearly apart from other young men their age."²¹ The authors also found "little association between rates of unemployment among unskilled males in a county-wide area and rates of enlistment in the same area" and rejected their hypothesis that young men "undecided about their long range vocational future are more likely to enlist."²² Finally, the authors discovered a weak association between attitudes toward war with the enlistment decision, arguing that "military service is attractive to a broad spectrum of youth with varying outlooks on work and war."²³

While this research is illuminating in terms of the decision making process of young men and their enlistment decisions in the late 1960s, several limiting factors require a re-examination of the issues and attitudes surrounding youth propensity to

¹⁹ Ibid., 3.

²⁰ Ibid., 2.

²¹ Ibid., 194.

²² Ibid., 137 and 59.

²³ Ibid., 82.

enlist. First, this study was conducted prior to the end of the military draft and young men were influenced by their draft status.²⁴ The possibility of military service overshadowed the decision making process for these young men. These circumstances are no longer applicable to young men as the draft ended in 1973. Further, this study was limited to young men, and the military, while still a male-dominated institution, has provided many opportunities to young women over the last twenty-five years. Finally, the attitudinal questions for this research were limited to the Vietnam War, a topic that is much less relevant to American youth today.

More recent research on the propensity of American youth to serve in the military has been based on two broad approaches: econometric models based on civilian unemployment rates or social/psychological models emphasizing personal motivations such as patriotism. Several econometric models have argued that propensity to serve in the military is driven by the civilian unemployment rate, although the empirical evidence is not conclusive.²⁵ While this argument appears to make sense, the empirical evidence is contradictory depending on the measures used for enlistment contracts and the figures used for unemployment.

²⁴ See Chapter Four, "Some Basic Motives For Enlistment," Youth In Transition Volume Five, 33-71.

²⁵ For example, see Colin Ash, Bernard Udis, and Robert McNown, "Enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force: A Military Supply Model and its Forecasts," The American Economic Review, (March 1983): 145-155; Charles Dale and Curtis Gilroy, "Enlistments in the All-volunteer Force: Note," The American Economic Review (June 1985): 547-551; and Charles Brown, "Military Enlistments: What Can We Learn From Geographic Variation?" The American Economic Review, (March 1985): 228-234.

The social models have emphasized the personal motivations of American youth.

For example, Linda Gorman and George W. Thomas examined the self-reported motivations of Army Reservists and investigated three motivations: money, self-improvement, and patriotism.²⁶ While an interesting research project, their pool of respondents was a group of individuals who were already members of the military. Their motivations may not be as applicable to the majority of American youth.

Another set of studies used data from the Monitoring the Future project, an ongoing study of high school seniors conducted by the Institute for Social Research.²⁷ This group of studies also explores the propensity of American youth to serve in the military. Their primary theoretical framework for examining youth propensity to enlist in the military is based on self-selection. The self-selection theory argues that the military tends to draw individuals who are pro-military. The authors found support for this thesis, arguing that "high school seniors who expect to serve in the military are more pro-military than those who do not, and those who anticipate military careers are the most promilitary."²⁸ This self-selection argument will be addressed further in the research design of this dissertation.

²⁶ Linda Gorman and George W. Thomas, "Enlistment Motivation of Army Reservists: Money, Self-Improvement, or Patriotism," Armed Forces and Society, (Summer 1991): 589-599.

²⁷ For example, see Jerald G. Bachman, "American High School Seniors View the Military, 1976-1982," Armed Forces and Society, (Fall 1983): 86-104 and Jerald Bachman, Lee Sigelman, and Greg Diamond, "Self-Selection, Socialization, and Distinctive Military Values: Attitudes of American High School Seniors," Armed Forces and Society, (Winter 1987): 169-187.

²⁸ Bachman, Sigelman, and Diamond, 290.

It is useful now to review the broader military manpower policy studies and literature concerned with military service. While this dissertation examines youth attitudes and their perspectives on military service, manpower studies provide the military's institutional perspectives and concerns surrounding personnel issues. The U.S. military is required to recruit, train, and retain a sufficient number of qualified individuals in order to meet the national security objectives established by the government. The most recent national security strategy, published in October 1998, "seeks to establish a stable, peaceful international security environment in which our nation, citizens, and interests are not threatened."²⁹

If U.S. security interests are threatened, the military must retain the ability to "deter, and, if necessary, fight and win, in concert with regional allies, two major theater wars, in overlapping time frames."³⁰ The key to the future success of the U.S. military "is the quality of its people. The men and women who comprise our all-volunteer Total Force are of the highest caliber; we must continue to attract and maintain this level of personnel."³¹ Military manpower studies and the issues surrounding military service provide the backdrop and environmental context for understanding youth proclivity to join the military.

²⁹ A National Security Strategy For A New Century, The White House, October 1998: 5.

³⁰ Dr. Edward L. Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements (ASD/S&R), Testimony to the House National Security Committee (HNSC), Military Personnel Subcommittee, January 29, 1998.

³¹ Dr. Warner, ASD/S&R, January 29, 1998 HNSC Hearing.

Military Service and Military Manpower Studies

Military service has been identified as a vital political issue for the United States by various authors including Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Eliot Cohen, and Charles Moskos. Military service issues can be examined from a variety of perspectives including national security strategy, weapons procurement, and military personnel issues. The latter perspective has not received much attention in the academic community. In The Hollow Army, the author argues that military personnel issues have no constituency.³² Congress has been content to allow the Department of Defense and the various military services to deal with their personnel issues and policies with little interference. The Department of Defense charges each of the services with the responsibility to create and implement specific personnel policies including recruitment, training, and retention policies.

Originally conceived, U.S. military manpower policy was based on the principle of a widespread obligation to serve. "George Washington urged Congress to accept the principle 'that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes . . . his personal services to the defense of it.'"³³ Over time, this principle has waned. As David Segal argues, "The principles and traditions of military service as being a

³² Henderson, William Darryl. The Hollow Army How the U.S. Army is Oversold and Undermanned. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990, Chapter 3: 19-47.

³³ John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, 39 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931-44), 26:374-91, quoted in Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989): 19.

manifestation of citizenship have been eroded by time and by social change."³⁴ Coupled with these changes over time, "the Gates Commission, which in the 1960s developed the blueprint for the all-volunteer force that the United States adopted in 1973 and maintains today, dealt a mortal wound to the principle of obligation by explicitly identifying financial inducements as the major incentive for voluntarism."³⁵ Thus, the intangible principles of duty and service to country become obscured and replaced by financial incentives.

Several scholars have argued that U.S. military manpower policy has been structured since the Gates Commission in terms of the fiscal relationship between the individual and the state.³⁶ The Gates Commission reordered the relationship between the individual and the state and established an economic argument for military service while ignoring the social and political aspects of military service. This relationship between the state and the individual came to be defined solely in terms of labor-market principles - a relationship based on economic principles. The waning of the principle of individual obligation to the state in terms of military service has led to a "redefinition of

³⁴ Segal, 62.

³⁵ Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 17.

³⁶ For example, see David Segal, *Recruiting For Uncle Sam*; Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism Education For Civic Consciousness*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983); Philip Abbott, *The Shotgun Behind the Door Liberalism and the Problem of Political Obligation*, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1976); Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, eds., *The Military More Than A Job?*, (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988); and John Pullen, *Patriotism In America A Study of Changing Devotions 1770-1970*, (New York: American Heritage Press, 1971).

military service from being an obligation of citizenship in a community to being an obligation of national citizenship and, most recently, to being a job.³⁷

Perhaps more importantly, the principles of citizenship, duty, and responsibility to the nation have diminished.³⁸ Americans tend to perceive their ability to join the military in terms of rights. For example, President Clinton began his tenure by emphasizing the rights of gays to join the military.³⁹ Further, individualism and the emphasis on rights over responsibilities have likely contributed to the current political and social climate in which the majority of American youth are unlikely to volunteer to join the military. Recent research has shown that American youth "have difficulty seeing the relevance of the armed forces" and these youth are "turned off" by the discipline, uniformity, and long hours of military life."⁴⁰ From an institutional perspective, the difficulty for the armed forces remains motivating sufficient numbers of youth to volunteer for military service, during a time in which the military is increasingly viewed as irrelevant by the very individuals needed to fill its ranks.

³⁷ Segal, 45.

³⁸ This argument is suggested by several authors including David Segal, Morris Janowitz, and Charles Moskos. See footnote 36. Also, Dennis and Owen argue that the decline in these values and patriotism is more pronounced for the current youth culture than for any prior generation. See Jack Dennis and Diana Owen, "The Partisanship Puzzle: Identification and Attitudes of Generation X," in After the Boom: The Politics of Generation X, ed. Stephen C. Craig and Stephen Earl Bennett (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 43-61.

³⁹ One of President Clinton's first policy changes affecting the Department of Defense involved lifting the ban on gays in the military. See "The Commander and Chiefs," U.S. News and World Report, (February 8, 1993): 37-40.

⁴⁰ Bradley Graham, "The Bugle Sounds, But Fewer Answer," The Washington Post (March 13, 1999): A3.

Further, the core political values of American society may be antithetical to military service, especially in the current era. Traditional military professionalism has its own set of core values, "which to some extent are contrary to those held by liberal civilian society. Military organization is hierarchical, not egalitarian, and it is oriented to the group rather than the individual; it stresses discipline and obedience, not freedom of expression; it depends on confidence and trust, not *caveat emptor*."⁴¹ This is not to suggest that military service and core democratic values are mutually exclusive. Rather, for an increasing number of American youth, military service is not even a possible consideration of their post-high school vocational choices.

Therefore, one can argue that, in the late 1990s, the prevailing American view is that military service is no longer as valued nor as necessary as in the past few decades. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union was viewed as a direct threat to the United States and the military had little difficulty in attracting large numbers of qualified, highly competent recruits. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has emerged as the sole military superpower. Prevailing attitudes toward military service, called the victory disease,⁴² are likely reflected in the diminished number of individuals volunteering for military service.

⁴¹ Colonel Robert G. Gard, Jr., "The Military and American Society," Foreign Affairs 49 (July 1971): 699.

⁴² Weinberger and Schweizer, p. xvii.

The problem with these contemporary attitudes are that the individuals volunteering for military service may not reflect the general attitudes of American society, calling into question the representativeness of the military. In his book, Making The Corps, Thomas Ricks argues that cultural alienation, reflected in the growing gap between the absence of values in society and their transmission in the Marine Corps, has the potential to become a danger to society. "Ricks points to two factors that have worsened the civil-military gap: the lack of elites serving in the military, and the maintenance of a large military in peacetime."⁴³ Further, the concentration of specific values within the military, values that are not widely shared by civil society, may increase the tensions between civil society and the military. In an article entitled, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dunlap, Jr. warns us about the dangers of a large, professional military with few ties to civil society.⁴⁴ A military institution, which does not reflect the general attitudes of civil society, may be unwilling to serve and potentially die for that civil society. In other words, a military institution which believes its service is not valued by the government and civil society may not be able to guarantee the future security of the very nation it is supposed to serve.

⁴³ See Amy Waldman, "A Parallel Universe," The Washington Monthly, (December 1997): 53.

⁴⁴ Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters, (Winter 1992-93): 2-20.

This civil-military gap between the values indoctrinated by the military and those held by the general public may have dangerous, unintended consequences for American democracy. Tocqueville noted the dangers for a democracy when the military holds distinct values that may not be congruent with the mainstream values of American society.

“...because in democracies the richest, best-educated, and ablest citizens hardly adopt a military career, the army becomes a little nation apart, with a lower standard of intelligence and rougher habits than the nation at large. But this little uncivilized nation holds the weapons and it alone knows how to use them. The danger from the turbulent and warlike spirit of the army is actually increased in democracies by the pacific nature of the citizens. There is nothing more dangerous than an army amid an unwarlike nation.”⁴⁵

This is not to suggest that the military has overt intentions of taking over the American system of government. Rather, one can argue that this perspective highlights the dangerous potentialities of the personnel issues of an AVF with few ties to civil society.

Further, the military must retain a sufficient number of individuals to fill its key leadership positions. The military is not like any other corporation, business, or institution - this institution cannot compete in terms of wages as the latest government figures indicate a 13.5% lag behind civilian wages.⁴⁶ Additionally, this institution cannot hire mid-level managers and top level executives from outside the military

⁴⁵ See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America, trans. George Lawrence, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966): 648-649.

⁴⁶ Rick Maze, Jack Weible, and Patrick Pexton, “Does It Pay To Stay?”, Air Force Times, (July 27, 1998): 12.

institution to fill its key leadership positions. The military must grow its senior leaders, a process that evolves over many years. "It takes just as long to develop a Lieutenant-Colonel as it does to design and build a new weapon system; keeping our forces modern and ready is a critical component of preserving a core of talented leaders."⁴⁷ The current difficulties the military is experiencing in recruiting quality personnel may not be reflected immediately in terms of values or leadership. Congress and the Department of Defense may not yet realize the far-reaching implications of the current personnel problems. Still, the Gates Commissions' restructuring of the relationship between the individual and the state had unintended consequences for the US military and has contributed to the lack of American youth interested in military service. By dismissing the civic responsibility of citizens to potentially defend its government, this Commission perpetuated the devaluation of service before self.

Additionally, a cursory examination of the recruitment strategies of the services indicates that the military has pursued market strategies to attract young men and women into the various services, emphasizing the individualistic benefits of military service. While the "economic man" strategy, which emphasizes the educational and training opportunities of military service may have been successful in meeting the past recruitment goals of the services, the cost of emphasizing individualistic goals may occur in terms of unit cohesiveness, morale, and retention, intangible concepts difficult

⁴⁷ David McCurdy, "And What To Do About It," Washington Quarterly, (Winter 1996): 115.

for social scientists to measure. Defense Secretary Cohen recently acknowledged this strategy of emphasizing the "economic man" may not be the right message. He has asked the services to prepare new recruitment strategies that emphasize patriotism and challenge, suggesting that the previous strategies emphasized individualistic concerns and were not successful in attracting individuals oriented more toward less selfish goals.⁴⁸

While economic recruitment strategies may have been successful in meeting the past recruitment goals of the services, one may argue that the services have not done an adequate job in turning these new recruits into soldiers, sailors, and airmen.⁴⁹ High attrition rates, lack of unit cohesiveness, and turbulent personnel practices have led to many new recruits viewing their service in the military simply as a job. One may argue that the inability of the services to instill a code of values in the military which emphasizes service before self is necessary to maintain the fundamental links between civil society and the military. In other words, creating citizen-soldiers is more important than creating soldier-citizens. Yet, what is the cost in terms of military efficiency? One may argue that within a democracy, the creation of a warrior mentality is an ideal that cannot be achieved except under wartime conditions.

The creation of a warrior mentality may be difficult for a democracy, yet the process continues today. The initial goal of the military is to strip the individual of all

⁴⁸ Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, DoD News Briefing, March 16, 1998.

⁴⁹ For example, see the Kassebaum Baker Report on Gender Integrated Training, December 1997.

sense of individuality and convert the individual into a member of a military unit. This reformulation of self is accomplished through a variety of means including the alteration of their appearances. Recruits are divested of their external vestiges through haircuts and the removal of all personal items including civilian clothing. Their personal freedoms are restricted and confined within the military structure and their daily lives are controlled by others.

This reconceptualization of identity is designed to create a substantially altered individual whose self identity is subsumed into the collective identity of the integrated whole: the military unit. Military units require discipline, authority and hierarchy to accomplish their missions. Unquestionable belief in the hierarchy of the military structure and those individuals with authority based on rank have been the essential cornerstones of military effectiveness. Military effectiveness is directly related to the ability of the unit to act in unison. Individual considerations and concerns must be dissipated, with the collective goals of the unit achieving primacy.

Specifically, military training is designed to reinforce the primacy of collective identity. Obstacle courses, training exercises, and integrated group tasks are created to bolster the confidence of the unit as well as the individual members. Training humbles and may humiliate the individual, yet it also instills pride of accomplishment and group identification. The identity of self becomes intertwined with the collective identity of the unit. The unit succeeds when all members of the unit succeed; alternatively, all fail

if one member of the unit fails.

Potential differences between recruits may significantly reduce the military effectiveness of the unit, however, the historical evidence suggests that these differences are ameliorated in times of war. J. Glenn Gray argues that each recruit is dependent on others for his very survival. "This confraternity of danger and exposure is unequalled in forging links among people of unlike desire and temperament, links that are utilitarian and narrow but no less passionate because of their accidental and general nature."⁵⁰ This argument suggests that the differences of identity are insignificant in times of war. Additionally, the collective identity of the unit appears to hold primacy for each member of the unit.

This theme of collective identity superseding self-identity is explored further in military socialization studies. Charles Moskos, in his seminal work on the enlisted man, argues that the military soldier has neither strong beliefs about national war aims nor a highly developed sense of personal commitment to the war effort.⁵¹ Rather, the broad picture is one in which soldiers adjust to their environment and the primacy of their unit evolves in explaining effective military performance. In other words, the cohesiveness and effectiveness of military units is directly related to the individual soldiers' sense of community within his unit.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 27.

⁵¹ Charles C. Moskos Jr., The American Enlisted Man, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970): 7.

For military units to be effective fighting units, a sense of collective identity must be ingrained into each member of the unit. This initiation process takes place during basic training and is reinforced through military training. Robert Jay Lifton describes this rite of passage as a symbolic form of death and rebirth.⁵² He argues that in this process the "civil identity, with its built-in restraints, is eradicated, or at least undermined and set aside in favor of the warrior identity and its central focus upon killing."⁵³ The emergence of the traditional warrior mentality, created by this rite of passage, requires the acknowledgment of supremacy of the unit, with self-identity and differences dispersed in recognition of the need for survival. These fundamental concepts of discipline and service before self, required for military efficiency and unit cohesiveness, are among the most difficult principles for a liberal democracy to instill in new recruits and likely have contributed to less youth willing to join the military.

This review of the issues surrounding military service and manpower policies demonstrates the need of the military to recruit, train, and retain a sufficient quantity and quality of young people to meet the national security objectives of the United States. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1996 and the current national security strategy emphasize the principles of globalization and engagement, indicating that the United States expects to remain an active leader in the international arena in the next century. Further, these strategies highlight the necessity of a strong military

⁵² Robert Jay Lifton, Home From the War, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973): 28.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 28.

capable of fighting and winning two major theater wars. As previously noted, the key component to the successful fulfillment of these strategies remains the quality of people attracted to military service.

Since the end of the military draft in 1973, military manpower studies have focused on the viability of the All-Volunteer Force in terms of the quality and quantity of young Americans attracted to military service. Additionally, the implications of these policies in terms of military effectiveness and representation of general civil society attitudes as well as their potential impact on the American democratic system have been explored. It is now appropriate to focus once again on the likelihood of American youth to enlist in the military and explain the theoretical framework used for this dissertation.

Theoretical Framework

As noted in the Youth In Transition project, the available measures to explore youth choice behavior do not easily fit into a single unifying theoretical framework.⁵⁴ In this same vein, my dissertation will combine several theoretical frameworks to explain youth motivations for joining the military. The military has a broad spectrum of appeal for American youth, although one can argue that this broad spectrum of appeal has

⁵⁴ Johnston and Bachman, 2.

narrowed over the past several years. In examining youth propensity to enlist in the military, the primary indicator involves examining youth intentions.

Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) argue that intentions are valid indicators of likely behavior.⁵⁵ In order to understand and potentially predict choice behavior, it is necessary to identify the antecedents to youth propensity and the relative significance of these factors. This dissertation does not examine whether likely propensity equates to actual enlistments.⁵⁶ Rather, this research is interested in determining the antecedents of youth propensity and the importance of these factors influencing the likelihood of young people to enlist in the military.

Ajzen and Fishbein's theory views a "person's intention to perform a behavior as the immediate determinant of the action."⁵⁷ These authors argue this approach does not mean there will always be a perfect correspondence between intention and behavior, rather individuals will usually act in accordance with their intentions. According to their theory, intentions are a function of two basic determinants: one personal in nature and the other reflecting societal influence.⁵⁸ Further, these authors argue that their theory does not make specific reference to the individuals' attitudes toward specific

⁵⁵ Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior (Inglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1980): 5.

⁵⁶ The latest research examining the validity of youth propensity and actual enlistments found that approximately 70% of those youth who indicated they would definitely or probably join the military had done so within five to six years. See Jerald G. Bachman, David R. Segal, Peter Freedman-Doan, and Patrick M. O'Malley, "Does Enlistment Propensity Predict Assessment? High School Seniors' Plans and Subsequent Behavior," Armed Forces and Society (Fall 1998): 59-80.

⁵⁷ Ajzen and Fishbein, 5.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 6.

objects, people, or institutions; rather they assume that the attitude toward the behavior takes precedence. They reject demographic characteristics as predictors of behavior arguing that these characteristics are not central to their theory. Rather these aspects of an individual are external variables. "From our point of view, external variables may influence the beliefs a person holds or the relative importance he attaches to attitudinal and normative considerations. It follows that external factors may indeed influence behavior, but there is no necessary relation between any given external variable and behavior."⁵⁹

A combination of these approaches to attitudes may provide a more complete analysis, particularly when one examines youth proclivity to serve. In searching for explanations of youth proclivity to serve, one must examine demographic characteristics and attitudinal factors because of the unique nature of the behavior involved. The military has traditionally been a male dominated institution, that typically attracts middle to lower class individuals (specifically in the enlisted force), and a behavior that requires the subordination of certain basic American values such as personal freedom. Further, demographic variables can be treated as explanatory variables as well as provide "important controls for testing whether the observed relationships are due to the social origins of respondents."⁶⁰ These factors require an examination of these various

⁵⁹ Ibid., 9.

⁶⁰ Richard G. Niemi, How Family Members Perceive Each Other, (New Haven: Yale university Press, 1974): 17.

demographic characteristics in order to determine whether certain groups of individuals are more likely to enlist than other groups. Are the specific characteristics of military service more likely to appeal to certain groups of individuals than others? A robust examination of youth propensity to enlist in the military requires one to explore these variables.

Still, this theory provides a broad framework in which the antecedents to possible enlistment can be examined. These antecedents include the demographic characteristics of American youth, their attitudes toward war and foreign policy issues as well as societal influences. Societal influences can be measured by exploring the impact of various agents of influence such as the family and peers on likely youth propensity. This measurement of societal influence will be explained in greater detail. First, it is useful to further explain the broad theoretical frameworks melded together in this dissertation in order to understand youth propensity.

As previously noted, research exploring youth proclivity to join the military suggests that self-selection is the key component in the decision making process in determining whether youth are attracted to military service. Self-selection can be defined as "the tendency for certain types of persons to enter military service while others avoid it."⁶¹ This definition suggests that the military has a natural pull for some individuals, while others reject military service. The military does provide unique

⁶¹ Bachman, Sigelman, and Diamond, 279.

opportunities and experiences that some individuals may not find available to them through any other means, including high-tech training, leadership, physical challenges, and travel. This self-selection process suggests that individual perceptions and values are critical to likely youth propensity. This research will explore the unique aspects of military service and their appeal to American youth.

Further, in examining youth attitudes toward military service, one would expect the traditional value of patriotism to resonate with those individuals attracted to military service. Americans have typically responded positively to the value of patriotism and often equate military service with patriotism. The most thorough examination of recent research on patriotism was done in 1992 by Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz.⁶² These authors investigated the various meanings of patriotism and discovered that "patriotism appears still to be a protean concept, one that continues to shape the fabric of our political practices and to inform our debates about the nature of loyalty to country, the meaning of citizenship, and the appropriate character of our political membership in the modern nation-state."⁶³

While patriotism likely conjures different images for every individual, "our most vivid associations link war and patriotism. Patriotic emotions rise to their highest levels during wars, and national holidays are often occasions for expressing patriotic

⁶² John L. Sullivan, Amy Fried, and Mary G. Dietz, "Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988," American Journal of Political Science (Vol. 36, No. 1, February 1992): 200-234.

⁶³ Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz, 231-232.

sentiments about past wars.”⁶⁴ This is not to suggest that patriotism is only associated with war and military service. Rather, military service likely reflects patriotism as one way in which citizens can demonstrate their belief in the values and ideals of their political system as well as their willingness to sacrifice their life in defense of that system.

While it is likely that American youth are attracted to military service as an expression of their patriotism, the surveys used to analyze likely youth propensity do not provide a direct measure of youth patriotism. Still, these surveys do explore what is most important to American youth and the researcher can investigate individual perceptions and values as well as the impact of these perceptions on likely propensity. Further, the surveys used in this dissertation allow the researcher to investigate the various societal influences on youth propensity.

Political socialization studies have examined the significance of social influences, known as agents of influence. While there is little agreement on the nature and components of political socialization, several scholars have provided guidance in defining the parameters of this political science subfield. For example, Easton and Dennis (1969) defined political socialization as “those developmental processes through which persons acquire political orientations and patterns of behavior.”⁶⁵ A

⁶⁴ Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism, Morality, and War (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1993): 133.

⁶⁵ David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System Origins of Political Legitimacy, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969): 7.

broader definition of political socialization, one that combines socialization and social learning is provided by Hess and Torney (1967) in which socialization is defined as "the process whereby a junior or new member of a group or institution is taught its values, attitudes, and other behavior."⁶⁶

One final definition of political socialization demonstrates the lack of agreement concerning the dimensions embodied within political socialization. Greenstein provides the broadest definition of political socialization, arguing that "political socialization is the deliberate inculcation of political information, values and practices by instructional agents who have been formally charged with this responsibility. A broader conception would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicit political learning but also nominal nonpolitical learning that affects politically relevant social attitudes and the acquisition of politically relevant personality characteristics."⁶⁷ The most current literature to address the parameters of this political science subfield argues that "political learning is a global concept that encompasses political socialization."⁶⁸

While there is little agreement on the parameters of political socialization research, political socialization gained prominence within the political science discipline

⁶⁶ Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967): 6.

⁶⁷ Fred Greenstein, (1968, 551) quoted in Barrie Stacey, Political Socialization in Western Society, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978): 3.

⁶⁸ Pamela Johnston Conover, "Political Socialization: Where's the Politics?" in Political Science: Looking to the Future, Volume Three Political Behavior, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991): 131.

when Herbert Hyman published his seminal work on political socialization.⁶⁹ Herbert Hyman provided the foundation for the field of political socialization by arguing that while political behavior was extremely complex, it was also an outgrowth of socialization. Hyman explored studies of children's responses to various aspects of political participation. He specifically examined the agents of socialization, discovering that the foremost agent of socialization into politics is the family, although the influence of parents wanes over time.⁷⁰

The primacy of the family as the main socializing agent of children has been investigated by various scholars⁷¹ with some success. Langton's research (1969) supported Hyman's conclusions and found that as the influence of the family wanes, it is replaced by peers.⁷² Hess and Torney (1967) challenged these conclusions concerning the primacy of the family, arguing that the "effectiveness of the family in transmitting attitudes has been overestimated in previous research."⁷³ These authors suggested that "the school apparently plays the largest part in teaching attitudes, conceptions, and beliefs about the operation of the political system."⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

⁷⁰ Ibid., 105.

⁷¹ A complete listing of research in this area can be found in Jack Dennis, ed. Socialization to Politics: A Reader, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973): 321-322.

⁷² Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

⁷³ Hess and Torney, 217.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 217.

Political socialization scholars have continued to explore the various agents of socialization with little agreement on which agents are most influential in terms of transmitting political ideas, values, and attitudes. As Dennis (1973) noted, "The family, educational system, peers, mass media of communication and important political events all have socializing effects."⁷⁵ Agents of influence are the primary sources of political attitudes, although these are not the exclusive sources of political attitudes. Social, economic, and political issues as well as the environmental context surely affect political attitudes. What is most relevant for this research is an acknowledgment that various agents such as family and peers likely influence youth propensity to enlist. Due to the unique nature of potential enlistment into the military, particularly the inherent dangers surrounding military service, one may suggest that the family likely remains the primary agent of influence. Youth propensity to enlist is also likely influenced by peers, as previous research has demonstrated the waning of parental influence as children mature. What is most important, from a theoretical perspective, is the contribution political socialization studies provide in understanding youth propensity to join the military.

This eclectic theoretical framework for understanding youth propensity to join the military combines several approaches in order to fully comprehend the various antecedents to likely youth propensity. As previously argued, youth intentions are a valid indicator of likely behavior and this research is primarily concerned with

⁷⁵ Dennis, 321.


unraveling the various antecedents to this choice behavior in order to understand why fewer youth are interested in military service. It is now useful to apply this theoretical framework to youth propensity and describe the research design of this dissertation.

Research Design

This dissertation is primarily interested in exploring youth proclivity to join the military. As previously argued, self-selection is the critical component in the decision-making process of individuals in determining whether to enlist in the military. This dissertation will explore a variety of motivations for individuals to join the military. The military services are required to attract young men and women to fill the ranks of the military. The critical components in this self-selection process are the attitudes and values of the individual as well as the agents of influence. Those individuals who place a higher premium on specific values such as duty and service to country are more likely to join the military. This is not to suggest that those individuals who do not join the military are less patriotic, rather, the tendency is for individuals for whom these values resonate are more likely to join the military. Further, consistent with the fundamental arguments of political socialization, when primary agents of influence such as family and friends are supportive of military enlistment, the individual is more likely to enlist. Also, youth with direct exposure to agents of influence with military experience are more likely to join the military.

Finally, there are linkages between specific individual attitudes and youth proclivity to join the military. Public opinion research has focused on the central concept of attitude and this dissertation will continue this vein of research. "Attitudes have three main components: a cognitive element that links the object to information, an affective element that links the object to an evaluation or emotional reaction, and a conative element that links the object to actual behavior."⁷⁶ This dissertation will demonstrate the linkages between specific attitudes of youth and their proclivity to join the military. Model one summarizes the research design of this dissertation.

Model 1



⁷⁶Barbara Norrande and Clyde Wilcox, eds., Understanding Public Opinion (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997): 3.

For this dissertation, I will employ surveys generated by the Department of Defense to track youth attitudes and these surveys are fully explained in Chapter two. The dependent variable in this analysis is propensity to enlist. Propensity to enlist is a reflection of self-selection. Self-selection is operationalized as the likelihood of enlisting in the military over the next several years. A variety of exogenous variables will be investigated in each chapter. Further, each chapter contains the relevant hypotheses for each aspect of youth propensity to enlist in the military. Finally, the time frame for this analysis of youth propensity is limited to the Post-Cold War era, from 1990 to 1996.

Chapter two establishes the dependent variable in this research, explains the reasoning for limiting the period of analysis, and explores the demographic characteristics of American youth in the data base. These demographic characteristics include race, gender, age, parents' level of education, and region of the country. These characteristics are also analyzed in terms of their impact on youth proclivity to serve in the military.

Chapter three examines the specific agents of influence such as family, peers, coaches, teachers, and employers. This chapter answers the question, "With whom did you discuss military service?" Further, this chapter analyzes whether these discussants were supportive of military service. Also, this chapter explores whether these agents of influence had military experience and the impact of that experience on youth propensity

to join. Finally, this chapter discovers the primary sources of opinions about the military and the impact of these sources on youth proclivity to enlist in the military.

Chapter Four allows these young people to speak for themselves.⁷⁷ This chapter examines the various reasons given by youth as to why they would enlist as well as why they are not interested in military service. Also, this chapter explores the various aspects of military service that appeal to young people such as leadership, physical challenges, money for education, and duty to country. Finally, this chapter discovers how much consideration these youth gave to enlisting in the military.

Chapter five explores youth attitudes toward various foreign policy issues including their perspectives on peacekeeping missions, humanitarian relief missions, and traditional military operations. This chapter also examines youth attitudes toward the use of military force and the impact of these various attitudes on their likely propensity to join the military. Chapter six concludes this dissertation with a review of the relevant findings of this research as well as the implications of declining youth propensity to join the military.

The contribution of this dissertation to the political science discipline is one in which youth attitudes toward military service are explored as well as the implications and consequences for the United States and its military institution. This dissertation seeks to combine the literature on political socialization, political attitudes, and military

⁷⁷ The framework for this chapter is modeled after Chapter nine in the Youth In Transition, Vol. Five, Young Men and Military Service book. See Johnston and Bachman, 139-148.

manpower policies. The current literature on youth attitudes toward military service is over a decade old and much has changed in the political, social, and cultural environment to warrant a re-examination of youth attitudes. Further, there is little research explaining the interaction between the values of American youth and their views on issues of equality, duty, and personal freedom. Finally, this dissertation fills a gap in the literature by exploring the implications of declining youth propensity in terms of military effectiveness and national security.

Propensity to Join

Chapter Two

Since 1975, the Department of Defense, through their annual Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), has tracked the likelihood of American youth to join the military. This chapter will conceptualize youth propensity to serve, and explore the various demographic characteristics of the respondents of this survey in terms of their race, gender, age, region of the country and parents' education in order to determine which groups of individuals are most attracted to military service.

Data and Methods

The Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) has provided information to the Department of Defense and the individual military services regarding the enlistment propensity of American youth. YATS has undergone several revisions since 1975¹ and has been expanded to include information covering the role advertising and influencers exhibit in the enlistment decision process, attitudinal questions concerning war and

¹ From the Fall 1975 through Spring 1980, YATS was conducted as semi-annual surveys of approximately 5,200 young males aged sixteen to twenty-one. Beginning with the Fall 1980 administration, YATS became an annual survey, and females and older males were added to the sampling frame. Significant methodological changes occurred in 1983 (a new contractor; the use of computer assisted telephone interview methods were introduced); 1990 (sample frame was expanded to include residents of Alaska and Hawaii as well as individuals who had completed, or were enrolled in their third or fourth year of college); and in 1991 (a panel sample was introduced). The panel sample was dropped in 1994 and since 1995 the sample selection has changed to a list-assisted random digit dialing procedure.

current events, as well as questions aimed at measuring their perceptions of what is most important to them. The questionnaire is currently divided into sixteen content sections including educational status, employment status, current events, influences and background characteristics.

The target population for YATS consists of sixteen to twenty-four year old youth residing in the United States in households or non-institutionalized group homes. Youth in the military, youth with prior military service, and youth currently accepted for service in the military are excluded from this survey. Since its inception, YATS has used random digit dialing techniques to locate respondents for administration of this telephone survey. Screening and interviewing for the YATS survey occurs in the fall of every year and the results are usually available in late winter. Generally, the Department of Defense is interested in interviewing around 10,000 American youth every year with a minimum response rate of 65%. These interviews are approximately thirty minutes long. Following completion of data collection, range, skip, and logic checks are performed on the survey file to assure data accuracy.

YATS has evolved into a complex survey of American youth. While the basic questions concerning youth propensity to serve have remained unchanged, different forms of this survey have been administered to various subsamples of respondents each year. In addition, slightly different forms of the questionnaire have been employed over the years. This poses some problems for my analysis. Some of the variables that are

significant for this study were asked of different subsets of interviewees in the same year, making multivariate analysis difficult and impossible in some instances. In some of my analyses, the number of cases may be quite large, while in other instances, the number of cases will be reduced. Further, differences in question wording and questions asked across years hinders longitudinal analyses. Each of these problems will be explained in detail as they arise.

This research is designed to measure the propensity of American youth to enlist in the military. The dependent variable in this analysis is propensity to enlist, a reflection of an individual's likelihood of joining the military. In future chapters, a variety of exogenous variables will be operationalized. Demographic characteristics, attitudes toward war, attitudes toward the military, and the exposure of military experience will all be examined as foundational considerations in youth proclivity toward military service. This chapter will specifically examine various group characteristics to determine if specific groups are more likely to enlist than others in the military using a variety of statistical techniques including contingency tables, measures of association and multivariate regression models.

Youth attitudes toward the military and young people's propensity to join are complex, multidimensional phenomenon likely involving intricate decision making processes based on individual desires and circumstances as well as the recruiting requirements of the United States military. While the choice of military service is

individualized, there are specific circumstances and tendencies that make military service a more viable option for some individuals. An exploration of various background characteristics is aimed at disentangling some of these conditioning factors. Conditioning factors such as race, gender, age, region, and parents' education likely predispose some individuals toward enlistment. These characteristics, however, do not necessarily lead to military service, nor may they be thought of as immediate causes of enlistments.² A review of previous studies concerning youth propensity to join the military is necessary in order to explore the various hypotheses and expectations investigated in this chapter.

Previous Research

Previous research, as noted in chapter one, suggests several expectations in terms of youth propensity to join the military when examining the various conditional factors of American youth.³ First, in terms of race, several researchers discovered that minorities have a higher proclivity to enlist in the military than whites.⁴ For example,

² Jerome Johnston and Jerald G. Bachman, Youth in Transition, Vol. V, Young Men and Military Service, (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1972): 152.

³ Previous studies of youth propensity are over a decade old and much has changed in the international security environment including the end of the Cold War, the democratization efforts in Central and Eastern Europe, and the increase of humanitarian missions around the world.

⁴ For example, see James Hosek and Christine E. Peterson, Enlistment Decisions of Young Men (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, July 1985); John D. Blair, "Emerging Youth Attitudes and the Military" in The Changing World of the American Military, ed. Franklin D. Margiotta (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979); and David R. Segal and Naomi Verdugo, "Demographic Trends and Personnel Policies as Determinants of the Racial Composition of the Volunteer Army," Armed Forces and Society Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer 1994): 619-632.

Blair found that the "likelihood of serving in the military is highly linked to the racial and socioeconomic backgrounds of the respondents. Blacks anticipate military service in proportions considerably greater than one would expect based on their socioeconomic status alone."⁵ Further, in 1992, Bartling and Eisenman discovered that when youth were asked, "how likely is it that you will be serving in the military?" 31.3% of the Black respondents and 45.4% of Hispanics responded either *probably* or *definitely* as compared with only 15.1% of the white group and 7.7% of the Asian-Americans."⁶ While these studies suggest that there are differences in propensity rates among minorities, one can hypothesize that minorities generally are more likely to be found in the more positive categories of propensity than whites.

Turning to gender, military service traditionally has been the domain of men and likely resonates more with men than women. As expected, researchers found that males were more likely to respond positively to military service than females. For example, Bartling and Eisenman discovered that "higher proportions of males gave positive responses than did females (e.g. 18.7% of males responded *definitely* as compared with only 6.6% of females)."⁷ While the U. S. military has eliminated many of the historical barriers to women serving in the military, particularly the quota system limiting the

⁵ John D. Blair, "Emerging Youth Attitudes and the Military" in The Changing World of the American Military, ed. Franklin D. Margiotta (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979):174.

⁶ Carl A. Bartling and Russell Eisenman, "Attitudes Of American Youth Concerning Military and Civilian Jobs," Adolescence, Vol. 27, No. 106 (Summer 1992): 409. Italics found in original.

⁷ Bartling and Eisenman, 409. Italics found in original.

number of women permitted to serve in the armed forces, I still expect military service to resonate more positively with men than women.

Turning to the age of the respondents, few researchers have examined the impact of age on their propensity decision, partly due to the complexity of factors involved in the decision making process of youth. Still, Orvis, Gahart, and Schutz discovered that younger respondents were more likely to enlist than older respondents. They argued that this finding is consistent with their previous studies and "probably reflects the fact that older applicants implicitly have made decisions not to enlist for longer periods of time and for that reason are less likely to reverse those decisions."⁸ This research suggests that younger respondents are more likely to respond positively to military service than older respondents.

Turning to regional variations, several researchers have explored whether the location of a respondent has a more positive effect on their propensity than others living in different regions of the country. For example, Johnston and Bachman investigated the popular myth that serving in the military is more popular among Southerners. "This expectation seems to be based on the assumption that serving in the military is a proud tradition in the culture of the Southern states."⁹ Still, these researchers found no tendency for Southerners to enlist more frequently than others in the late 1960s. In a

⁸ Bruce R. Orvis, Martin T. Gahart, with Karl F. Schutz, Enlistment Among Applicants for Military Service (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1990): 25.

⁹ Johnston and Bachman, 103-104.

more recent and limited study of geographic variations, Brown discovered regional differences among enlistees in which "*the Midwest replaced the South as the dominant per capita supplier of recruits to the volunteer Army.*"¹⁰ These studies suggest that there may be regional differences between respondents. I suggest that these regional differences may be a reflection of where the military primarily is located in the United States and I expect to find higher positive propensity rates for respondents living in regions of the country with large concentrations of military installations such as the South and Midwest.

Finally, turning to the primary area of investigation in terms of the conditional factors of potential enlistees, socioeconomic status has been widely studied by a variety of researchers. Johnston and Bachman, in the late 1960s, hypothesized that the military offered the opportunity for individuals to escape their current environment and/or provided these individuals with opportunities unavailable to them through other means such as college or work experience.¹¹ This escape and opportunity theme was examined to determine whether some individuals were more strongly attracted to military service because of their social conditions and the authors found little support for the escape theme. Still, they did find that one of most important predictors of enlistment was the socioeconomic level (SEL) of the family, suggesting that this socioeconomic level

¹⁰ Charles Brown, "Military Enlistments: What Can We Learn From Geographic Variation? The American Economic Review (March 1985): 233. Italics found in original.

¹¹ Johnston and Bachman, 101-102.

“apparently affects the hierarchy of an individual’s preferences for post-high school activities: higher SEL youth choose college over any other alternative.”¹² Several of the Rand studies also found the socioeconomic status of the parents to be a significant predictor of youth propensity. For example, Orvis, Gahart and Schutz discovered that “high aptitude high school seniors from lower income families were more likely to enlist than their counterparts from families with higher average incomes.”¹³ Further, several researchers used the parents’ education level as a measure of socioeconomic status and discovered that those individuals with more educated parents were less likely to choose military service.¹⁴ These findings suggest that youth from lower socioeconomic levels are more likely attracted to military service, probably due to the opportunities the military offers these individuals in terms of educational benefits, training, and work skills. As the YATS database does not contain information concerning the income level of the respondents’ parents, the parents’ education level will be used as a surrogate measure of socioeconomic status.

To summarize, previous research studies suggest the following hypotheses:

- H₁: Higher positive propensity tendencies for minorities than whites;
- H₂: Higher positive propensity tendencies for men than women;
- H₃: Higher positive propensity tendencies for younger respondents;
- H₄: Higher positive propensity tendencies for respondents from the South and Midwest;
- H₅: Higher positive propensity tendencies for youth with less-educated parents.

¹² Johnston and Bachman, 128.

¹³ Orvis, Gahart, and Schutz, 17.

¹⁴ For example, see Sue Berryman, Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Underclass Army (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988): 6-7, and the two primary Rand studies by Orvis, Gahart and Schutz as well as Hosek and Peterson.

Data Analysis

Propensity to enlist is measured throughout this dissertation with a single question: How likely is it that you will be serving in the military in the next few years?¹⁵ The available responses include "definitely," "probably," "probably not," and "definitely not." In the original data base these responses were coded one for "definitely," two for "probably," three for "probably not," four for "definitely not," ninety-eight for "don't know," and ninety-nine for "refused" to answer. For ease of interpretation, I recoded these responses to reflect a negative to positive categorical scale with one assigned to "definitely not," two assigned to "probably not," three assigned to "probably," and four assigned to "definitely." All individuals who responded "don't know" or "refused to answer" were removed from my analysis as the purpose of this research is to analyze their likelihood of joining the military. As these individuals accounted for less than 1.2 percent of the data base, their removal will not have a significant impact on the results of my analysis.


¹⁵ Several composite measures of propensity to enlist were attempted, however these conceptualizations tended to obscure the intentions of the respondents and grouped together individuals who may not have shared the same intensity and conclusion in terms of their propensity. For example, one question asked the individuals how much thought they had given to military service with the following three responses available: never thought, some consideration, or serious consideration. An additive scale would group those individuals in the definitely not/serious consideration with individuals who responded probably not/some consideration. Instead of creating an additive scale, I decided to use only the basic question for the dependent variable. Several multivariate analyses were conducted to determine if there were significant differences between the two measures and minuscule differences were found.

Chart 2-1 provides a graphic representation of youth propensity. While my primary focus throughout this dissertation is the Post-Cold War era, it is interesting to note the historical trend of youth propensity. As Chart 2-1 demonstrates, youth propensity to enlist has declined over time. For example, there has been more than a fifty percent drop in the "likely" category since 1976 (21.6% in 1976 compared to 9.0% in 1997) and more than a fifty percent drop in the "definitely" category in the same period (3.0% in 1976 compared to 1.2% in 1997). Additionally, there has been a significant increase in the number of youth within the "definitely not" category since 1976 (41.1% in 1976 compared to 63.5% in 1997).

Some of these propensity changes are likely the result of the changes in the survey. For example, in 1980, women were added to the survey and there is a marked increase in the "definitely not" category (41.6% in 1979 compared to 52.5% in 1980). Further, there was a corresponding drop in the "likely" category (19.7% in 1979 compared to 16.1% in 1980) and the "definitely" category (3.0% in 1979 compared to 2.7% in 1980). Additionally, the volatile changes noted in 1990 may reflect a heightened awareness of the dangers of military service as this was the beginning of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm military operations against Iraq. It is interesting to note that US military success in Desert Storm did not translate into a higher percentage of youth within the more positive categories of "probably" or "definitely," potentially due

to the distance of the conflict from the United States and the limited time frame of this military operation which lasted approximately six weeks in terms of military combat.

Chart 2-1



With this historical examination of youth propensity to join the military in mind, it is time to examine the youth of the 1990s. My specific analysis will be limited to the Post-Cold War era. The 1990s represents an interesting paradox for the U.S. military. At the end of the Cold War, much of the immediate public discourse in the U.S. focused on the “peace dividend” and the downsizing of the U.S. military. These debates also

explored limited future roles for the U.S. armed forces in light of the demise of the former Soviet Union. Yet, as one examines the 1990s in terms of the employment of the U.S. military around the world, one finds an increase in the number of worldwide missions in which the military became involved. For example, the U.S. armed forces engaged in one of the largest coalition operations in recent history against the Iraqi military, as well as deployments to Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In fact, the increase in U.S. military missions around the world in the past decade is currently stressing the armed forces. "After a decade of cuts that have shrunk the armed forces by 36 percent, the nation's military leaders say the reductions may have gone too far, and they are starting to push for a troop increase. Pentagon officials warn that a three-or four-fold increase in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations since the end of the Cold War is straining the current level of 1.37 million active-duty service members."¹⁶

The 1990s, therefore, can be characterized as a decade of relative peace and prosperity for the United States, while the U.S. military has been constantly and consistently deployed in support of various missions around the world. Against this backdrop, one may wonder if American youth are attracted to military service. If so, why? What are the factors that influence youth propensity to join the military? Further, which groups of American youth are attracted to military service? Are there specific

¹⁶ Bradley Graham, "Military Services Considering Request for Additional Troops," Washington Post, July 18, 1999, A4-A5.

demographic characteristics that distinguish individuals in terms of their likelihood of joining the military? If so, what are the relevant characteristics of potential joiners?

Propensity to enlist is defined as the likelihood of an individual joining the military within the next few years. For this chapter, in order to examine the largest number of cases and provide a broad examination of the conditional factors impacting youth propensity as well as to reduce the potential yearly effects of specific events, I pooled the data into a single file.¹⁷ Further, for ease of comparison, I created four categories describing the likelihood of their propensity: Joiners, Likely, Unlikely, and Disinterested. Joiners is defined as those individuals whom responded "definitely," the Likely category includes those individuals whom responded "probably," the Unlikely category includes those individuals whom responded "probably not," and the Disinterested category contains individuals whom responded "definitely not" to the basic propensity question. The frequency distribution for the dependent variable, Join1, is: Disinterested - 56.5%, Unlikely - 31.6%, Likely - 10% and Joiners - 1.9%.¹⁸

Having established the dependent variable in this analysis, the next step requires an analysis of the various hypotheses concerning the background characteristics of American youth. At this point, it was necessary to create dummy variables for race and region to facilitate the analysis employing measures of association and multivariate

¹⁷ The pooled data includes the following years: 1990 through 1996.

¹⁸ The breakdown of the number of cases in each category is: Disinterested - 29,774; Unlikely - 16,629; Likely - 5,261; and Joiners - 983 for a total number of valid cases of 52,647.

techniques.¹⁹ Further, two variables, Q713A and Q713B were used to capture parents' education level. Q713A represents the father's level of education and Q713B represents the mother's level of education in years of schooling completed, ranging from 7 to 21 years of schooling. Finally, the age of the respondents ranges from 16 years old to 24 years old and is captured by the variable CALCAGE.

The following contingency tables reveal the proportions in each category as well as demonstrate the strength and direction of the relationship between propensity to enlist and these various characteristics. The measures of association provide a numerical value that reflects the relationship between the variables in the tables. The most appropriate measures of association for these tables are gamma and Somer's d , as the dependent variable is ordinal and the independent variables (the conditional factors) are nominal, such as gender, race and region; as well as ordinal, such as level of parents' education and age. Gamma is a symmetric measure of association based on the logic of pair-by-pair comparison. Each case in the contingency table can theoretically be paired with every other case in the table. Gamma tends to overstate the actual relationship between the variables, therefore, Somer's d is included in this analysis. Somer's d is a more conservative measure that includes ties on the dependent variable to ensure the accurate reflection of the true strength of the association.²⁰

¹⁹ Appendix 1 lists the various regions and the states contained within each category.

²⁰ Kirk Elifson, Fundamental of Social Statistics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1990): Chapter Nine.

One word of caution in terms of the statistical chi-square significance levels: if a sample size is large enough, even tables whose association is small may be statistically significant. This is likely the case in the following contingency tables. The sample size for almost all of these tables is over 50,000 cases and all the variables are statistically significant. Still, care must be used in interpreting these results. While individual characteristics such as gender and age may be likely indicators of youth propensity to enlist, these are not the sole determinants of propensity, nor potentially the most important determinants. Future chapters will explore other explanations for propensity to enlist. Contingency tables of the dependent variable and the conditioning factors are found in the following tables.

First, Table 2-1 clearly demonstrates that military service resonates more with men. Men are twice as likely as women to be found in the combined Joiners and Likely propensity categories (14.9% of men compared to 6.3% of women). Further, almost three-fourths of all women are found in the Disinterested category compared to less than half of the men (71.2% of women versus 48.5% of men). This table succinctly shows that gender does matter in terms of likely youth propensity with the measures of associations indicating a modestly strong relationship. While the armed forces of the United States has expanded opportunities for women over the last twenty-five years, military service still appeals more to men than women.

Table 2-1
Gender of Respondents
(1990 - 1996)

	Males	Females
Disinterested	48.5%	71.2%
Unlikely	36.6%	22.5%
Likely	12.4%	5.6%
Joiners	<u>2.5%</u>	<u>.7%</u>
	100%	100%

n = 52,646

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .422

Somer's d = .238

Table 2-2 explores the relationship between race and youth propensity. This table demonstrates that military service is more attractive to minorities, with the strongest measures of association found among Hispanics and Other individuals. Military service likely provides unique opportunities such as job training, high-tech skills, and money for education for these individuals that may not be available through other means. Whites are less likely to join the military than all other racial categories with only 9.7% in the combined Likely and Joiners categories. Further, Whites have the largest number of respondents in the Disinterested category (58%). Hispanics, Blacks, and Other respondents have more individuals in the Joiners category, while Hispanics have the lowest percentage in the Disinterested category (46.0%). These findings suggest that military service may be more valued by minority communities in terms of

providing opportunities and conferring "legitimate careers on those from groups that hold marginal social and economic positions in the country."²¹

Table 2-2
Race of Respondents
(1990 - 1996)

	White	Black	Asian	Hispanic	Other
Disinterested	58.0%	55.7%	48.5%	46.0%	47.9%
Unlikely	32.3%	24.8%	35.3%	32.6%	32.2%
Likely	8.1%	16.3%	14.7%	18.2%	16.9%
Joiners	<u>1.6%</u>	<u>3.2%</u>	<u>1.5%</u>	<u>3.2%</u>	<u>3.0%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
χ^2 sign. =	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Gamma =	-.165	.079	.155	.241	.200
Somer's d =	-.098	.047	.093	.148	.122
n = 52, 647					

Table 2-3A and Table 2-3B strongly support the hypothesis that younger individuals are more likely to enlist than older individuals. There is a clear, declining pattern among the Joiners: as age increases, positive propensity declines and negative propensity increases. A clear drop in positive propensity occurs between the ages of eighteen and nineteen years old, likely when most youth are choosing between military service and college. Berryman argues that military service represents a legitimate activity for individuals not interested in immediately attending college or seeking civilian

²¹ Sue E. Berryman, Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Underclass Army, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988): 2.

work, a "socially acceptable and productive niche for those who are not yet prepared to make the work/college choice."²² Minorities may not have the same level of access to resources, financial and social, available to Whites, thus increasing the appeal of military service for these individuals.

Table 2-3A
Age of Respondents (in years)
(1990 - 1996)

	16	17	18	19	20
Disinterested	39.6%	44.1%	52.4%	58.1%	62.3%
Unlikely	38.5%	36.4%	33.4%	32.0%	29.5%
Likely	18.1%	16.2%	11.8%	8.4%	7.0%
Joiners	<u>3.8%</u>	<u>3.3%</u>	<u>2.4%</u>	<u>1.5%</u>	<u>1.2%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 52,647

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = -.269

Somer's d = -.153

Table 2-3B
Age of Respondents (in years)
(1990 - 1996)

	21	22	23	24
Disinterested	64.8%	65.5%	68.2%	70.7%
Unlikely	28.2%	28.1%	26.6%	24.4%
Likely	6.2%	5.6%	4.5%	4.3%
Joiners	<u>.8%</u>	<u>.7%</u>	<u>.7%</u>	<u>.6%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 52,647

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = -.269

Somer's d = -.153

²² Berryman, 3.

Table 2-4 shows few differences between the respondents' likelihood of serving and their region of the country. The South has a slightly larger percentage of individuals in the Likely and Joiners category, followed closely by the West. Interestingly, the lowest percentage in the combined Likely and Joiners group (9.7%) is found in the Midwest, in contrast to Brown's earlier study in which he found the Midwest to be the largest supplier of enlisted personnel to the military. Region of the country does not appear to have much impact on the likelihood of youth to enlist in the military.

Table 2-4
Region of Respondents
(1990 - 1996)

	Northeast	South	Midwest	West
Disinterested	57.7%	55.0%	58.5%	55.7%
Unlikely	32.0%	31.2%	31.8%	31.6%
Likely	8.7%	11.6%	8.2%	10.7%
Joiners	<u>1.6%</u>	<u>2.2%</u>	<u>1.6%</u>	<u>1.9%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%
n =	10,107	18,424	13,717	10,129
χ^2 sign. =	.000	.000	.000	.030
Gamma =	-.036	.059	-.064	.024
Somer's d =	-.020	.034	-.036	.013

Turning to the final independent variables investigated, Table 2-5 and 2-6 demonstrate a slightly negative relationship between parents' education level and youth propensity. For example, respondents whose father possesses less than a high school

diploma are three times more likely to be Joiners than individuals whose father possesses at least a college degree. Further, those individuals whose fathers are highly educated are the least likely to be Joiners (.8%) and the most likely to be in the Disinterested category (61.3%). The same patterns hold true for mothers' level of education. Further, as the education level of either parent increases, there is a corresponding decrease in the likelihood of these individuals enlisting in the military. This finding may be the result of the parents' experiences during the Vietnam era in which the majority of the protests against the war were taking place at universities around the country. Interestingly, the education level of the parents seems to have little impact on the Unlikely category as there are few differences among the various levels of education.

Table 2-5
Father's Level of Education
(years of schooling)
(1990 - 1996)

	<12	12	13 - 15	16	>16
Disinterested	53.5%	56.3%	57.8%	59.3%	61.3%
Unlikely	30.8%	31.2%	32.0%	32.1%	31.9%
Likely	13.0%	10.4%	8.4%	7.2%	6.0%
Joiners	<u>2.7%</u>	<u>2.1%</u>	<u>1.8%</u>	<u>1.4%</u>	<u>.8%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 44,908

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = -.078

Somer's d = -.044

Table 2-6
 Mother's Level of Education
 (years of schooling)
 (1990 - 1996)

	<12	12	13 - 15	16	>16
Disinterested	50.8%	56.5%	59.2%	58.8%	62.2%
Unlikely	30.7%	31.7%	31.3%	32.3%	30.8%
Likely	15.6%	9.8%	8.0%	7.7%	5.9%
Joiners	<u>2.9%</u>	<u>2.0%</u>	<u>1.5%</u>	<u>1.2%</u>	<u>1.1%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 47,777

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = -.090

Somer's d = -.050

To summarize, the measures of association between youth propensity and the preceding independent variables revealed the strongest relationships in terms of gender and age. The armed forces, traditionally an all-male domain, still attract an overwhelming number of men compared to women. Further, as young people mature, they are less likely to enlist in the military. While all of the statistics for race are significant, racial identification appears to be more important for minorities, especially Hispanics and Others. For Whites, there exists a slightly negative relationship with propensity to enlist. A slightly negative relationship also exists between parents' education level and propensity to enlist. Finally, the region in which individuals are living appears to have little impact on likely youth propensity.

While the preceding tables suggest that these independent variables provide minimal explanatory power in understanding potential youth propensity, the question remains whether any of these conditional factors can assist in predicting youth enlistment? A regression model was run to determine the predictability of youth to enlist based on the various characteristics already explored. This model provides the foundation for the future regression models employed throughout this research. Table 2-7 shows the results of this regression model in which propensity to enlist is the dependent variable and the various conditional factors are the independent variables. Later chapters will explore other explanations for propensity to enlist.

The multivariate analysis shows that the largest standardized coefficient for the conditional factors is associated with gender, as men are more likely to enlist than women. Further, the second largest standardized coefficient is negative and associated with age: as respondents become older, they are less likely to enlist. In addition, whites are slightly less inclined to volunteer than minorities, as the coefficient for whites is negative. For the regional variables, Southerners are slightly more likely to enlist than any other region of the country. Finally, as expected, there is a slight, negative relationship between propensity to enlist and parents' level of education. While these results were expected, the coefficient of determination (Adjusted $r^2 = .116$) is quite low indicating that demographic characteristics provide minimal explanation for the variation in youth proclivity to enlist in the military.

Table 2-7

OLS Regression Analysis of Propensity to Enlist
(1990 - 1996)

	Beta	Sign. t
Asian	.021	.000
Black	.025	.001
Hispanic	.055	.000
White	-.038	.000
Gender	.211	.000
Age	-.231	.000
Northeast	.005	.309
South	.032	.000
West	.014	.011
Father's Education	-.035	.000
Mother's Education	-.051	.000

n= 43,188

Adjusted R² = .116

Summary

In this chapter, various conditional factors were examined that may lead some individuals to be more likely to join the military than others. The most significant finding, as expected, is that the likelihood of joining the military is stronger among men than women. Several weak associations between propensity and race were found, although there are clearly differences between whites and minorities in terms of their likelihood of joining the military. Also, a slightly negative relationship between propensity and parents' level of education was revealed. Berryman has suggested that

enlisted positions in the military are equivalent to blue-collar jobs in the civilian work force and are more likely to attract minorities and less educated individuals²³ and these findings support her conclusions.

Further, the age of the individual is a modest negative predictor of likely enlistment, suggesting that individuals consider military service and future education plans as mutually exclusive categories. Region has little impact on youth propensity, although the Northeast and Midwest regions have slightly negative associations with youth propensity. While these conditional factors are a likely beginning point in exploring youth propensity to enlist and do provide some generalizations about whom is attracted to military service, these characteristics are not the sole determinants of propensity. I believe that perceptions, attitudes, and socialization likely provide additional explanatory factors of the individuals most attracted to military service. These key concepts will be explored in the following chapters.

²³ Berryman, 46.

Social Influences and Influencers

Chapter Three

Chapter two examined the likelihood that underlying preconditions influence American youths' enlistment propensity. In this chapter, the impact of social influences, also known as agents of influence, on youth propensity to join the military are explored. First, it is necessary to establish who are the agents of influence in determining youth propensity to enlist. Political socialization research suggests the family and peers are likely agencies of influence. Did the respondents discuss the possibility of military service with anyone besides a military recruiter? If so, whom? What impact did these discussions have on propensity? Does military experience among the agents of influence affect youth propensity? Further, where do youth attain their views of the military? How influential are these sources in determining their propensity level? Are there strong correlations between these various influencers and youth propensity to join? If so, which are the most important?

Theoretical Considerations

As noted in chapter one, Azjen and Fishbein argue that human behavior is driven by intentions. Determining the antecedents to intentions helps explain and possibly,

predicts human behavior. These authors suggest two broad categories of determinants to intentions: one reflects social influences while the other reflects personal values.¹

This chapter will examine the social influences on youth intentions to join the military and the next chapter will begin to explore the more individualistic approach, specifically attitudes and values.

Also noted in chapter one, political socialization gained prominence within the political science discipline in the late 1950s. Herbert Hyman argued that studies of children's responses to various aspects of political participation did not directly demonstrate political socialization, but rather inferred that "the totality of experiences in that childhood status left its mark and is responsible in part for the adult patterns."² Hyman's research inspired many scholars to investigate a variety of aspects and issues surrounding socialization with little agreement over the next several decades. Political socialization studies became less prominent in the 1980s and research investigating youth attitudes became equally scarce during this same time frame.

Hyman's analysis of socialization cataloged the processes underlying the establishment of socialization patterns. He specifically examined the agents of socialization, discovering that the foremost agent of socialization into politics is the family. He also found that parental influence wanes as peers and other agencies exert

¹ Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Behavior (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980): 6.

² Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959): 29.

their influence on the maturing individual.³ Various other scholars expanded this foundation to include secondary influencers such as schools, social groups, institutions, and mass media.⁴

For example, the influence of the mass media on public attitudes has been researched from a variety of perspectives including the effect on elections, campaigns, and governance.⁵ Still, there is little scholarly consensus on the effects of mass media. Some scholars have suggested the media acts as a primer for public opinion focusing public perceptions on specific problems, while others have focused on the ability of the public to process news.⁶ There appears to be little scholarly research linking mass communication and political socialization, although we are beginning to see more research in this area. For example, one scholar noted that "the most important consequences of political socialization via mass communication may consist of

³Ibid., 105.

⁴ As noted in chapter one, the best catalog of political socialization research investigating the various agencies can be found in Jack Dennis, ed. Socialization to Politics: A Reader (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973): Part Eight - Agencies of Political Socialization., 321-409.

⁵ For example, see Thomas E. Patterson, Out of Order (New York: Vantage Books, Inc., 1993); Matthew Robert Kerbel, Remote and Controlled Media Politics in a Cynical Age (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Larry J. Sabato, Feeding Frenzy How Attack Journalism Has Transformed American Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1991); and James Fallows, Breaking the News How the Media Undermine American Democracy (New York: Vintage Books, Inc., 1996).

⁶ For example, see John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Doris Graber, Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide (New York: Longman, 1984).

perceptual cognitions about the political world, rather than the traditional indicators of knowledge, namely, participation, directional attitudes, or partisan allegiances.”⁷

Additionally, while scarce attention was paid by political socialization scholars to the process by which political attitudes may be transmitted from parents to children, Chaffee, McLeod, and Wackman (1973) investigated family communication patterns arguing that “what the parent knows may be less important than how he transmits it to his child. For that reason, it is important to look more closely at the process of socialization and at such factors as the patterns of parent-child communication.”⁸ These authors discovered “there is considerable evidence that parental constraints on the child’s interpersonal communication in the home influence the process of political socialization.”⁹ This research is particularly relevant to this dissertation as one of the factors analyzed is discussions about military service with agencies of socialization. This discussion component of youth propensity to join will be elaborated in the data methods section of this chapter.

In total, these researchers suggest that these agents of influence are the primary but not exclusive sources of political attitudes. Social, economic, and political issues, as well as the environmental context also affect political attitudes. Still, during the 1960s,

⁷ Steven H Chaffee and Seung-Mock Yang, “Communication and Political Socialization,” in Orit Schilov, ed., Political Socialization, Citizenship Education, and Democracy (New York: Teachers College Press, 1990): p. 143.

⁸ Steven H. Chaffee, Jack M. McLeod, and Daniel B. Wackman, “Family Communication Patterns and Adolescent Political Participation,” in Jack Dennis, ed. Socialization to Politics: A Reader (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973): 349.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 364.

researchers expected that familial values directly affected youth attitudes. One scholar noted that, "we would be exceedingly surprised were we to discover, in research on any factor whatsoever, that a knowledge of the parents' position or score on a factor did not predict positively to the score of the adolescent."¹⁰ Researchers, however, have not been very successful in determining the exact nature or significance of these social relationships in the transmission of American political attitudes, ideas and culture from one generation to another. For example, Jennings and Niemi discovered that moderate to strong correlations between parents and their children were the exception rather than the rule and that parental influence wanes over time as peers become more influential.¹¹

Data Methods

Despite limited success in determining the exact nature and role of agents of influence, parents and peers likely influence youth propensity to enlist in the military. For example, research in the political communications field has found that "parents' views tend to be more important when young people are making decisions about educational, financial, and vocational choices."¹² The decision to enlist in the military squarely fits into the category of a vocational choice and it is likely that parents are

¹⁰ Ernest Campbell, "Adolescent Socialization," in Handbook of Socialization, ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969): 827.

¹¹ M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981): 76.

¹² Patricia Noller and Mary Anne Fitzpatrick, Communication In Family Relationships (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1993): 145.

among the key agents of influence. Further, research investigating decision making in the family argues that "decisions may vary along a number of different dimensions including complexity, novelty or repetitiveness, degree of associated risk, seriousness of the consequences, and the extent to which the decision is revocable."¹³ The decision to enlist in the military is likely a complex process that involves gathering information about the requirements, obligations, and benefits of military service. Further, this collecting information phase is likely supplemented with discussions. Young people probably discuss the possibility of enlisting in the military with individuals whose opinion they respect, trust, and admire such as family, peers, and school counselors.

For these reasons, an examination of whether youth discussed military service with someone other than a military recruiter is necessary to illuminate one potential aspect of young peoples' decision making process. These discussions signify an interest on the part of the individual and this research is particularly interested in determining who influences youth propensity. Three dichotomous variables are created to capture discussions: FAMDISC for discussions with family members including parents, siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins; PEERDISC for discussions with friends, and OTHRDISC for discussions with teachers, coaches, counselors, and employers. As

¹³Nöller and Fitzpatrick, 143.

previous research has suggested, the most significant agents are likely to be parents and peers.¹⁴

The presence or absence of these discussions does not tell us the direction of influence, nor does it tell us whether these youth were searching for information, guidance, or possibly validation of their likely propensity. Still, these discussions inform us as to whom these youth view as important social influencers. We can further examine the role of these agents by determining whether these agents are supportive of youth propensity to enlist. Previous research argues that if these social influencers are supportive of youth enlistment, then these youth are more likely to enlist.¹⁵

Further, it is likely that direct exposure to military service positively impacts on youth propensity. In an earlier study of young men and military service, Johnston and Bachman hypothesized that a military family would likely provide more modeling and support for a positive enlistment decision than families where males members have not served in the military.¹⁶ These researchers also examined military role modeling in terms of peers and found a modest relationship.¹⁷ For this research, military experience is measured by combining several questions which ask whether certain individuals including family members, peers, and others have ever been in the military and whether

¹⁴ Bruce R. Orvis, Martin T. Gahart with Karl F. Schutz, Enlistment Among Applicants for Military Service: Determinants and Incentives (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1990).

¹⁵ Jerome Johnston and Jerald G. Bachman, Youth In Transition Volume V Young Men and Military Service (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1972).

¹⁶ Ibid., 114.

¹⁷ Ibid., 123.

these same individuals are currently on active duty. Several dichotomous variables are created to capture direct military exposure. Fathers, Mothers, Other Relatives, Peers, and Others are the five categories of influencers used in this analysis. The Others category includes coaches, teachers, employers, and counselors.

In addition to examining these personal agents of influence, discovering the sources of youth information about the military may provide further insight to the decision making process of these young people. One may wonder where American youth attain their views of military service especially in light of the reduced visibility of the military in the past twenty years. Since the draft ended in 1973, fewer family members have served in the military, resulting in generally less familiarization with the military and the demands of military life. Further, with the end of the Cold War, the military reduced the total number of individuals required on active duty.¹⁸ Also, as a result of the Base Realignment and Closure Commissions' (BRAC) recommendations, the number of military bases in major metropolitan areas has been significantly reduced.¹⁹ Finally, today's high school seniors were in grade school during Desert Storm, the most recent large-scale military engagement involving the U.S. military since

¹⁸ In 1989, the total number of active duty military personnel was 2.13 million. In 1996, the total number of active duty military had dropped to 1.47 million. The total number of active duty military personnel by fiscal year from 1950-1998 can be found at www.defenselink.mil. (accessed May 18, 1999).

¹⁹ The 1988 Commission recommended closing 16 major installations, the 1991 Commission recommended closing 26 major installations, the 1993 Commission recommended closing 28 major installations, and the 1995 Commission recommended closing 27 major installations. A listing of all the Commissions' recommendations can be found at www.defenselink.mil. (accessed May 19, 1999).

the Vietnam War, resulting in a generation that has not been personally affected by issues of war and military service. All of these circumstances taken together have resulted in a less visible, more isolated military. So, the question remains: where do youth attain their views of the military?

While family and friends likely remain important sources of information for adolescents, the media has increasingly become a vital source of information.²⁰ The impact of media exposure will likely depend on the type and context of media coverage. For example, if individuals cited the movie "Top Gun" as his primary source of information about the military, they are more likely to have a positive view of the military and may be more likely to enlist than someone for whom the movie, "Full Metal Jacket" was influential. This does not necessarily mean that individuals who had a more positive view of the military are going to enlist, rather their tendency toward enlistment is likely to be higher than those individuals with negative views toward military service.

With these theoretical considerations in mind, previous research suggests the following hypotheses:

- H₁: Youth who discussed military service with individuals other than military recruiters are more likely to enlist;
- H₂: Youth who discussed military service with family members are more likely to enlist;
- H₃: Youth who received positive encouragement for enlistment are more likely to enlist;

²⁰ For example, see the National Association of Secretaries of States Report, "New Millenium Project - Phase I," A Nationwide Study of 15-24 Year Old Youth, January 1999. These researchers found that the media has overtaken personal agents as important sources of information. This report can be found on the Internet at www.nass.org/nass99 (accessed April 21, 1999).

- H₄: Youth who have direct exposure to military service are more likely to enlist;
H₅: Youth who were exposed to positive sources of military information are more likely to enlist.

Data Analysis

A five step process investigates the preceding hypotheses. First, a determination must be made about whether there is a correlation between youth propensity and discussing military service with someone other than a military recruiter. Once this determination is made, the second step in this analysis is to discover with whom these discussions were held. Agents of influence are identified when the respondents answer the following question: "With whom did you discuss the possibility of military service?"²¹

After determining the individuals mentioned as agents of influence, the third step in this analysis requires examining whether these agents support possible military enlistment for the respondents.²² Next, a determination of whether military experience among these influencers affects youth propensity is required. Finally, an exploration of the sources of youth information concerning military service is necessary to determine whether specific sources impact youth propensity.

²¹ The responses to this question are captured in the variable Q644GA and are available for all seven years of analysis.

²² The responses to this series of questions is measured by the variables Q644N series and is asked in 1991 through 1996.

Discussions

Initially, a dichotomous variable, PROPENS2, was created to capture whether youth discussed the possibility of military service with anyone besides a military recruiter. A frequency distribution of PROPENS2 (not shown) reveals that 29.9% of youth did discuss military service. There were no significant racial differences in terms of discussions. Consistent with the findings in chapter two, there were significant differences between men and women as well as younger and older respondents. Men more frequently discussed military service than women (34.8% compared with 21.5%) and younger respondents were more likely to discuss military service than older respondents (39.8% of 16-18 year olds compared with 24.5% of 19-24 year olds.)

Table 3-1 summarizes a cross-tabulation of PROPENS2 and youth propensity categories. As expected, the Likely category and Joiners discussed military service more frequently than the Disinterested and Unlikely categories. While this table explains the distribution of discussions within each propensity category, this table does not allow the researcher to determine the impact of these discussions on likely youth propensity. Table 3-2 shows the impact of discussing military service with someone other than a military recruiter on youth propensity.

Table 3-1
Discussed Military Service?
(1990-1996)

Propensity Category	Discussion Category	
	Yes	No
Disinterested	17.4%	82.6%
Unlikely	38.9%	61.1%
Likely	64.1%	35.9%
Joiners	76.2%	23.8%

n = 52,324

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .592

Somer's *d* = .286

As Table 3-2 clearly demonstrates, discussing possible military service does have a significant impact on youth propensity. Respondents were eight times more likely to join the military if they discussed military service. Further, individuals in the Likely category were four times more likely to join if they had discussed military service with someone other than a military recruiter than those individuals who did not discuss possible military service. Most interestingly, the Somer's *d* statistic is larger in Table 3-2 (.388) than Table 3-1 (.286), indicating that discussions influence propensity rather than propensity leading to discussions. These findings suggest that discussing military service may have some predictive power in determining which youth are most likely to enlist in the military.

Table 3-2
Impact of Discussions on Propensity
(1990-1996)

Propensity Category	Discussion Category	
	Yes	No
Disinterested	32.8%	66.7%
Unlikely	41.0%	27.5%
Likely	21.4%	5.2%
Joiners	4.8%	.6%

n = 52,324

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .592

Somer's *d* = .388

An OLS multivariate regression analysis was conducted with JOIN1 as the dependent variable and PROPENS2 representing the two discussion categories. Table 3-3 summarizes the standardized coefficients for this regression analysis. Controlling for gender, race, parents' education, and age, this analysis revealed that PROPENS2 is a modest predictor of youth enlistment propensity with a standardized coefficient of .314. Having established this modest relationship between discussing military service with someone other than a military recruiter and youth propensity, the next step in this analysis requires determining with whom these youth discussed the possibility of military service.

Table 3-3
OLS Regression for Military Discussion
(1990-1996)

Variables:	Standardized Coefficient	<i>t</i>	Level of Significance
PROPENS2	.314	71.602	.000
Asian	.033	5.978	.000
Black	.032	4.632	.000
White	-.029	-3.643	.000
Hispanic	.059	10.993	.000
Age	-.182	-42.022	.000
Gender	.166	38.399	.000
Father's Education	-.036	-6.724	.000
Mother's Education	-.051	-9.377	.000

n = 43,159

Adjusted r^2 = .209

Discussions With Agents of Influence

Question 644GA asks "With whom did you discuss military service?" The responses to this question are designated agents of influence. The responses to this question were not prompted by the interviewers, nor was there a list in which the respondents could choose these agents of influence. These responses represent the spontaneous answers of the respondents. Table 3-4 summarizes the total percentages for each of the categories of responses to Q644GA.

As a group, the most important primary influencers were family members (a combined 52.7%) followed closely by peers (a combined 40.6%). As a single entity,

friends were the most frequently mentioned with 35.7% of all respondents mentioning this group first. These youth discussed military service with their mothers slightly more frequently than with their fathers, which may be a result of mothers being more accessible to their children or possibly a reflection of the number of children raised in single parent families.²³ Consistent with previous socialization research, the most important agents of influence within the other category reflect the significance of schools in the socialization process as counselors and teachers combined accounted for almost five percent of the primary influencers.

Table 3-4
Agents of Influence*
(1990-1996)

FAMILY:

Mother	22.4%
Father	19.7%
Brother	3.3%
Sister	.6%
Spouse	2.0%
Other Relative	<u>5.0%</u>
	52.7%

PEERS:

Friend	35.7%
Boyfriend	4.1%
Girlfriend	<u>.8%</u>
	40.6%

²³ For example, Dennis and Owen characterize the socialization of Generation X as "an era of fragmented families and pervasive mass communication." See Jack Dennis and Diana Owen, "The Partisanship Puzzle: Identification and Attitudes of Generation X," in After the Boom: The Politics of Generation X, ed., Stephen Craig and Stephen Earl Bennett, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997): 59.

OTHERS:

Counselor	2.6%
Teacher	2.2%
Coach	.0%
Employer	.8%
Other	<u>1.1%</u>
	6.7%

* Percentage totals
n = 15,890

For measuring association between these discussions and propensity to enlist, three dichotomous variables were created. FAMDISC captures the presence of discussions with family members, PEERDISC for discussions with friends, and OTHRDISC for discussions with other individuals such as coaches, teachers, counselors, and employers. Table 3-5 displays the results of the cross-tabulation of these three independent variables and Join1, the dependent variable.

As Table 3-5 demonstrates, there are few differences between discussions with family members and other individuals. Whether an individual discussed possible military service with family members or other individuals does not appear to have a significant impact of their likely propensity as demonstrated by the small statistical measures of association. The most significant finding is the negative impact of peers discussions on youth propensity. This finding is consistent with previously cited research in which American youth "have difficulty seeing the relevance of the armed forces" and these

youth are "turned off" by the discipline, uniformity, and long hours of military life."²⁴

These attitudes toward military service likely explain the slightly negative impact on these discussions on youth propensity. Still, these findings support previous research, specifically the assertion by Johnston and Bachman that the family remains one of the key influence senders "as parents are least often seen as neutral . . . and the overall strength of association is strongest between expected parent response and latent behavior."²⁵ While the preceding tables determined the presence of discussions as well as with whom individuals those discussions were held, these tables cannot assess the nature of their discussions. The question remains: Do these agents of influence support or oppose possible military service for these youth?

Table 3-5
Impact of Discussions With Specific Agents of Influence
(1990-1996)

	FAMDISC	OTHRDISC	PEERDISC
Disinterested	29.8%	34.5%	36.8%
Unlikely	40.8%	36.4%	42.3%
Likely	23.9%	23.5%	17.6%
Joiners	<u>5.5%</u>	<u>5.6%</u>	<u>3.3%</u>
	100%	100%	100%
n =	8,271	1,005	6,351
χ^2 sign. =	.000	.000	.000
Gamma =	.141	.072	-.164
Somer's d =	.095	.050	-.111

²⁴ Bradley Graham, "The Bugle Sounds, But Fewer Answer," The Washington Post (March 13, 1999): A3.

²⁵ Johnston and Bachman, 118.

Support For Enlistment

Support for military enlistment by agents of influence can be measured by analyzing the responses to the following question, "How do you think (specific individual) would feel about your serving in the active military? Would you say that (specific individual) would strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, or strongly oppose the idea?"²⁶ This question was specifically asked for each individual mentioned as a discussant by the respondents.²⁷ In addition to the limitations of this question already noted, this analysis is based on the respondent's perception of favorable or unfavorable support for military enlistment by the various discussants. Mothers, fathers, and friends do not provide independent responses. Still, I suspect these perceptions are fairly accurate as they are predicated on actual discussions. Despite these limiting factors, youth perceptions of support or nonsupport for military enlistment can reveal the role and importance of these various agents of influence and their impact on youth propensity.

²⁶ In 1991, the responses available were: very favorable, favorable, neither favorable nor unfavorable, unfavorable, or very unfavorable. This year group was merged with the 1992-1996 year groups. Also, this question specifically referred to the individual mentioned as a discussant. In other words, if an individual mentioned discussing military service with his father, then the word father was substituted in the specific individual space. In 1990, this question was asked in a slightly different format and was omitted from this analysis.

²⁷ This question is a subset of question Q644GA and V644G. As a result, the number of valid cases continues to drop. In some specific instances, the number of cases will become too small to conduct multivariate regression analyses, particularly when we examine the smaller groups of agents of influence.

Table 3-6
Favor Military Enlistments?²⁸
(1991-1996)

	Unfavorable	Neither	Favorable
Agents of Influence:			
Mother	32%	29%	39%
Father	16%	29%	55%
Other Relatives	15%	23%	62%
Peers	21%	32%	47%
Others	11%	26%	63%
n = 4,360			

As Table 3-6 demonstrates, others and other relatives are the most supportive of military enlistments, while mothers are the least supportive. Fathers are more supportive than mothers. Next to mothers, friends are less supportive of military enlistments. They also are the largest group without definitive opinions. While Table 3-6 explains general support for enlistment, this table does not explain the impact of this support on likely enlistment. Cross-tabulations of youth propensity with support for enlistment are summarized in the following tables. All five categories of the agents of influence are examined, although there is a limited number of individuals within the others' support group. One can conclude from this limited number that youth are less likely to consult with these individuals compared to family members and friends. The following tables demonstrate several interesting patterns.

²⁸ The unfavorable category combines very unfavorable and unfavorable responses, while the favorable category combines favorable and very favorable responses.

Table 3-7
Mothers' Support of Potential Enlistment
(1991-1996)

	Very Unfavorable	Unfavorable	Neither	Favorable	Very Favorable
Disinterested	45.1%	38.7%	34.1%	24.5%	26.2%
Unlikely	38.1%	41.4%	40.8%	38.3%	28.4%
Likely	12.7%	17.6%	21.3%	30.7%	32.8%
Joiners	<u>3.5%</u>	<u>2.3%</u>	<u>3.8%</u>	<u>6.5%</u>	<u>12.6%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 4,284

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .245

Somer's *d* = .169

Table 3-8
Fathers' Support of Potential Enlistment
(1991-1996)

	Very Unfavorable	Unfavorable	Neither	Favorable	Very Favorable
Disinterested	50.4%	41.2%	34.2%	29.2%	26.9%
Unlikely	36.8%	41.5%	45.7%	42.3%	32.2%
Likely	10.7%	13.9%	17.4%	24.0%	30.5%
Joiners	<u>2.1%</u>	<u>3.4%</u>	<u>2.7%</u>	<u>4.5%</u>	<u>10.4%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 4,276

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .232

Somer's *d* = .159

Table 3-9
Other Relatives' Support of Potential Enlistment
(1991-1996)

	Very Unfavorable	Unfavorable	Neither	Favorable	Very Favorable
Disinterested	48.1%	40.5%	36.2%	26.1%	28.2%
Unlikely	27.5%	36.7%	39.3%	37.6%	31.3%
Likely	21.4%	19.7%	19.8%	29.8%	28.7%
Joiners	<u>3.1%</u>	<u>3.0%</u>	<u>4.7%</u>	<u>6.5%</u>	<u>11.8%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 1,689

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .221

Somer's *d* = .139

Table 3-10
Peers' Support of Potential Enlistment
(1991-1996)

	Very Unfavorable	Unfavorable	Neither	Favorable	Very Favorable
Disinterested	49.0%	43.9%	40.3%	34.0%	31.4%
Unlikely	36.1%	38.3%	39.7%	40.6%	35.6%
Likely	11.4%	14.5%	17.0%	21.3%	24.0%
Joiners	<u>3.5%</u>	<u>3.3%</u>	<u>3.0%</u>	<u>4.1%</u>	<u>9.1%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 4,562

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .173

Somer's *d* = .116

Table 3-11
Others' Support of Potential Enlistment
(1991-1996)

	Very Unfavorable	Unfavorable	Neither	Favorable	Very Favorable
Disinterested	40.1%	41.7%	40.6%	29.6%	27.2%
Unlikely	33.2%	27.8%	32.4%	31.7%	28.9%
Likely	20.4%	23.7%	24.5%	28.8%	32.4%
Joiners	<u>6.3%</u>	<u>6.8%</u>	<u>2.5%</u>	<u>9.9%</u>	<u>11.5%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 562

χ^2 sign. = .030

Gamma = .133

Somer's d = .091

Overall, the most interesting finding in these tables is the impact of parental support. If an individual's mother supports enlistment, that individual is almost four times more likely to join the military. If an individual has the support of their father or relative, he/she is three times more likely to be in the Joiners category. The statistical measures of association indicate that these relationships (mother's support, father's support, and other relative's support) are the most important in terms of youth propensity. The support of peers is less influential (about twice as likely to be a Joiner), with the support of others having the least impact on likely propensity for Joiners.

For the Likely category, parental support is also important, although to a lesser degree. If an individual's mother or father supports their enlistment, they are twice as

likely to enlist in the military. Support of peers, other relatives, and others is less important for the Likely category, although peer support increases the likelihood of enlistment by about forty percent. For the Unlikely category, support for enlistment appears to have little impact on their likely propensity. For the Disinterested youth, nonsupport for enlistment by all of the agents of influence averages around eighty-eight percent, while support for enlistment averages around fifty-five percent. This finding suggests that the military has strong support among the general public, although military service may not be the right option for every individual.

The next step in this analysis requires an examination of the predictive nature of these support variables. A multivariate OLS regression was conducted with JOIN1 (youth propensity categories) as the dependent variable; race, gender, age, parents' education level, PROPENS2,²⁹ and agents mentioned³⁰ were entered as independent control variables. Additionally, independent variables for support were included in this regression. The support variables used were: Q644NMOM for mothers' support, Q644NDAD for fathers' support, and Q644NFR for peer support.³¹ Table 3-12 summarizes the results of these OLS regression models.

²⁹ PROPENS2 is the dummy variable for the basic discussion question.

³⁰ Agents mentioned are captured in the variables V644GDAD, V644GMOM, V644G2 (other relatives), V644G6 (other individuals), and V644G8 (peers).

³¹ Regression analyses were not run for other relatives and others as the number of valid cases did not exceed 2,000 cases. While this is an arbitrary minimum number, I did not want to make generalizations based on fewer than this number of cases. Further, the regression analyses for these support variables had to be run separately because of the problem of subsets. Respondents answered these support questions only if they had mentioned these individuals as discussants. Therefore, there were no valid cases when the regression models were run with all the support variables included in the

Table 3-12
OLS Regressions For Support*
(1991-1996)

Variables:	Mothers	Fathers	Peers
Asian	.010	.006	.013
Black	.064**	.046	.076**
Hispanic	.050**	.049**	.090***
White	-.022	-.031	.014
Gender	.141***	.130***	.134***
CALCAGE	-.182***	-.191***	-.198***
Father's Education	-.042	-.036	-.062
Mother's Education	-.018	-.024	-.030
PROPENS2	.202***	.186***	.196***
V644GMOM	N/A	.041**	.066***
V644GDAD	.040**	N/A	.112***
V644G2 (other relatives)	.094***	.090***	.098***
V644G6 (others)	.105***	.105***	.064***
V644G8 (friends)	.098***	.089***	N/A
Q644NMOM	.187***	N/A	N/A
Q644NDAD	N/A	.169***	N/A
Q644NFR	N/A	N/A	.131***
*standardized betas	n = 3,659	n = 3,734	n = 3,814
**p = .01	r ² = .208	r ² = .189	r ² = .209
***p = .000	Adj. r ² = .205	Adj. r ² = .186	Adj. r ² = .207

These regression analyses reveal that this model represents a somewhat better fit, as evidenced by the slight increase in the r²s when these support variables are included. These support variables do provide the second best indicator in explaining youth propensity. Further, all of these support variables are positive, providing support

model. Also, for example, when examining mothers' support, the variable capturing a discussion with the mother had to be removed as these two variables were equal. In other words, the mother discussion variable was a constant. This applies to the analyses for fathers and peers.

for one of my original hypotheses (H_3). If these agents of influence support military enlistment for the respondents, they are slightly more likely to enlist. Still, the best predictor for youth enlistment remains whether the respondents discussed military service with someone other than a military recruiter. In other words, the actual discussions seem to be more important than with whom the respondents discussed potential military service.

Military Experience

The next step in this analysis is to determine the relative importance of military experience among these agents of influence. This series of questions is still related to whether the respondents discussed military service with someone other than a military recruiter. In other words, if an individual did not discuss military service, then they were not asked about the military experience of any of these agents of influence. This fact limits the broad application of these findings, but does allow for an analysis within this limited scope. Still, I want to determine whether direct military exposure, as demonstrated by past or present military service, makes a difference in youth likelihood of joining the military. We assume that military experience is a positive reinforcer for military service, although military experience during the Vietnam War likely perpetuates negative impressions of military service.³²

³² An initial cross-tabulations of veterans and nonveterans with support for enlistment did not support this conclusion, although there is no way to distinguish Vietnam veterans from other veterans.

As stated earlier, 29% of all respondents discussed military service with someone other than military recruiters.³³ Table 3-13 summarizes the percentages of agents of influence with military experience. Overall, slightly more than half (51.7%) of these agents had military experience. As expected due to the traditional nature of military service being dominated by males, fathers and other relatives were more likely to have been in the military. About one-third of the respondents' peers possess military experience, while their mothers have the least military experience. Still, these percentages appear low if these respondents were searching for actual military experience to guide their decisions or they may reflect the general decline in military experience throughout society.

Table 3-13
Military Experience of Influencers
(1992-1996)

	Military Experience?	
	Yes	No
Fathers	40.8%	59.2%
Mothers	1.5%	98.5%
Other Relatives	42.9%	57.1%
Peers	35.1%	64.9%
Others	22.5%	77.5%
n = 38,097		

³³ A total of 11,194 respondents of the 38,567 valid cases discussed military service. The valid cases for this analysis includes the years 1992 - 1996. During 1990 and 1991, military experience was not measured.

A further examination of military experience by year may provide some insight to these percentages of military experience. Table 3-14 summarizes the yearly percentages of military experience for these agents of influence. While the military experience of mothers and others remains fairly constant over this period of time, the large drop in military experience of fathers, peers, and other relatives from 1994 to 1995 is quite remarkable.³⁴ One possible explanation for this drop in military experience of fathers and other relatives is the ending of the draft in 1973. With the end of the draft, fewer individuals were required to serve and this drop in military experience may reflect that societal change. For peers, this drop in military experience may reflect the end of the Cold War and the military drawdown of the early 1990s. These large differences in military experience between discussants in various years will be addressed further once the aggregate relationship between military experience and youth propensity is examined.

³⁴ The yearly totals for military experience of influencers also reflects this dramatic change. In 1992, youth discussions were conducted with over 75% veterans; in 1993 over 73% of these discussions were with veterans; in 1994 over 71% of these discussions were with veterans; in 1995 the number of veterans drops to 38%; and in 1996, the number drops to 37%. These numbers likely reflect the overall decline in military experience among Americans.

Table 3-14
Agents of Influence with Military Experience³⁵
(1992-1996)

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Agents of Influence:					
Fathers.	63%	58%	55%	27%	26%
Mothers	3%	2%	3%	1%	2%
Other Relatives	51%	50%	57%	25%	33%
Peers	47%	49%	50%	23%	21%
Others	22%	22%	19%	18%	14%

In order to determine the impact of military experience on youth propensity, an aggregate cross-tabulation of youth propensity categories with military experience was compared to an aggregate cross-tabulation of youth propensity categories with the basic discussion variable, PROPENS2. This analysis allows the comparison between youth propensity categories and youth discussant categories. Individuals that did not discuss military service are contained within the "Nondiscussant" category. Those individuals that did conduct discussions are broken down into two categories: "Veterans" for those youth who talked with veterans and "Civilian" for those youth who discussed military service with individuals who have no military experience. Table 3-15 summarizes the results of these cross-tabulations. As noted earlier, there is a strong relationship between military service and these discussions. Still, Table 3-15 reveals only small

³⁵ These percentages represent the percentage of discussants with military experience in each group by year. For example, in 1992, 63% of fathers who discussed military enlistment with their child had military experience. Further, the total number of valid cases differs for each agent of influence as well as for each year and are not included.

differences between the groups that discussed military service in terms of whether these discussions were held with veterans or civilians. Once again, it seems likely that the discussions themselves are most important, not whether the individual is a veteran or civilian.

Table 3-15
Youth Propensity Categories Compared With Discussion Categories
(1992-1996)

	Nondiscussants	Veterans	Civilians
Youth Propensity Categories:			
Disinterested	67.7%	39.2%	34.2%
Unlikely	26.6%	38.0%	40.9%
Likely	5.1%	18.3%	20.7%
Joiners	.6%	4.5%	4.2%
n = 38, 097			

Before proceeding, the question remains whether these aggregate numbers are a true reflection of the impact of military experience. Having found that these discussions were conducted more often with veterans than civilians in 1992 - 1994, a brief examination of these same categories appears necessary. Table 3-16 summarizes the results for 1992 - 1996. Whether an individual discussed military service with a veteran or civilian appears to have little impact on their propensity category as their percentages are nearly identical, except in 1996. Youth who discussed military service with veterans in 1996 were less likely to be joiners than youth who discussed military service with civilians. Whether this change is directly attributable to the military experience of the agent of influence remains in question, although this decline in support for military

enlistment likely reflects the difficult recruitment and retention problems experienced by the military in the late 1990s.

Table 3-16
Youth Propensity Categories Compared With Discussion Categories
(1992-1996)

	Nondiscussants	Veterans	Civilians
Youth Propensity Categories:			
1992:			
Disinterested	61.2%	49.9%	49.5%
Unlikely	30.8%	34.8%	35.5%
Likely	6.7%	12.8%	12.6%
Joiners	1.3%	2.5%	2.3%
n = 5,536			
1993:			
Disinterested	68.2%	26.6%	28.5%
Unlikely	27.0%	43.8%	45.1%
Likely	4.4%	23.6%	21.4%
Joiners	.5%	6.1%	5.0%
n = 5,170			
1994:			
Disinterested	70.5%	32.3%	32.4%
Unlikely	24.6%	41.7%	43.1%
Likely	4.4%	20.5%	20.3%
Joiners	.5%	5.5%	4.1%
n = 6,504			
1995:			
Disinterested	68.0%	29.9%	32.4%
Unlikely	25.9%	39.8%	40.2%
Likely	5.5%	24.1%	22.6%
Joiners	.6%	6.2%	4.7%
n = 10,724			

	89		
	Nondiscussants	Veterans	Civilians
1996:			
Disinterested	68.8%	58.1%	32.4%
Unlikely	26.2%	29.1%	40.9%
Likely	4.5%	9.5%	22.4%
Joiners	.5%	1.9%	4.4%
n = 10,163			

Moving beyond these frequency distributions, the question remains whether military experience alone is correlated with youth propensity. Table 3-17 summarizes the correlations between youth propensity and military experience. The aggregate and yearly correlations are provided in an effort to better understand the impact of military experience. The findings in Table 3-17 suggest that the relationship between youth propensity and military experience is neither straightforward nor always direct. Military experience among the agents of socialization appears to have been more important in 1993 and 1994. This finding may reflect a more positive military experience among these agents of influence. If true, these individuals may have been more aggressive in highlighting the benefits of military service to young people. Consistent with Table 3-16, military experience in 1996 is negatively correlated with youth propensity, suggesting a more negative attitude toward military service than previously noted among the agents of influence. These negative attitudes by veterans may be the result of the perceived decreasing benefits of military service such as reduced medical care. Alternatively, these negative attitudes may be the result of the increase in the number of

military missions abroad, the uncertainty of the international environment, or possibly a reflection of attitudes toward the current Commander-In-Chief.

Table 3-17
Pearson's R for JOIN1 and Military Experience
(1992-1996)

	Aggregate	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Veterans	.166	.086	.326	.291	.201	-.005
Number of Cases	38,097	5,536	5,170	6,504	10,724	10,163

Moving beyond these correlations, I suspected that military experience may have some predictive power in determining youth likelihood of joining the military.

Originally conceived, I hypothesized that discussions with veterans would likely increase youth propensity. Several OLS regressions were conducted with JOIN1 as the dependent variable. The control variables included race, gender, parents' education, age, and PROPENS2, the basic discussion question. PROPENS2 is included in order to determine the independent effect of military experience. Table 3-18 summarizes the aggregate and yearly standardized coefficients.

In the aggregate, there are minimal differences between individuals discussing military service with veterans and civilians. As the yearly standardized coefficients demonstrate, discussing military service with veterans can provide some additional explanatory power in predicting youth propensity rates such as in 1993 and 1994. The

difficulty lies in determining why military experience is more important in some years as compared to other years. One possible explanation may be the weight that these youth place on the opinion of these agents of influence. Alternatively, it is possible that some agents of influence were more persuasive than others. Further, it is likely some agents had more positive military experiences than others. Unfortunately, we cannot measure the intensity nor the persuasiveness of these agents of influence. Also, we cannot measure the quality of their military experiences. Therefore, I cannot accept my hypothesis that direct exposure to military experience contributes to a higher rate of possible enlistment for youth. The data demonstrate a more complicated relationship and suggest that future studies may want to explore these relationships through interviews and focus groups.

Table 3-18
OLS Regression for Military Experience*
(1992-1996)

	Aggregate	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
PROPENS2	.300**	.105**	.295**	.279**	.312**	.342**
VETERANS	.012	-.009	.087**	.083**	.044**	-.004
	n=31,103	n=4361	n=4322	n=5386	n=8726	n=8306
	r ² =.207	r ² =.111	r ² =.264	r ² =.232	r ² =.226	r ² =.229

*standardized coefficients

**p = .000

Sources of Information

Finally, a brief exploration of the primary youth sources of information about the military may provide further understanding of youth propensity rates. This analysis will be limited as this type of question was asked only in 1994, 1995, and 1996.

Consistent with previous studies, I expect the primary sources to include parents and peers as well as the media.³⁶ As previously stated, I suspect that if individuals' primary source of information is positive, then the individual is more likely to enlist.

The initial question, Q644V1, asks respondents, "Where do you get your impressions about life in the military?" and the respondents can reply with as many as three different sources of information.³⁷ These responses were recoded into several categories: father, mother, other family, friends, others, movies/TV, and ads/things read.³⁸ Dichotomous variables were created for each category.

Table 3-19 summarizes the frequency distributions for sources of youth impressions about the military. SOURCE represents the respondents' primary source of information, SOURCE1 represents their second response, and SOURCE2 captures their third mention. Peers are identified as the primary source of information about the

³⁶ For example, see *After the Boom: The Politics of Generation X*, edited by Stephen C. Craig and Stephen Earl Bennett. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997).

³⁷ This is an open-ended question with the respondents providing the sources. There is not a general list provided for them in which they may select the sources of information. Further, the database selected and coded the respondents' first, second, and third sources of information. They are captured in the following questions: Q644V1 is the respondents' first choice, Q644V2 is the respondents' second choice, and Q644V3 is the respondents' third choice.

³⁸ Movies and TV were combined in the original database and were separated into two different groups in another question, Q644X1.

military (36.5%) for American youth. Over half of the respondents mentioned peers as one of their sources of information (54.9%). Secondly, family members are mentioned next the most frequently with approximately 49% of all respondents mentioning at least one member of their family as a source of information. Further, movies are consistently identified as the third most important source of youth perceptions about the military, capturing slightly more than one-third of all mentions. Consistent with previous findings in this chapter, other individuals are less important sources of information for youth.

Table 3-19
Sources of Youth Perceptions About the Military
(Percentage Within Each Category)
(1994-1996)

	SOURCE	SOURCE1	SOURCE2
Categories:			
Friends	36.5%	21.3%	7.1%
Family	27.6%	21.2%	10.3%
Movies	19.5%	10.6%	5.0%
Others	9.0%	5.6%	2.8%
Things Read	7.4%	7.7%	3.9%
No Mention	*	33.6%	70.9%
	100%	100%	100%

n = 26,583

*Those individuals who did not answer the initial question were coded as missing cases.³⁹

³⁹ The number of individuals who did not respond to this question accounted for less than 3.5% of the total number of cases.

While interesting, these frequency distributions do not demonstrate whether a significant statistical relationship exists between these sources of information and youth propensity rates. In order to determine the impact of these sources on youth propensity, these three sources were collapsed together into seven dichotomous variables: Father, Mother, Family (for other relatives), Friends, Others, Movies, and Things Read. Table 3-20 summarizes the results of these cross-tabulations.

Table 3-20 clearly demonstrates that sources of information about the military do have an impact on youth propensity, particularly for Joiners. If mothers are a source of information, young people are four times more likely to enlist than if their source of information about the military is movies/television. If fathers, others, or other relatives are a source of information, young people are twice as likely to join the military than if their source of information is movies/television. Further, personal sources of information have a greater impact on youth propensity compared to things read or movies/television. Sources of information are somewhat important for the Likely category, while these sources have little impact on the Disinterested and Unlikely propensity categories. Finally, the measures of association demonstrate a slightly negative impact of movies/television and friends on likely youth propensity. These findings are consistent with previous negative peer attitudes toward military service. Further, these findings suggest that those individuals whose source of information about

the military is movies/television may be selecting programs that portray the military in a negative light, possibly reinforcing their preconceived notions about military service.

Table 3-20
Impact of Sources on Youth Propensity
(Percentages Within Each Category)
(1994-1996)

	Mother	Father	Family	Friends	Others	Movies/ TV	Things Read
Disinterested	51.2%	54.3%	55.9%	60.5%	55.2%	59.3%	54.1%
Unlikely	30.1%	31.3%	29.5%	29.8%	29.2%	31.5%	33.7%
Likely	14.4%	11.6%	12.5%	8.3%	13.0%	8.2%	10.6%
Joiners	4.3%	2.8%	2.1%	1.4%	2.6%	1.1%	1.6%
n =	604	4,942	7,450	14,559	5,079	8,851	4,383
χ^2 sign. =	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Gamma =	.145	.074	.051	-.094	.101	-.076	.066
Somer's <i>d</i> =	.087	.042	.029	-.053	.058	-.043	.038

While the preceding analysis demonstrates the impact of the sources of information on youth propensity, these findings tell us little about the nature of these sources of information. Unfortunately, a determination as to whether these sources hold positive or negative views about the military is not possible due to the manner in which these factors are measured. The only mechanism available to measure positive or negative views toward the military is found within the discussion subset of the data base. This does not allow the researcher to determine whether things read and movies/television highlight positive or negative characteristics of military service. These

limitations prevent an acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis concerned with whether supportive sources positively affect youth enlistment. Intuitively, I suspect this true, but this survey does not provide a measure to investigate this hypothesis.

Summary

In this chapter, the impact of social agencies on the potential military enlistment of youth was examined. The most important finding reveals that discussions with someone other than a military recruiter are modestly correlated with youth propensity rates as well as a modest predictor of enlistment. Intuitively, if youth are interested in military service, these individuals are likely to discuss the possibility of joining the military with individuals most important in their lives.

The analyses of these agents of influence reveal several interesting patterns. The primary agents of influence are family members, with peers following closely behind in terms of these discussions. Family members, particularly mothers, possess a great deal of influence over the decision of young people to join the military. Youth are more likely to discuss possible military service with family members. Peers remain the second most influential group, although their influence tends to have a slightly negative impact on likely enlistment. The correlations and regression analyses demonstrate only a minimal relationship between these agents of influence and youth propensity, suggesting that discussions are more important than with whom these discussions are held.

In terms of supporting military enlistment, those agents of influence less intimately involved in the daily lives of these youth such as others and other relatives are the most supportive of military enlistment. Mothers tend to be the least supportive, while peers remain the most ambiguous group. A review of the impact of military experience reveals no clear patterns, indicating that other factors such as the quality of these agents' military experience may overshadow the possible impact their experiences could have on youth propensity rates. Finally, a review of the sources of youth perceptions about the military demonstrate a limited impact on their likely propensity.

Youth Speak For Themselves

Chapter Four

In chapter three, I examined the impact of agencies of socialization, the military experience of these agencies, and the youth sources of information about the military. In this chapter, youth explanations' for their own propensity categories are explored. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) suggest that the second broad category of determinants to intentions is more personal in nature and reflects individual attitudes and values. The first priority for understanding youth explanations of their intentions requires a review of the intensity of their considerations. How much consideration did these youth give to joining the military? Next, the second part of this analysis explores the specific reasons given by these individuals for likely joining the military. What factors and aspects of military service appeal to these youth? In other words, what attracts youth to military service? Further, it is also appropriate to explore why some youth were not interested in military service and their explanations are included in this analysis.

Once these immediate responses are considered, an exploration of what is important to these youth provides additional insight to their propensity categories. The YATS database asks a series of questions interested in determining what is important to these youth. These questions allow the youth to speak for themselves and provides further evidence, more detailed in nature, of their likely propensity. What do these

youth value? How important is duty to country? How important is personal freedom? Further, how important are job security, money for education, technical training, and leadership opportunities? What is the impact of these youth attitudes on their likely propensity? These questions will be explored as I begin to examine the interaction of these personal values and attitudes with youth propensity.

Theoretical Considerations

As noted in chapter one, Johnston and Bachman hypothesized that "young men who perceive a good fit between themselves and military-type jobs are more likely to enlist."¹ These authors define the basic concept of fit as "the relationship of a person's needs and the environmental supply of that need."² Needs are conceptualized as "aspects of a job that are thought to be salient to a job choice."³ This theory suggests an individualized decision making process for youth. This process likely involves youth evaluating the intrinsic and extrinsic costs and benefits of military service. One way to investigate this self-selection process is to explore the intensity of youth consideration of military service as well as their motivations for their enlistment decisions. President Lincoln highlighted this process of weighing motivations when he wrote, "Among these motives (of volunteering for military service) would be patriotism, political bias,

¹ Johnston and Bachman, 34.

² Johnston and Bachman, 34.

³ Johnston and Bachman, 34.

ambition, personal courage, love of adventure, want of employment..."⁴ As President Lincoln suggested, there are a variety of motivations for youth to volunteer for military service and these motivations remain relevant today. This chapter explores their stated reasons for joining the military as well as their reasons for not wanting to join the military.

Still, Johnston and Bachman also argue that "the motivation for most human behavior is very complex and can seldom be reduced to a single overriding factor. Even when it can, the behaving individual is not always in the best position to identify that factor."⁵ One way to further examine youth motivations is to explore their values and attitudes. I suggest that underlying these overt reasons for joining the military, youth, whose attitudes and values are more in concert with the unique aspects of military service, are more likely to join the military than others. These youth are motivated to join the military because of some intrinsic aspect or appeal of military service. I believe that youth who possess values more consistent with the military ethos of service before self, are more likely to join the military than others who place greater importance on individual values such as personal freedom.

This is not to suggest that the overt reasons given by youth for joining the military are inconsistent with their attitudes or values. Rather, this self-selection

⁴ Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953): 445, quoted in Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens And Soldiers The Dilemmas of Military Service (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985): 138.

⁵ Johnston and Bachman, 139.

process is multifaceted and can be examined more fully by exploring what is important to these individuals. I suspect the traditional appeals of military service such as patriotism and duty likely resonate in those individuals more likely to join the military. For example, youth attracted to military service may state they are joining the military to obtain money for education, but underlying that overt reasoning is an intrinsic appeal or "fit" consistent with military values.

This notion of a distinctive set of values encompassing those attracted to military service has long been explored by various scholars.⁶ For example, the classic debate among military scholars is whether military service is a calling or an occupation. "The concept of a calling suggests voluntarism... It does imply a sacred mission, legitimization through institutional values, a high level of devotion to the tasks of office, communion with others in the calling, and a reward system based not as much on salary as on a life-style appropriate to the social position of the calling."⁷ This is not to suggest that all individuals joining the military hear this calling. In fact, Janowitz noted in 1960 that "those individuals who see the military as a calling or a unique profession are outnumbered by a greater concentration for whom the military is just another job."⁸

⁶ For example, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960); and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970).

⁷ Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal. The All-Volunteer Force A Study of Ideology in the Military (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977): 152.

⁸ Janowitz, 117.

Still, some scholars have suggested that these two orientations are not mutually exclusive and have found a combination of these orientations among military service members suggesting, "a posture of pragmatic military professionalism that reflects concerns for both individual well-being and collective national security."⁹ I suspect this combination of individualism and collective security more accurately reflects the views of most individuals joining the military. There are unique aspects of military service such as the opportunity to serve your country, gain specific technical skills, the physical challenges of military service, and the opportunity for leadership which may not be available to certain individuals through any other means. More importantly, while "the pendulum of values in American society has been swinging toward an emphasis on individualism for several decades,"¹⁰ American youth joining the military likely find attractive the more traditional values of duty, honor, and country as well as the collective identity of being a member of the military. Through YATS, I can measure these values and their impact on propensity by exploring what is most important to these youth.

First, however, a review of previous youth attitudinal research is necessary. In recent years, few researchers have focused exclusively on youth attitudes, although

⁹ David R. Segal, Recruiting For Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989): 72. Further, in a study of ideology in the military, several scholars found that the noncareer military men held many similar attitudes as their civilian counterparts, while the career military men were much more promilitary than their civilian counterparts. See Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977).

¹⁰ Segal, 74-75.

marketers have discovered the significant purchasing power of today's youth and research in this area is growing.¹¹ One of the most comprehensive and current reviews of youth political attitudes, After the Boom: The Politics of Generation X, suggest that the media-driven characterizations of American youth as "indecisive, lacking in ambition, and as having 'few heroes, no anthems, no style to call their own'" are overly simplistic and lacking in substance.¹² This book provides a more systematic examination of youth political attitudes and provides the foundation for much of my analysis. These authors do acknowledge the tendency of researchers to characterize individuals within a generation as a cohesive whole, while downplaying the differences within each generation.¹³ Still, the collective identity of this generation continues to evolve and my research can add to the understanding of their perspectives.

To summarize, these scholars found little evidence to support the caricatures associated with Generation X.¹⁴ "Xers' political tendencies do not, with a few

¹¹ Dale Russakoff, "Marketers Following Youth Trends to the Bank," Washington Post, April 19, 1999., A1, A10. This article suggests a growing market for youth attitudinal research as evidenced by a recent study by Nickelodeon/Yankelovich, which is being sold to businesses for \$26,000.

¹² Stephen C. Craig and Stephen Earl Bennett, eds. After the Boom The Politics of Generation X (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997): 2. For example, in Chapter Two, Bennett and Rademacher remind scholars that too often anecdotal media evidence becomes the accepted conventional wisdom attributed to generations, specifically the Baby Boomers and Generation X (p. 39).

¹³ Craig and Bennett, 8.

¹⁴ Mike A. Males argues that the characterization of today's youth as America's worst generation ever is not only a myth, but an outright lie. See Mike A. Males, Framing Youth 10 Myths about the Next Generation (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1999).

exceptions such as ideological proclivities and possibly partisan leanings, mark them as much different from earlier cohorts, including baby boomers, when they were young.”¹⁵ Further, in an examination of political trust in government, Owen found no indication that Xers were more cynical than other cohorts, rather “If anything, the opposite is true.”¹⁶ Additionally, while she discovered that “their feelings of patriotism and national pride are not as strong as those of older Americans,”¹⁷ she noted that seventy percent or more of gen-Xers stated, “they (1) feel extremely good or very good when they see the flag flying; (2) have an extremely good or very strong love for their country; and (3) approve or strongly approve of the basic constitutional structure of the U.S. government.”¹⁸ In total, these studies suggest that while the values of American society may be shifting toward individualism, traditional values associated with military service still resonate within this generation. Therefore, I contend that the traditional values associated with military service as well as the unique opportunities available through military service will be found most often among those likely to join the military.

¹⁵ See Stephen Earl Bennett and Eric W. Rademacher, “The ‘Age of Indifference’ Revisited: Patterns of Political Interest, Media Exposure, and Knowledge among Generation X,” in Stephen C. Craig and Stephen Earl Bennett, eds. After the Boom The Politics of Generation X (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997): 39.

¹⁶ Diana Owen, “Mixed Signals: Generation X’s Attitudes toward the Political System,” in Stephen C. Craig and Stephen Earl Bennett, eds. After the Boom The Politics of Generation X (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997): 94.

¹⁷ Owen, 104.

¹⁸ Owen, 104.

With these theoretical considerations in mind, this chapter will investigate the following hypotheses:

- H₁: Those youth who gave serious consideration to military service are more likely to enlist;
- H₂: Those youth who perceive a good fit between the military and themselves are more likely to enlist;
- H₃: Those youth who value personal freedom are less likely to enlist.

Data Methods

Several statistical measures will be used in this chapter, including frequency distributions, cross-tabulations, chi-square (χ^2) tests of independence and regression. These relatively simple statistical measures are used because of several difficulties encountered with the database. First, all of the relevant questions were not asked in every year. For example, in 1990, the question used to measure intensity of consideration of military service was restricted to those youth who had indicated they might enlist in the military. This restriction limits the ability of the researcher to generalize for that specific year.

Further, the questions used to measure attitudes and values were asked randomly throughout the years of analysis. While the validity of these questions is not a concern, these questions were not asked of every respondent. This limits the ability of the researcher to use more sophisticated statistical measures such as regression for

analyzing the attitudinal variables as the number of missing cases are excessive. Still, excluding missing cases pairwise rather than listwise allows the researcher to analyze the relationship between these attitudinal variables and youth propensity. The sample years used in this chapter include 1990 through 1996.¹⁹

For this relationship between youth propensity and attitudes, the chi-square test will be used to examine the potential relationship between these variables. This test assesses the probability of obtaining results that differ from what might be found due to chance. A further statistical measure, the Somer's *d* statistic, will be generated to assess the strength of the relationship between these variables. These statistical measures will be used for the final analytical section of this chapter to evaluate youth attitudes and their impact on youth propensity.

Turning to key concepts, intensity of consideration and military fit must be defined. Intensity of consideration is designed to measure how much thought each respondent gave when contemplating military service. This concept is easily measured in the YATS database as Q525 asks, "Before we talked today, had you ever considered the possibility of joining the military? Would you say you never thought about it, you gave it some consideration, or you gave it serious consideration?"²⁰

¹⁹ For one series of analyses, 1991 data were omitted as the questions were asked in a slightly different manner and were not comparable with the other years. See footnote 21.

²⁰ Youth Attitudes Tracking Study, 1991 through 1996. Codebooks were made available by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

Next, measuring military fit is somewhat a more difficult process. The military provides several unique opportunities for its members. These include the opportunity to serve the country, specific technical training, leadership opportunities, physical challenges, and the opportunity to work as a member of a team. While some of these characteristics are not solely found within the military, military service can fulfill these needs for youth.

A series of questions, Q528, explores these attributes and values by asking the respondents how important these and other values are to them. For example, Q528K1 asks, "How important is job security - that is, having a steady job? Is this extremely important, very important, somewhat important, or not important to you?" While there was some variation each year, twelve key concepts were asked every year.²¹ These key concepts include money for education, physical challenge, develop leadership skills, working in a high-technology environment, equal opportunities for women, learning a valuable skill, job security, working as part of a team, staying in an area close to family, personal freedom, doing something for your country, and parents' approval.

In an effort to discover if these twelve attributes form coherent subsets that are independent of one another and to identify those attributes which can be classified as falling into the "military" fit conceptualization, factor analyses by year were

²¹ In 1991, these questions were asked for a specific service such as, "The Air Force offers the opportunity to get money for education. Do you strongly agree, mostly agree, neither, mostly disagree, or strongly disagree with that statement? As this series of questions is tapping a slightly different construct, these questions were not merged with the other years and are excluded from this analysis.

conducted.²² While three principal components emerged from these analyses, the results were not as distinct as one may expect. As an example, Table 4-1 summarizes the results from the 1994 principal component analysis, which typifies the results across years.

The first component suggests a "military fit" factor with country, high-tech, leadership, physical challenge, and teamwork loading together, although leadership also loads, to a lesser degree, on the liberal economic factor. The second component suggests a liberal, economic factor with equal opportunity for women, job security, personal freedom, skill, and, to a lesser degree, money for education loading together. The final component suggests a family factor with family location and parent approval much larger and loading together. While this factor analysis suggests three distinct components exist, these attributes will be examined independent of one another due to the manner in which these questions were asked.²³ Therefore, a composite variable for each component was not created, although these factor analyses suggest there are some attitudes and values more consistent with military service than others, especially physical challenge, teamwork, and service to country.

²² A cumulative file for all years was initially considered, but it was discovered that in 1990 all respondents were asked about all twelve attributes, while in 1992-1996 random subsets of youth were asked some of these questions. In an effort not to allow the 1990 data to dominate this analysis, factor analyses were conducted for every year. The patterns that emerged were consistent throughout every year examined.

²³ The youth selected to answer these questions were randomly selected, but with the exception of 1990, all of these attributes were not asked of all individuals. Composite variables were not created because too many valid cases became missing cases if individuals did not respond to all of the attributes within the composite variable.

Table 4-1
Principal Component Analysis
(1994)

	Components		
	Military Fit	Economic	Family
Variables:			
Physical Challenge	.705	-.026	.007
Teamwork	.645	.173	.173
Country	.640	.134	.211
High Tech	.563	.154	.028
Leadership	.542	.373	-.109
Job Security	.134	.679	.167
Equal Opportunity - Women	.096	.655	.004
Personal Freedom	-.060	.604	.332
Skill	.335	.556	-.012
Money For Education	.231	.510	-.136
Family Location	-.001	.070	.822
Parent Approval	.215	.062	.699

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser

Normalization. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

n = 1,794

Data Analysis

This chapter examines the intensity of youth consideration of military service, their reasons for joining and not joining the military, and what is most important to them. First, as previously noted, measuring and analyzing the intensity of youth propensity is a fairly easy process. From 1991 through 1996, Q525 asked all respondents about their consideration of military service. In 1990, this question was

restricted to those youth who has indicated they might enlist in the military.²⁴ For purposes of an aggregate examination of youth intensity, only 1991 through 1996 are included in the aggregate percentages as several statistical measures suggested significant differences when the 1990 youth were included.²⁵ Table 4-2 summarizes the aggregate and yearly percentages of youth and their consideration of military service.²⁶

Table 4-2
How Much Consideration Did You Give Military Service?

	Never Thought	Some Consideration	Serious Consideration
Aggregate n = 43,165	29.1%	49.6%	20.8%
1990* n = 2,354	8.9%	45.2%	45.9%
1991 n = 4,892	27.3%	49.2%	23.5%
1992 n = 5,573	29.5%	49.6%	20.9%
1993 n = 5,198	29.6%	48.9%	21.5%
1994 n = 6,529	30.0%	49.7%	20.3%
1995 n = 10,775	28.9%	50.2%	20.9%
1996 n = 10,198	29.3%	50.8%	19.8%
*restricted question			

²⁴ The respondents asked this question were limited to those who had responded "likely" or "definitely" to the basic propensity question, Q503, or some variation of that question.

²⁵ The mean for 1990 versus combined 1991-1996 is: 2.37 versus 1.92; the standard error for 1990 versus combined 1991-1996 is: .0132 versus .00338; the standard deviation is: .64 versus .70; and the variance is: .41 versus .49. I did not want to overinflate the intensity of those youth considering military service, nor did I want to underrepresent those youth for whom military service was never a consideration.

²⁶ 1990 is included in this table, but is not included in the aggregate numbers.

As Table 4-2 demonstrates, on average, about seventy percent of American youth gave some or serious consideration to military service throughout the 1990s. The number of youth giving some consideration to military service has remained fairly constant, while there has been a slight decline in serious consideration. The greatest yearly change in youth giving serious consideration to military service occurred from 1991 to 1992 (23.5% to 20.9%). This may be the result of the U.S. victory in the Gulf War, or possibly the result of the changing nature of U.S. military missions throughout the world.²⁷ It is interesting to note that there has not been a significant increase in the number of youth never considering military service, suggesting that the status of the military in American society has not declined.²⁸

Cross-tabulations between youth consideration and their demographics revealed few difference in terms of parent' education, region of the country, or age. In terms of race, there were few differences although Asians were less likely to consider military

²⁷ In a paper presented at the International Military Testing Association's Meeting in 1996, one scholar noted that youth view the military as less attractive than before the end of the Cold War. These youth indicated that military service had become more dangerous as the President and Congress seemed more willing to place the military in harm's way to fight someone else's battles. See "Declining Interest in Military Service: Qualitative Insights," by Anita R. Lancaster and Jerry Lehnus, DMDC, unpublished paper.

²⁸ For example see David R. Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989); Morris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education For Civic Consciousness (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983); and Gary Hart, The Minuteman: Restoring An Army of The People (New York: The Free Press, 1998.)

service.²⁹ As expected, men gave more serious consideration to military service than women.³⁰

Table 4-3
Cross-Tabulation of Youth Propensity and Youth Consideration
(1990-1996)

Youth Propensity:	Youth Consideration		
	Never	Some	Serious
Disinterested	73.9%	54.7%	42.0%
Unlikely	21.2%	35.5%	33.2%
Likely	4.3%	8.9%	19.4%
Joiners	<u>.6%</u>	<u>.9%</u>	<u>5.4%</u>
	100%	100%	100%

n = 42,663

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .389

Somer's d = .247

A cross-tabulation of youth propensity and youth consideration is summarized in Table 4-3. As expected, an overwhelming majority of youth who never considered military service are found in the disinterested category (73.9%). For those youth who gave some consideration to military service, over half of those respondents rejected military service and are found in the disinterested category (54.7%). Possible explanations for this will be explored later in this chapter when an examination of youth reasons for not enlisting are analyzed.

²⁹ Thirty-five percent of Asians had never considered military service and only sixteen percent had given serious consideration to joining the military.

³⁰ Thirty-nine percent of women had never considered military service with only fifteen percent giving serious consideration to joining the military. Slightly more than twenty-four percent of men gave serious consideration to joining the military, while another twenty-four percent had never considered joining.

Youth, who seriously considered military service, were also likely to reject military service as evidenced by the large percentages found in the disinterested category (42%) and the unlikely category (33.2%). Still, as seriousness increases, so does propensity to join. For example, while one in twenty of the never considerers is likely to or will join the military, one in five of the serious considerers is likely to or will join. These findings suggest that intensity of consideration is a vital part of the youth decision making process. The more thought given to military service, the more likely these youth will enlist. A further examination of this cross-tabulation reveals that within the joiners category, 64.7% gave serious consideration to joining the military, suggesting that their level of commitment to military service is modestly high.

Before we explore the stated reasons as to why youth would consider military service, one further analysis of youth consideration is necessary. The question remains as to whether youth consideration is a strong predictor of youth propensity. An OLS regression, summarized in Table 4-4, demonstrates that youth consideration is a modest predictor of youth propensity. Still, consistent with the findings in chapter three, discussing military service with someone other than a military recruiter remains the largest predictor of youth propensity to join. As expected, youth consideration adds to our understanding of youth propensity and increases the model fit as evidenced by the slight increase in the r^2 (.231 with Q525 compared to .209 without Q525).

Table 4-4
OLS Regression For Youth Consideration
(1990-1996)

	Standardized Coefficient	<i>t</i>
Variables:		
Asian	.034*	5.783
Black	.019*	3.720
Hispanic	.015*	10.952
White	-.031*	-3.515
CALCAGE	-.200*	-42.122
Gender	.144*	30.159
Fathers' Education	-.024*	-3.995
Mothers' Education	-.047*	-7.997
PROPENS2 (Discuss)	.260*	51.638
Q525 (Consideration)	.158*	31.537

n = 35,149

**p* = .000

Adj. r^2 = .231

S.E. = .6357

The evidence to date suggests that while an overwhelming majority of youth gave some consideration to military service, the majority of these youth rejected military service. The question remains why? Before we review the reasons why these youth would not choose military enlistment, it seems prudent to explore the reasons they gave for considering military enlistment. In 1990, the respondents, who had given some or serious consideration to military service, were asked, "What are the main reasons you would consider joining the military?" This question was changed in 1991 and remained the same through 1996. This question, Q526A1, asks the respondents, "If you were to

consider military service, what would be the main reasons?"³¹ The 1990 question specifically asks what reasons these youth are considering military service, while the latter question from 1991 through 1996 asks the respondents to address a hypothetical situation. Due to this limiting factor, these two questions are addressed separately.

Table 4-5 summarizes the responses to the 1990 question. Only those youth who had given some or serious consideration to military service were asked this question. The most frequently cited reason for joining the military was job training (24.9%). Over seventeen percent of these youth cited the more traditional appeal of duty as the primary reason for them to consider military service, followed closely behind by money for education (16%). Some of the more traditional motivations for military service such as self-esteem, maturity, and travel were mentioned less frequently by these youth.

Table 4-5
Youth Reasons for Joining the Military
1990

Job Training/Work Skills	24.9%
Other Reasons (Not Specified)	17.8%
Duty/Obligation/National Defense	17.3%
Money For Education	16.0%
Pay	8.4%
Self-Esteem	4.9%
Travel	4.5%
Retirement Benefits	3.2%

³¹ Once again, 1990 data is not included in this analysis as this question was phrased differently and asked only of those individuals who had thought about military service (responded either some or serious consideration for question Q525. Further, starting in 1994, only one-half of the respondents were asked this question.

Physical Challenge	1.4%
Maturity	1.2%
Teamwork	.5%
	100%
n= 2,041	

Table 4-6 summarizes the reasons given for possible military service by youth in 1991 through 1996. Again, one limitation that must be borne in mind in analyzing these responses is that the question requires the respondents to make a judgment about a hypothetical situation that may not reflect their own circumstances. Also, this question appears to ask youth what is attractive or beneficial about military service without these benefits necessarily applying to themselves. Still, the responses in Table 4-5 are somewhat consistent with the previous table as the top five responses are the same, just in a slightly different order.

Table 4-6
Youth Reasons for Joining the Military
(1991-1996)

Money For Education	25.7%
Job Training/Work Skills	16.2%
Duty/Obligation/National Defense	11.8%
Other (Not Specified)	11.4%
Pay	9.8%
Would Not Consider	8.0%
Travel	3.5%
Job Security	2.6%
Develop Discipline	2.2%
Retirement Benefits	1.8%
Self- Esteem	1.7%
Can't Find A Job	1.7%

Family Tradition	1.2%
Physical Challenge	.9%
Get Away From Home	.7%
Structure Life	.5%
Not Ready For College	.2%
Meet Others	.1%
n = 26, 724	100%

In Table 4-6, one of the most fascinating findings is that these youth state the primary benefit of military service is money for education, indicating that the military advertising campaigns highlighting this benefit have reached a significant portion of the American youth. As expected, duty/obligation remains a frequently given reason for considering military service (11.8%), while eight percent of the youth would not even consider military service. While these two tables provide a broad overview of the possible reasons why youth may join the military, a more thorough examination using cross-tabulations provides a clearer picture of why youth do join the military.

A cross-tabulation analysis of youth propensity categories with their stated reasons is analyzed in an effort to better understand the specific reasons why some youth choose military service. Specifically, Table 4-7 compares the reasons for military service of the 1990 youth with their propensity category and Table 4-8 compares the reasons for military service of the 1991 through 1996 youth if they were to consider joining the military. These tables compare the aggregate percentages for each reason given to the percentage totals for each reason within two of the youth propensity categories.

The two categories of youth propensity most likely to join the military, Joiners and Likely, were selected in order to determine whether their specific reasons for joining the military are similar to all youth. While I suspect these likely joiners share similar reasons for joining the military, it is also likely that their rank ordering of these reasons is different than the aggregate as their reasons are more personal in nature. I suspect their motivations to join the military are not based on abstract benefits or appeals. Rather, these likely joiners are considering military service for themselves and are highlighting the most important factor that attracted them to the military. This process of reasoning is likely much different from those individuals less likely to join the military, for whom this question reflects an unlikely outcome.

Table 4-7
Youth Reasons for Joining the Military
1990 Comparison

	Aggregate	Joiners	Likely
Job Training/Work Skills	24.9%	23.4%	27.0%
Duty/Obligation/National Defense	17.3%	23.0%	17.3%
Money For Education	16.0%	10.6%	14.8%
Pay	8.4%	6.0%	6.7%
Self-Esteem	4.9%	6.0%	5.3%
Travel	4.5%	4.1%	5.2%
Retirement Benefits	3.2%	3.7%	3.1%
Physical Challenge	1.4%	.9%	1.5%
Maturity	1.2%	.5%	1.5%
Teamwork	.5%	.5%	.4%
Other Reasons (Not Specified)	<u>17.7%</u>	<u>21.3%</u>	<u>17.2%</u>
	100%	100%	100%
	n=2,041	n=218	n=890

Table 4-8

Comparison of Youth Reasons for Joining the Military
1991-1996

	Aggregate	Joiners	Likely
Money For Education	25.7%	19.9%	24.4%
Job Training/Work Skills	16.2%	20.5%	20.3%
Duty/Obligation/National Defense	11.8%	16.9%	15.4%
Pay	9.8%	9.0%	7.2%
Would Not Consider	8.0%	*	.2%
Travel	3.5%	4.8%	3.8%
Job Security	2.6%	2.2%	1.9%
Develop Discipline	2.2%	2.8%	3.1%
Retirement Benefits	1.8%	1.6%	2.2%
Self- Esteem	1.7%	3.8%	2.9%
Can't Find A Job	1.7%	.6%	1.3%
Family Tradition	1.2%	2.8%	2.4%
Physical Challenge	.9%	1.2%	1.0%
Get Away From Home	.7%	1.6%	.9%
Structure Life	.5%	*	.8%
Not Ready For College	.2%	*	.2%
Meet Others	.1%	*	.2%
Other (Not Specified)	<u>11.4%</u>	<u>12.3%</u>	<u>11.8%</u>
	100%	100%	100%
	n=26,724	n=502	n=2,610

*No one gave this response

There are several interesting trends noted in these two tables. While the top three responses are the same as the aggregate, the order of their importance is somewhat different. The primary motivation for Joiners is job training/work skills for both the 1990 group and the 1991-1996 group (23.4% and 20.5% respectfully). For the 1990 group, duty/obligation is almost as important as gaining technical skills from the military (23.0%), while money for education is a distant third. This suggests there exists an intrinsic appeal for military service within those most likely to join the military.

For the 1991-1996 group, the second most frequently given reason is money for education (19.9%), followed closely by duty/obligation (16.9%). Travel, getting away from home, family tradition, and self-esteem were more frequently cited by Joiners than the aggregate group, suggesting a wider array of motivations for joining the military.

For the Likely category, their rank ordering is identical with the aggregate group, although there are significant differences in their percentages. For the 1990 group, job training was more frequently mentioned (27.0% compared with 24.9%), while money for education and pay were less frequently mentioned, suggesting that these youth are more interested in securing their future by gaining expertise than in immediate financial gratification. For the 1991-1996 group, significant differences were found in the number of youth mentioning job training (20.3% compared with 16.2%) and duty/obligation (15.4% compared with 11.8%). Similar to the Joiners, self-esteem and family tradition were more often mentioned by the Likely group, suggesting that the intrinsic appeal of military service still resonates within these youth.

As the preceding tables suggest, youth are motivated and attracted to military service for a variety of reasons. Some of these reasons reflect more concrete concerns such as attaining job skills and money for education, while other reasons reflect more abstract concepts such as duty or self-esteem. Still, youth propensity rates continued to decline throughout the 1990s. Why have the majority of these youth considered military service and rejected that option for themselves? A review of their reasons for

not enlisting provides some insight as to why military service does not appeal to the majority of American youth.

Table 4-9 summarizes youth stated reasons for not enlisting in the military. The most often cited specific reason for not wanting to join the military is their dislike for military life (17.8%), closely followed by other career interests (13.2%). A smaller portion of these youth noted family obligations (10.3%) and long term commitment (9.7%) as their reasons for not enlisting in the military. Senator John Warner recently suggested that the military should examine shorter commitments in an effort to arrest the declining propensity of American youth. "For a young person, four years is a lifetime. Allowing them to serve for eighteen months may be more expensive for the government, but it'll have other benefits."³² Less frequently cited reasons included threat to life, against beliefs, health, not qualified for military service, and fear of boot camp. Interestingly, a sizable portion of these youth could not give a specific reason why they did not want to enlist in the military (24.3%).

Table 4-9
Youth Reasons For NOT Enlisting In the Military
(1990-1996)

Dislike Military Life	17.8%
Other Career Interests	13.2%
Family Obligations	10.3%
Long Commitment	9.7%
Threat To Life	7.7%
Against Beliefs	6.2%

³² Senator John W. Warner (R-VA) as quoted by Bradley Graham, "Short-Term Remedy For Recruiters?" Washington Post, March 18, 1999, pg. 19.

	122	
Education	3.5%	
Health	3.2%	
Pay	1.8%	
Not Qualified	1.3%	
Fear Boot Camp	.8%	
Negative Publicity	.2%	
Military Layoffs	.1%	
Other (Not Specified)	<u>24.3%</u>	
	100%	

n = 25,680

What Is Most Important To Youth?

To this point, this chapter has explored the magnitude of consideration given by these youth concerning their enlistment potentialities, their reasons for joining the military, as well as their reasons for not wanting to the join the military. Youth are motivated to join the military for a variety of reasons, some more self-centered than others. Youth are also motivated not to join the military for a variety of reasons, primarily their dislike of military life and other career interests as well as the inherent dangers associated with joining the military such as threat to life. Continuing to allow these youth to speak for themselves, it is now appropriate to explore their responses to a series of questions that asks them how important various concrete and abstract principles and attributes are to them.

As previously noted, the Q528 series of questions asks the respondents how important various concepts are to them. For example, Q528A1 asks, "How important is getting money for education? Is this extremely important, very important, somewhat

important, or not important to you?" Prior to 1990, this series of questions was not asked as YATS was originally designed as a recruiting tool for the military and tracking these kinds of attitudes was not deemed necessary as youth enlistments met the needs of the military. Significant design changes took place in 1990 and YATS began to track these kinds of attitudes in an effort to better understand youth propensity.

This series of questions measures how important various concepts and attributes are to American youth. These questions also measure which aspects of military service are most salient for American youth. Still, as previously argued, while some of these attributes are traditionally associated with military service such as doing something for your country and teamwork, these attributes are not exclusively associated with military service. An individual can serve his country by pursuing a career in public service and teamwork is a part of various professions including the legal and medical career fields. Further, such attributes as living close to family and friends, as well as personal freedom are antithetical to military service. Military service requires individuals to leave their family and friends and also requires the individual to surrender some of their personal freedoms such as marching in a demonstration in uniform.³³

Still, this series of questions allows the researcher to determine, within a limited scope, what is most important to these youth and make comparisons between these various attributes. Further, these questions highlight which underlying constructs are

³³ For example see the Code of Military Justice. The Code of Military Justice lists specific activities and behaviors not permitted by active-duty members of the military.

most important for those individuals likely to join the military. Several types of analyses including frequency distributions, cross-tabulations, and chi-square tests were conducted to examine the relationship between these variables and youth propensity.

Appendix 2 summarizes the frequency distributions for the twelve attributes investigated and Appendix 3 summarizes the results of the cross-tabulations of these twelve attributes with youth propensity.

At this point, two methodological points need to be re-emphasized. This series of questions was asked of all respondents in 1990, but randomly asked of respondents in 1992 through 1996. Therefore, the 1991 data are excluded from this analysis. Further, in an effort to prevent the overrepresentation of the 1990 data, a cumulative file was not created to analyze these attributes and youth propensity. This situation creates an overwhelming number of tables if the researcher is interested in determining the impact of each of these twelve attributes on each category of youth propensity for each year.

While it is interesting to explore youth attitudes toward these various attributes, the primary focus of this dissertation is youth propensity to enlist. Therefore, an analysis of these attributes must be examined in terms of their impact on youth propensity. As a result, the following tables present a snapshot of the most important differences found between six of the twelve attributes and the youth propensity categories. Further, a limited number of years was selected in order to provide a parsimonious picture of the relationship between youth propensity and these

attributes.³⁴ Finally, as previously noted throughout this dissertation, individuals who responded "don't know" or "refused to answer" were excluded from this analysis.

Appendix 2 clearly shows that job security and personal freedom are the two most important attributes with over 90% of the responses consistently falling in the extremely/very important category every year. The importance of job security suggests some concern by these youth for their economic future and may be a reflection of their parents' turbulent economic experiences during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The level of importance placed on personal freedom suggests a strong commitment by these youth to the American ideal of liberty. Further, the next most important attribute is skill, with about 85% of youth placing this attribute in the extremely/very important category, suggesting again a certain level of concern about their economic future and the necessity for specific training to ensure their future economic prosperity. Most notable in analyzing these three most important attributes is the consistency of these youth attitudes over the years. This consistency falls off when money for education, teamwork, and country are examined.

Interestingly, the importance of teamwork appears to have increased over time,³⁵ while the importance of country has decreased over time, while there are no

³⁴ The three years selected include 1990, 1993 and 1995. These years were randomly selected as the researcher decided to examine every other year. 1990 represents the first year these attributes were investigated. Since these attributes were not investigated in 1991, the researcher skipped 1992 and selected 1993, skipped 1994 and selected 1995.

³⁵ This finding is not consistent with much of the contemporary research that claims the current generation of American youth are more individualistic. See National Association of Secretaries of States Report, January, 1999.

clear patterns in examining money for education. The decreasing importance of doing something for country may reflect Morris Janowitz's argument that "there has been a decline in the vitality and clarity of civic education in the United States" and he suggests "a need to reconstruct a sense of patriotism."³⁶ Finally, the least important attributes are high-tech and physical challenge, although both attributes' level of importance appears to be increasing and both attributes are rated as extremely/very important by almost half of the respondents.

As previously mentioned, Appendix 3 summarizes the results of cross-tabulations of youth propensity categories with the twelve attributes. To focus more succinctly on the impact of these attributes on youth propensity, the following tables extract specific data from this appendix and explore half of these attributes. There were few significant differences in the level of importance placed on skill, teamwork, parent approval, and equal opportunity for women in terms of their propensity categories. Therefore, specific tables for these attributes are not included in the following analyses. Finally, three measures of association are included such as the chi-square test of significance, Gamma and Somer's *d* in order to consider the statistical relationship between youth propensity and these attributes.

The two most important attributes, job security and personal freedom, are considered first in the following tables. Table 4-10 summarizes the cross-tabulation of

³⁶ Morris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism Education For Civic Consciousness (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983): ix, x.

youth propensity with this attribute. This table clearly demonstrates that job security has little impact on youth propensity as evidenced by the measures of association. With the exception of the chi-square test in 1990, all of the other measures of association indicate that the level of importance an individual places on job security has little impact on their likely propensity.³⁷ There are no clear patterns among any of the propensity categories, therefore one can conclude that there is no significant relationship between these two variables. While military service may provide job security for some young people, this attribute is not a primary motivator for enlistment in the military.

Table 4-10
How Important Is Job Security?
(percentages within each category)

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1990				
Disinterested	63.1%	56.9%	50.0%	53.0%
Unlikely	28.2%	31.2%	36.8%	32.8%
Likely	6.8%	9.5%	10.9%	11.6%
Joiners	<u>1.9%</u>	<u>2.4%</u>	<u>2.3%</u>	<u>2.6%</u>
n = 9,672	100%	100%	100%	100%
χ^2 sign. = .001				
Gamma = .054				
Somer's d = .000				

³⁷ The chi-square listed is the result of the 2-sided *t* test and the Somer's *d* statistic is when Join1 is the dependent variable. Further, the variations in the 1993 data are the result of a disproportionate number of individuals in the Disinterested and Unlikely categories and the relative few number of individuals in the Joiners category. For example, there are 1,325 individuals in the Disinterested category, 773 in the Unlikely category, 209 in the Likely category, and only 33 in the Joiners category.

	Not Important	128 Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1993				
Disinterested	65.3%	54.4%	55.8%	57.7%
Unlikely	17.4%	38.6%	33.6%	32.0%
Likely	13.0%	7.0%	9.2%	8.7%
Joiners	<u>4.3%</u>	<u>0%</u>	<u>1.4%</u>	<u>1.6%</u>
n=2,340	100%	100%	100%	100%

χ^2 sign. = .507

Gamma = -.025

Somer's d = -.014

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1995				
Disinterested	66.7%	58.2%	59.3%	57.8%
Unlikely	14.8%	29.6%	29.0%	28.2%
Likely	14.8%	10.6%	10.0%	11.6%
Joiners	<u>3.7%</u>	<u>1.6%</u>	<u>1.7%</u>	<u>2.4%</u>
n = 2,737	100%	100%	100%	100%

χ^2 sign. = .716

Gamma = .032

Somer's d = .018

Table 4.11 examines the impact of personal freedom on likely youth propensity.

There are significant differences in the level of importance Joiners and the Disinterested place on personal freedom. Joiners are the least likely to view personal freedom as very or extremely important. Disinterested youth are the most likely to attribute a great deal of importance of this attribute. Interestingly, as the level of importance placed on personal freedom increases, the likelihood of joining the military decreases as evidenced by the Disinterested propensity category. Similarly, as the level of importance placed on personal freedom decreases, the likelihood of joining the military increases as

demonstrated by the Likely and Joiners propensity categories. These patterns hold true for each year in this analysis. The measures of association reveal a slightly negative relationship between propensity and the personal freedom variable, evidence that supports one of the hypotheses for this chapter. The more likely an individual believes personal freedom is extremely/very important, the less likely they are to join the military.

Table 4-11
How Important Is Personal Freedom?
 (percentages within each category)

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1990				
Disinterested	33.8%	37.4%	49.9%	57.5%
Unlikely	27.9%	36.4%	37.3%	31.2%
Likely	23.6%	20.9%	10.5%	9.5%
Joiners	<u>14.7%</u>	<u>5.3%</u>	<u>2.3%</u>	<u>1.8%</u>
n = 9,679	100%	100%	100%	100%
χ^2 sign. = .000				
Gamma = -.182**				
Somer's d = -.110**				
1993				
Disinterested	33.3%	47.9%	53.3%	60.5%
Unlikely	38.9%	33.3%	36.5%	29.5%
Likely	22.2%	15.2%	8.7%	8.7%
Joiners	<u>5.6%</u>	<u>3.6%</u>	<u>1.5%</u>	<u>1.3%</u>
n = 2,354	100%	100%	100%	100%
χ^2 sign. = .000				
Gamma = -.138**				
Somer's d = -.079**				

	Not Important	130 Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1995				
Disinterested	25.0%	37.7%	58.0%	61.3%
Unlikely	16.7%	36.7%	30.2%	29.4%
Likely	41.7%	22.1%	9.9%	7.8%
Joiners	<u>16.6%</u>	<u>3.5%</u>	<u>1.9%</u>	<u>1.5%</u>
n = 2,815	100%	100%	100%	100%
χ^2 sign. = .000				
Gamma = -.167**				
Somer's d = -.096**				

**p = .000

Turning toward the military "fit" attributes, the logical starting place is with the Country variable. Table 4-12 summarizes the impact of this attribute on youth propensity. As expected, there are significant differences between each of the propensity categories. Joiners are almost five times more likely to rate doing something for your country as extremely important than those who believe doing something for your country is not important. Further, as the level of importance for Country increases, so does the percentages of individuals found in the more positive propensity categories. For example, in 1990, 5.2% of those who rated Country as extremely important were Joiners. In the same year, .6% of those who rated Country not important were Joiners. In addition, individuals who rated Country as extremely important are fifty percent less likely to be Disinterested in military service, indicating

that youth attitudes toward doing something for their country does have a significant impact on youth propensity to enlist in the military.

The measures of association suggest a modest positive relationship between these two variables, with all of the chi-square tests, Gamma, and Somer's *d* statistics significant. One may wonder whether these attitudes are driving youth propensity or is propensity driving these attitudes? In other words, which is the dependent variable and which is the independent variable? The Somer's *d* statistic allow the researcher to examine each variable as the dependent variable. The results are quite remarkable: in every year, the Somer's *d* statistic is higher when youth propensity is the dependent variable.³⁸ These results suggest that attitudes do make a difference in terms of youth propensity, particularly when serving your country is extremely important to these youth.

Table 4-12
How Important Is Doing Something For Your Country?
(percentages within each response)

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1990				
Disinterested	81.5%	65.2%	46.3%	42.7%
Unlikely	16.0%	29.1%	39.5%	33.6%
Likely	1.9%	5.1%	11.8%	18.5%
Joiners	.6%	.6%	2.4%	5.2%
n = 9,617	100%	100%	100%	100%

³⁸ For example, in 1990, the Somer's *d* statistic for Country as the dependent variable is .176 compared to .242 for Join1 as the dependent variable. For 1992, Country = .091 and Join1 = .134; for 1993, Country = .151 and Join1 = .191; for 1994, Country = .140 and Join1 = .163; for 1995, Country = .164 and Join1 = .193; and for 1996 Country = .004 and Join1 = .003.

χ^2 sign. = .000
 Gamma = .318**
 Somer's d = .205**

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1993				
Disinterested	85.3%	66.2%	51.6%	52.8%
Unlikely	12.0%	30.0%	35.4%	30.4%
Likely	2.7%	3.6%	10.8%	12.0%
Joiners	<u>0%</u>	<u>.2%</u>	<u>2.2%</u>	<u>4.8%</u>
n = 2278	100%	100%	100%	100%

χ^2 sign. = .000
 Gamma = .248**
 Somer's d = .155**

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1995				
Disinterested	80.9%	67.0%	51.1%	48.3%
Unlikely	14.2%	25.7%	36.4%	28.1%
Likely	3.9%	6.5%	10.6%	19.3%
Joiners	<u>1.0%</u>	<u>.8%</u>	<u>1.9%</u>	<u>4.3%</u>
n = 2,858	100%	100%	100%	100%

χ^2 sign. = .000
 Gamma = .282**
 Somer's d = .182**

** p = .000

As previously noted, several of the attributes which were thought to possibly belong in the military "fit" construct such as teamwork, high-tech, and leadership did not emerge as particularly significant in terms of their impact on youth propensity. Still, the physical challenge requires a closer examination in terms of its impact on youth propensity and the results of this cross-tabulation are summarized in Table 4-13. Once

again, a clear, convincing pattern emerges: the more important a physical challenge is, the more willing an individual is to join the military. For example, in 1995, those individuals who rated a physical challenge as extremely important were eight times more likely to enlist in the military than those individuals who rated this attribute as not important. Conversely, the less important a physical challenge is, the less likely an individual is to enlist in the military as evidenced by the decreasing importance placed on this attribute by the Disinterested.

Further, there is a significant increase every year between the very important and extremely important responses for Joiners, suggesting that this attribute may be one of the most important factors in attracting certain individuals to join the military. A similar increase can be found within the Likely category, although their increase occurs between the somewhat important and very important responses. Again, this attribute is definitely more important for the more positive propensity categories, suggesting that military service is viewed as physically challenging and can fulfill this need of a physical challenge for these youth. The measures of association show a modest, positive relationship between youth propensity and this attribute with all of the statistics found to be significant. This attribute does appear to motivate some individuals to join the military.

Table 4-13

How Important Is A Physical Challenge?
(percentages within each response)

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1990				
Disinterested	69.4%	54.8%	43.1%	40.7%
Unlikely	25.7%	36.9%	37.9%	33.1%
Likely	4.3%	7.3%	15.5%	20.0%
Joiners	<u>.6%</u>	<u>1.0%</u>	<u>3.5%</u>	<u>6.2%</u>
n = 9,581	100%	100%	100%	100%

 χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .307**

Somer's d = .220**

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1993				
Disinterested	76.3%	62.6%	51.7%	45.2%
Unlikely	20.3%	30.4%	34.6%	35.9%
Likely	2.7%	6.1%	11.8%	13.9%
Joiners	<u>.7%</u>	<u>.9%</u>	<u>1.9%</u>	<u>5.0%</u>
n = 2,281	100%	100%	100%	100%

 χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .292**

Somer's d = .201**

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1995				
Disinterested	74.9%	64.6%	47.5%	46.6%
Unlikely	21.6%	29.0%	33.8%	28.5%
Likely	3.0%	5.3%	16.6%	18.2%
Joiners	<u>.5%</u>	<u>1.1%</u>	<u>2.1%</u>	<u>6.7%</u>
n = 2,780	100%	100%	100%	100%

 χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .308**

Somer's d = .217**** p = .000

Before examining the attribute that most people suspect draws youth into the military, money for education, one additional attribute requires a brief examination. As previously argued, military service requires the individual to leave his/her home, his family and friends and move around the country and world. One of the attributes, Famlocat, examines this aspect of military service. The Q528 question asks the respondents, "How important is staying in an area near your family and friends?" It is likely that those youth who believe this attribute is extremely/very important are less likely to join the military. Table 4-14 summarizes the results of the cross-tabulation of this attribute and the propensity categories.

As expected, this attribute is inversely related to youth propensity. As the level of importance placed on family location increases, the likelihood of enlistment decreases as evidenced by the Disinterested propensity category. For example, in 1990, 44.8% of the respondents who rated Family Location as not important were within the Disinterested category. In the same year, 60.4% of the respondents who rated Family Location as extremely important were Disinterested youth. This change represents approximately a twenty-five percent increase in youth unwilling to join the military. Similarly, as the level of importance placed on family location decreases, the likelihood of joining the military increases as evidenced by both the Likely and Joiners propensity categories. All of the statistics reveal a slightly negative relationship between these two

variables. If an individual is extremely/very concerned about remaining in close physical proximity to their family and friends, these individuals are less likely to join the military.

Table 4-14
How Important Is Family Location?
(percentages within each response)

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1990				
Disinterested	44.8%	47.0%	54.4%	60.4%
Unlikely	36.3%	37.9%	34.3%	28.7%
Likely	14.3%	12.2%	9.5%	9.5%
Joiners	<u>4.6%</u>	<u>2.9%</u>	<u>1.8%</u>	<u>1.4%</u>
n = 9,681	100%	100%	100%	100%

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = -.155**

Somer's d = -.093**

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1993				
Disinterested	51.0%	52.1%	59.4%	65.6%
Unlikely	28.0%	35.1%	31.2%	27.4%
Likely	17.4%	10.9%	7.9%	5.9%
Joiners	<u>3.6%</u>	<u>1.9%</u>	<u>1.5%</u>	<u>1.1%</u>
n = 2,298	100%	100%	100%	100%

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = -.168**

Somer's d = -.096**

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1995				
Disinterested	49.4%	50.9%	59.2%	65.1%
Unlikely	30.6%	34.0%	29.4%	25.8%
Likely	16.3%	12.3%	10.2%	8.3%
Joiners	<u>3.7%</u>	<u>2.8%</u>	<u>1.2%</u>	<u>.8%</u>
n = 2,732	100%	100%	100%	100%

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = -.170**

Somer's d = -.098**

** p = .000

Finally, the last attribute examined in this analysis is money for education. In the earlier analysis of reasons for potential military service, this was the primary reason given by individuals to join the military if they were to consider military service. Money for education has been an important recruitment tool for each of the services, particularly the Army. Table 4-15 summarizes the results of the cross-tabulation of youth propensity and this "money for education" attribute.

The evidence in this table provides a somewhat mixed picture. There are no clear patterns explaining the relationship between propensity to enlist and money for education, except for the Likely category. For this group, as the level of importance placed on this attribute increases, so does their willingness to join the military. This finding suggests that money for education may be more important in attracting certain individuals than others. Still, the measures of association are not significant in 1993. For 1990 and 1995, these statistical measures demonstrate a relatively minor, positive relationship between youth propensity and this attribute.

Table 4-15 suggests that money for education has little impact on likely youth propensity, a finding that may have a significant impact on future recruitment strategies for the armed forces. The attractiveness of military service in terms of money for education may not be as significant as some individuals believe, particularly military recruiters. This table also demonstrates that while money for education was the primary reason given by youth for possible enlistment, this attribute is not as important as some

of the other attributes examined in terms of youth propensity. Not surprisingly, the two most important attributes that resonate with the more positive propensity categories are Country and Physical Challenge. Those individuals more concerned with personal freedom and family location are less likely to enlist in the military, while those individuals most concerned about money for education may enlist.

Table 4-15
How Important Is Money For Education?
(percentages within each response)

	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1990				
Disinterested	62.4%	53.4%	48.3%	51.5%
Unlikely	29.1%	35.7%	37.4%	32.9%
Likely	6.5%	9.0%	11.6%	12.6%
Joiners	<u>2.0%</u>	<u>1.9%</u>	<u>2.7%</u>	<u>3.0%</u>
n = 9,675	100%	100%	100%	100%
χ^2 sign. = .000				
Gamma = .073**				
Somer's d = .043**				
	Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1993				
Disinterested	70.2%	56.4%	55.8%	55.2%
Unlikely	21.4%	34.8%	32.1%	32.0%
Likely	6.0%	6.1%	10.4%	10.8%
Joiners	<u>2.4%</u>	<u>2.7%</u>	<u>1.7%</u>	<u>2.0%</u>
n = 2,340	100%	100%	100%	100%
χ^2 sign. = .144				
Gamma = .045				
Somer's d = .026				

	Not Important	139 Somewhat Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1995				
Disinterested	66.2%	62.7%	55.9%	57.0%
Unlikely	24.2%	28.6%	30.8%	28.9%
Likely	7.6%	7.2%	11.6%	11.7%
Joiners	<u>2.0%</u>	<u>1.5%</u>	<u>1.7%</u>	<u>2.4%</u>
n = 2,840	100%	100%	100%	100%
χ^2 sign. = .035				
Gamma = .074*				
Somer's <i>d</i> = .042*				

***p* = .000

**p* = .05

To briefly summarize, this analysis has been an exploration into what is most important to American youth. The evidence suggests that youth are most concerned about economic factors such as job security and learning a valuable skill as well as their personal freedom. The military "fit" attributes do resonate more with those individuals most likely to join the military, particularly the attributes of doing something for your country and a physical challenge. Those youth most concerned with attributes antithetical to military service such as personal freedom and family location are least likely to consider military service. The next logical step in this analysis would be an examination of the predictive power of these attributes. However, the limitations of the database, specifically its structure, prevent this kind of analysis. The number of valid cases becomes too small to allow a substantial analysis of the predictive nature of these attributes.

Summary

In this chapter, American youth are given an opportunity to speak for themselves about their motivations for joining the military, their reasons for *not* wanting to join the military, the magnitude of their consideration in contemplating possible military service, and what is most important to them. On average, over seventy percent of American youth gave some or serious consideration to military service, yet military propensity continued to decline during the same time frame. Perhaps just as remarkable, the percentages of youth giving some consideration to military service remained fairly stable (around fifty percent) from 1990 through 1996. The evidence suggests that while a substantial number of youth considered military service, a substantial number of youth also rejected military service. The question is: Why?

The most often cited reasons for rejecting military service are: dislike of the military life, other career interests, family obligations, and long commitment. Further, a significant portion of these youth could not verbalize why they would not want to join the military (24.3%), suggesting that these youth may not understand the nature of military service, yet they know it is not something that appeals to them. The most often cited reasons for military service include: job training, duty, and money for education.

Still, when these youth rate what is most important to them, job security and personal freedom emerge as the most salient concepts for these youth. While military service can provide job security, this attribute does not appear to motivate youth to join

the military. Further, personal freedom can be viewed as the opposite of military service. The significance placed on these attributes by American youth may explain, in part, the decline in military propensity rates.

As expected, the attributes of country and a physical challenge resonate most with those individuals most likely to join the military. Military service appears to fulfill these specific needs for these youth. Other attributes such as teamwork, leadership, and a high-tech environment appeal somewhat more to those most likely to enlist, although these relationships are not as significant as the relationships between country, physical challenge, and youth propensity.

Youth Attitudes Toward War and Military Operations

Chapter Five

In the previous chapters, personal and societal determinants to enlistment proclivity were explored. While chapter four focused on what is most important to youth, this chapter examines youth propensity through the prism of their foreign policy attitudes. General and specific youth attitudes toward war and the use of military force in contemporary military operations will be analyzed. Further, the impact of these foreign policy attitudes on their likely propensity will be examined.

Theoretical Considerations

Any examination of attitudes must acknowledge the contributions of various theoretical approaches to political behavior research. For many decades, the political science discipline, particularly political behavior research, was dominated by two distinct theoretical approaches: the Michigan voting model and the rational choice models.¹ In the 1970s, researchers began to apply social cognition models to political behavior. "The first explicit and systematic application of modern cognitive psychology in political science was by Axelrod (1973, 1976). His research focused on the causal

¹ Richard R. Lau and David O. Sears, eds. Political Cognition, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1984: 3.

schemata of foreign policy makers: the beliefs of political leaders about why different political events came about."²

Social cognition models have been "dominated by three general views of thought processes, depicting humans successively as consistency seekers, naive scientists, and cognitive misers."³ One of the more prominent ideas which gained influence among political science scholars was the notion of schema. A schema is a hierarchical organization of knowledge in a particular domain and serves two important functions: schemata guide the processing and storage of incoming information and they guide the recall and interpretation of information in memory.⁴

Numerous political science studies have investigated political attitudes, using these hierarchical models to investigate the structure and the degree of consistency prevalent in political attitudes.⁵ The seminal work was conducted in 1964 by Converse, "who found very little consistency either among domestic attitudes, among foreign-policy attitudes, or between the two policy domains."⁶ My research is particularly interested in the foreign policy attitudes of American youth. Past research has characterized foreign policy attitudes of the mass public as "random, disorganized, and

² Lau and Sears, 6.

³ Lau and Sears, 347-348.

⁴ Lau and Sears, 350-351.

⁵ For example, see Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, "How People Organize the Political World: A schematic Model," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (1984): 95-126.

⁶ Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model," *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 81, No. 4, December 1987): 1099.

unconstrained if they exist at all. Further, foreign-policy thinking has not been found to be structured along standard ideological (liberal-conservative) lines, partisan lines, or class lines.”⁷ Still, more recent research has reinterpreted these earlier findings, suggesting that foreign policy attitudes are structured by core values and that “the general attitudes that constrain specific preferences are distinctive to the foreign policy domain.”⁸

Further, Stanley Feldman suggests “it is of particular interest to uncover the *underlying principles* that lend some degree of consistency and meaningfulness to public opinion.”⁹ He argues that “it is possible to develop reliable and valid measures of basic beliefs and that such measures are strongly related to policy positions, performance evaluations, and candidate evaluations.”¹⁰ These underlying principles are the core values of individual citizens and this value approach to political cognition has much to contribute to our understanding of political attitudes. As John Zaller argues, “every opinion is a marriage of information and values - information to generate a mental picture of what is at stake and values to make a judgment about it.”¹¹

⁷ Hurwitz and Peffley, 1099. In addition, Andre Modigliani found that the liberal/conservative spectrum was too simplistic to explain public opinion during the Korean War. See Andre Modigliani, “Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and Political Distrust: An Analysis of Public Opinion on Military Policy,” *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 66 (1972): 960-978.

⁸ Hurwitz and Peffley, 1114.

⁹ Stanley Feldman, “Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core Beliefs and Values,” *American Journal of Political Science* (Vol. 32, 1988): 416. Italics in original.

¹⁰ Feldman, 437.

¹¹ John Zaller, “Information, Values, and Opinion,” *American Political Science Review* (Volume 85, No. 4, December 1991: 1215.

Political science scholars have suggested a wide range of core political values associated with our democratic system of government including individualism, equality of opportunity, moral traditionalism, egalitarianism, egocentrism, and patriotism.¹² For my research, the most significant core political values are personal freedom and patriotism and their impact on youth propensity to enlist in the military. As noted in chapter four, those youth for whom personal freedom is extremely important are less likely to enlist, while those youth whose tendency is to view duty to country as extremely important are more likely to enlist. These two core values appear to represent polar opposites in terms of likely youth propensity.

Youth attitudes toward war and the use of military force have been investigated by a variety of scholars. For example, John D. Blair found that "there is relatively consistent evidence that male high school seniors in 1975 were less supportive of the use of military force and war in general than their counterparts in 1969."¹³ In a further study of high school seniors' attitudes in 1976-1982, Jerald Bachman discovered that "about 60 percent concurred that 'the U.S. should be willing to go to war to protect its

¹² For example, see Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model," *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 81, No. 4, December 1987): 1099-1120; Stanley Feldman, "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core Beliefs and Values," *American Journal of Political Science* (Vol. 32, 1988): 416-440; James McCann, "Electoral Choices and Core Value Change: The 1992 Presidential Campaign," *American Journal of Political Science* (Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1997): 564-583; and John L. Sullivan, Amy Fried, and Mary G. Dietz, "Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988," *American Journal of Political Science* (Vol. 36, No. 1, February 1992): 200-234.

¹³ John D. Blair, "Chapter 9: Emerging Youth Attitudes and the Military," in Franklin D. Margiotta, ed., *The Changing World of the American Military* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979): 163.

own economic interests,' and substantial minorities conceded that 'there are times when the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of other countries.'"¹⁴ One final study of high school seniors' attitudes from 1976 to 1985 found little change in terms of support for military intervention during the ten years studied, although their analysis did provide further evidence that "high school seniors who expect to serve in the military are more promilitary than those who do not, and those whose anticipate military careers are the most promilitary."¹⁵ These research efforts suggest that those individuals drawn to military service are more likely to support military intervention and military superiority than those individuals less interested in military service.

To summarize, public opinion concerning foreign policy issues is likely undergirded by specific underlying core values. While social scientists continue to grapple with defining the fundamental American core political values, the most relevant core values for this dissertation are personal freedom and duty. To some extent, personal freedom is antithetical to military service. While duty to country is identified with military service, all members of American society who are patriotic do not serve in the military. These theoretical considerations suggest the following hypotheses:

¹⁴ Jerald G. Bachman, "American High School Seniors View the Military: 1976-1982," Armed Forces and Society (Vol. 10., No. 1, Fall 1983): 96.

¹⁵ Jerald G. Bachman, Lee Sigelman, and Greg Diamond, "Self-selection, Socialization, and Distinctive Military Values: Attitudes of High School Seniors," Armed Forces and Society (Vol. 13, No. 2, Winter 1987): 182.

H₁: Youth more supportive of the military as an instrument of foreign policy are more likely to join the military.

H₂: Youth more supportive of military superiority for the United States are more likely to join the military.

Data Methods

With the goal of understanding youth propensity in mind, this chapter explores youth attitudes toward foreign policy issues. The YATS database asks a variety of questions that allows the researcher to analyze youth attitudes toward specific military operations, military superiority and war. Three specific questions capture general youth attitudes toward war. The first, Q527A, asks the respondents whether they think there are times in which the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of other countries. The second question, Q527B, asks the respondents whether they think the U.S. should go to war to protect its own economic interests. The third question, Q527C, asks the respondents whether they think the U.S. should have much more military power than any other nation. Each of these questions was asked in every year from 1990 through 1996. Beginning in 1994, the YATS survey asked one additional question concerning general views toward war: Q527A1 asks the respondents whether they think the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of U.S. citizens. The available responses for all of these questions reflect a five-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.¹⁶

¹⁶ The original coding of these variables reflected a positive to negative scale with strongly agree = 1, mostly agree = 2, neither = 3, mostly disagree = 4, and strongly disagree = 5. These variables were recoded to reflect a negative to positive scale

These 'go to war' questions measure different priorities for the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy and require the respondents to make a judgment about when the employment of military force is appropriate. Q527A, renamed WRRGTS, reflects a more global, less nationalistic approach to foreign affairs asking respondents whether it is appropriate to use military force to protect the rights of citizens in other countries. Q527B, renamed WRECON, reflects a more protectionist approach to economics and taps into the perspective that the economic security of the U.S. is a vital national interest. Alternatively, Q527C, renamed USMILPWR, asks respondents whether retaining U.S. military superiority should be a priority for the United States. Finally, Q527A1, renamed WRUSCTZ, asks respondents whether the military should be employed to protect the rights of U.S. citizens. The responses to these questions will be examined independently as well as their impact on youth propensity.

Further, the YATS survey allows the researcher to measure the likelihood of youth to volunteer for a future war. Q527D asks respondents, "If you felt it necessary for the U.S. to fight in some future war, what would be the likelihood you would volunteer to serve in the military? The available responses for this question, renamed WRSERV, include: "definitely not volunteer," "probably not volunteer," "probably

volunteer,” and “definitely volunteer.”¹⁷ Once again, the responses to this question will be analyzed independently as well as its impact on youth propensity.

The next group of questions examined in this chapter explore whether youth are supportive of employing military force into civil unrest situations abroad. For example, in 1992 and 1993, the YATS survey asks: “In Yugoslavia, civil strife is destroying the homes and livelihoods of its citizens. Do you think the U.S. military should intervene in situations like this?” The available responses included “opposed,” “neither,” or “in favor.”¹⁸ This same question was also asked in 1992 and 1993 with the phrase “in cooperation with the UN” added.¹⁹ Further, a similar question was asked in 1993 concerning the use of the military in Somalia and Haiti for peacekeeping missions. Q644I states: “U.S. armed forces are presently on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. They might be involved in a similar mission in Haiti. Do you think U.S. military personnel should be used in peacekeeping missions in situations like this?”²⁰

These questions appear to have been designed to determine whether youth were supportive of the expanding roles of the U.S. military after the end of the Cold War. During 1992 and 1993, American political and military leaders were actively engaged in political debates concerning the proper roles and missions of the U.S.

¹⁷ Once again, this question was renamed and recoded to reflect a negative to positive scale with definitely not volunteer = 1, probably not volunteer = 2, probably volunteer = 3, and definitely volunteer = 4.

¹⁸ This is question Q527S in the 1992 and 1993 YATS codebooks and was renamed YUGO.

¹⁹ This question was renamed YUGOUN and is in the 1992 and 1993 codebooks.

²⁰ This question was renamed PEACEKEEP and is found in the 1993 codebook.

military. Further, this debate examined whether U.S. military troops should be under the command authority of the United Nations.²¹ These questions are only asked in 1992 and 1993. There were no additional questions in other years designed to measure youth opinions on government or public affairs. Still, these questions do provide a limited insight as to whether youth in those years thought the role of the military should be expanded to include peacekeeping missions. Once again, these questions will be analyzed independently as well as in terms of their impact on youth propensity.

The final set of questions analyzed in this chapter explore the impact of specific military operations and events on youth propensity. This section of the YATS survey begins by stating, "I will now ask you about some current and possible roles of the U.S. armed forces. For each role, I'd like to know how it would affect your attitude toward enlistment."²² For example, in 1990, Q527H states: "Finally, a few months ago, the U.S. reacted to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by moving a sizable military force into the Gulf area. How does this affect your attitude toward enlistment? Are you more likely to enlist, neither, or less likely to enlist?"²³

²¹ The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) concerning U.S. peacekeeping forces permits "U.S. military personnel to serve under non-American United Nations commanders - but only on a case-by-case, highly restricted basis." See "Counting the Cost of Keeping the Peace," U.S. News and World Report, February 14, 1994, p.36.

²² This introduction can be found in every year of the YATS codebooks.

²³ Once again, this entire series of questions was recoded to reflect a negative to positive scale with less likely to enlist = 1, neither = 2, and more likely to enlist = 3. Further each of these variables are renamed for ease of interpretation. For example this question is renamed USSR.

These questions measuring the impact of specific events and roles of the U.S. military obviously differ every year, although they can be grouped into several types of missions. For ease of comparison, four categories capturing the various roles and missions of the military are created: traditional military operations, humanitarian relief missions, domestic law enforcement missions, and peacekeeping operations. Table 5-1 lists the various missions within each of the categories and the variable created (with the year in which the question was asked) to capture each mission. Appendix 4 contains the complete wording of these questions.

Table 5-1
Roles of U.S. Military

A. Traditional Military Operations:

1. Iraq (IRAQ/1990)
2. Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DSTORM/1991/1992)
3. Iraq (IRAQENLT/1996)

B. Humanitarian Relief Missions

1. Mississippi Floods (MSFLOODS/1993)
2. Domestic Disaster Relief (USDISSTR/1994/1995/1996)
3. Worldwide Disaster Relief (WLDDISEN/1996)

C. Domestic Law Enforcement Missions

1. Stop Drugs from entering U.S. (USDRUGS/1994/1995/1996)
2. Control U.S. Civil Disturbances (USCIVIL/1994/1995/1996)

D. Peacekeeping Operations

1. Peacekeeping in Somalia (PEACENL/1993)
2. Haiti peacekeeping (HAITI/1994)
3. UN Peacekeeping worldwide (UNPEACE/1994/1995/1996)
4. Bosnia peacekeeping (BOSNIAEL/1996)

One further analysis will be conducted in which these various missions are examined from a domestic and international standpoint. Two broad categories are created and all of these questions will be placed either in the domestic or international domain. This will allow a slightly different examination of the impact of these roles and missions on youth propensity. The researcher can determine whether youth are more willing to enlist if military missions directly benefit the United States. These missions may be viewed as less threatening to American youth and may also reflect a tendency toward an isolationist foreign policy perspective. Alternatively, if youth are more willing to enlist for international missions, this perspective may reflect a more internationalist approach to foreign policy.

While this series of questions limits the ability of the researcher to easily generalize about youth foreign policy attitudes, these questions do allow an examination of the net effect of specific military operations on youth propensity. This analysis can be accomplished by comparing the percentages of those more likely to enlist with those less likely to enlist for each type of operation. This net assessment approach limits the broad application of these findings, although patterns among the various categories of missions may have extensive implications for the U.S. military. For example, if American youth react negatively to a specific type of mission such as UN peacekeeping and the U.S. increases the number of peacekeeping missions undertaken by the military,

the military may experience further difficulties in recruitment. Finally, this series of questions does not allow the researcher to conduct sophisticated statistical analyses such as OLS regressions due to the yearly changing nature of these independent variables. Rather, these questions allow the researcher to determine whether the specific roles of the military directly impact on youth propensity to enlist.

Data Analysis

The first set of analyses explore youth attitudes toward foreign policy, U.S. military superiority, and volunteerism for a necessary war and their impact on youth propensity. The dependent variable remains JOIN1, which captures youth responses to their likelihood of joining the military. A cumulative file was created in order to maximize the number of cases analyzed. Once again, this series of questions was not asked of all respondents, although the cumulative file captures over seventy-four percent of the respondents for the relevant years (1990-1996). A review of the responses by year did not reveal any significant differences for this first set of independent variables.²⁴

Table 5-2 summarizes the frequency distributions for youth responses to the three 'going to war' questions.²⁵ As expected, youth are most supportive of employing

²⁴ This yearly comparison was accomplished by comparing the cumulative mean with the yearly means.

²⁵ The going to war to protect the rights of U.S. citizens captures responses only for 1994, 1995, 1996. This question was not asked in 1990 through 1993.

military force to protect the rights of American citizens with over 90% of youth strongly or mostly agreeing with the U.S. going to war under these circumstances. The majority of American youth are more supportive of using the military to protect U.S. economic interests than protecting the rights of other citizens around the world (71.9% strongly/mainly agree compared to 57.1%). This attitude toward protecting U.S. economic interests is consistent with President Clinton's foreign policy platform during his presidential campaign, in which he emphasized the need to put U.S. economic interests first in the conduct of foreign affairs.²⁶ Finally, youth are eight times less likely to support the use of military force to protect the rights of other citizens compared to protecting the rights of American citizens, suggesting a strong nationalistic perspective among these youth.

Table 5-2
The U.S. Should Go To War To Protect...
(percentages within each category)

	U.S. Economic Interests? (1990-1996)	Rights of U.S. Citizens? (1994-1996)	Rights of Other Citizens? (1990-1996)
Responses:			
Strongly Disagree	5.1%	1.2%	8.9%
Mostly Disagree	9.6%	1.8%	17.0%
Neither	13.4%	3.2%	17.0%
Mostly Agree	38.4%	25.1%	41.4%
Strongly Agree	<u>33.5%</u>	<u>68.7%</u>	<u>15.7%</u>
	100%	100%	100%
	n = 40,080	n = 17,011	n = 40,130

²⁶ See "The Unmaking of Foreign Policy," U.S. News and World Report, October 18, 1993, p. 32.

While the preceding table shows the distribution of youth attitudes toward war, this table does not allow the researcher to examine the impact of these attitudes on youth propensity. The following series of contingency tables provides such an opportunity. Table 5-3 examines the impact of youth attitudes toward protecting U.S. economic interests on youth propensity; Table 5-4 displays the impact of youth attitudes toward protecting the rights of U.S. citizens on youth propensity; while Table 5-5 shows the impact of youth attitudes toward protecting the rights of other citizens on youth propensity.

As Table 5-3 demonstrates, youth attitudes toward going to war to protect U.S. economic interests do have a limited impact on their likely propensity. For example, respondents, who strongly agreed with this statement, were twice as likely to enlist in the military compared to individuals who strongly disagreed. Further, individuals likely to join the military who strongly support this use of military force are about one and one-half times more likely to join the military compared to respondents who strongly disagreed. For those individuals not interested in joining the military, strong support for this use of military force resulted in a twenty-five percent decrease in their likelihood of not joining the military. The measures of association for this independent variable are small, yet all are statistically significant. These findings suggests that attitudes toward going to war to protect U.S. economic interests do have a slightly positive impact on youth enlistment.

Table 5-3

The Impact of Youth Attitudes Toward Protecting
U.S. Economic Interests On Youth Propensity
(percentages within each category)
(1990 - 1996)

	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Neither	Mostly Agree	Strongly Agree
Disinterested	69.3%	60.2%	60.0%	54.2%	52.4%
Unlikely	20.9%	29.8%	31.3%	34.7%	31.7%
Likely	8.2%	8.7%	7.4%	9.7%	12.8%
Joiners	<u>1.6%</u>	<u>1.3%</u>	<u>1.3%</u>	<u>1.4%</u>	<u>3.1%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 39,816

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .135**

Somer's d = .085**

**p = .000

An analysis of Table 5-4 and Table 5-5 reveals similar findings. Respondents have higher propensity rates if they strongly support the use of military force to protect the rights of American citizens (three times higher) as well as other citizens around the world (about one and one-half times higher) compared to those who strongly disagreed. Those individuals likely to join the military have slightly higher propensity rates if they strongly support the use of military force in these instances.

Further, for the disinterested youth, as their level of agreement with the use of force increases, their likelihood of not enlisting in the military decreases. This finding suggests that these individuals realize the necessity of using military force in certain

instances, although one cannot conclude that these individuals are more likely to enlist in the military. Rather, this is more likely an acknowledgment on their part that the use of military force may require their enlistment in these types of circumstances. Finally, all of the measures of association are small and significant, suggesting that youth attitudes do influence their likely propensity. While the preceding tables have examined the impact of youth attitudes toward war on their likely propensity, the next attitudinal variables explore youth attitudes toward military superiority and necessary war.

Table 5-4
The Impact of Youth Attitudes Toward Protecting
Rights of U.S. Citizens On Youth Propensity
(percentages within each category)
(1994 - 1996)

	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Neither	Mostly Agree	Strongly Agree
Disinterested	77.0%	63.4%	68.1%	60.3%	55.8%
Unlikely	12.2%	24.9%	26.0%	28.0%	30.1%
Likely	9.8%	10.4%	5.1%	10.6%	11.1%
Joiners	<u>1.0%</u>	<u>1.3%</u>	<u>.8%</u>	<u>1.1%</u>	<u>3.0%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 16,928

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .126**

Somer's d = .069**

**p = .000

Table 5-5
The Impact of Youth Attitudes Toward Protecting
Rights of Other Citizens On Youth Propensity
 (percentages within each category)
 (1990 - 1996)

	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Neither	Mostly Agree	Strongly Agree
Disinterested	64.0%	59.8%	59.0%	54.3%	46.6%
Unlikely	23.2%	29.8%	31.8%	33.7%	35.2%
Likely	10.3%	8.9%	8.0%	10.3%	14.5%
Joiners	<u>2.3%</u>	<u>1.5%</u>	<u>1.2%</u>	<u>1.7%</u>	<u>3.7%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 39, 872

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .121**

Somer's *d* = .069**

***p* = .000

Turning first to the question of military superiority, Table 5-6 summarizes the impact of youth attitudes concerning whether the U.S. should remain a military superpower on youth propensity. One of the hypotheses for this chapter suggests that youth who are more supportive of military superiority are more likely to enlist. It seems logical that these individuals have a vested self-interest in the military retaining its superiority as the level of danger to them personally would likely be reduced. An analysis of Table 5-6 bears out this conclusion. Respondents are three and one-half

times more likely to enlist if they strongly support military superiority for the U.S., while those likely to enlist in the military also possess a higher enlistment rate (over two times higher) compared to those who strongly disagreed with the U.S. retaining its military superiority. Once again, the measures of association are small and significant, suggesting that attitudes do influence youth propensity rates.

Table 5-6
The Impact of Youth Attitudes Toward Military
Superiority On Youth Propensity
(1990-1996)

	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Neither	Mostly Agree	Strongly Agree
Disinterested	70.1%	59.3%	58.2%	53.4%	50.2%
Unlikely	22.3%	31.8%	32.5%	34.6%	31.3%
Likely	6.6%	7.7%	8.1%	10.4%	14.9%
Joiners	<u>1.0%</u>	<u>1.2%</u>	<u>1.2%</u>	<u>1.6%</u>	<u>3.6%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 39,841

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .158**

Somer's d = .121**

**p = .000

The final question examined in this group explores the impact of youth responses to the following question: "If you felt it necessary for the U.S. to fight in some future war, what would be the likelihood you would volunteer to serve in the

military?" This question is particularly interesting as previous research found that the majority of young people "would probably not participate voluntarily even in a war defined as necessary. Nevertheless, young people have not generally rejected war and sacrifice, but they appear more cautious in supporting the use of military force and more selective in the price that they are willing to pay."²⁷ Table 5-7 allows the researcher to determine if these conclusions are still applicable in the Post-Cold War era.

Table 5-7 provides the frequency distributions of the responses by year for this question. The yearly percentages are included to demonstrate the significant fluctuations in youth willingness to volunteer for military service. Most notable is the impact of Desert Shield/Desert Storm on youth attitudes. The percentages of youth probably or definitely willing to volunteer is highest in 1991, with the corresponding lowest percentages for definitely not volunteering also found in 1991. Interestingly, beyond that increase in the percentages of youth willing to volunteer, there is a marked decline in youth willingness to volunteer for military service even though the question is specifically framed in terms of their belief that war is necessary. In other words, even though these individuals may believe that war is necessary, they are unwilling to volunteer. These findings are similar to the previously cited research, suggesting that young people are still cautious in their support for the use of military force.

²⁷ See Blair, 173-174.

Table 5-7
If War Necessary, Likelihood of Volunteering
(1990 -1996)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Definitely Not	26.3%	17.0%	18.9%	19.5%	21.8%	23.7%	24.5%
Probably Not	36.7%	38.3%	38.2%	38.3%	39.0%	38.8%	39.3%
Probably	29.2%	35.1%	34.4%	33.7%	31.4%	30.7%	30.0%
Definitely	7.8%	9.6%	8.5%	8.5%	7.8%	6.8%	6.2%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n =	9,584	4,829	3,500	5,124	4,251	7,081	5,534

The preceding table does not allow the researcher to determine whether volunteering for a necessary war impacts youth propensity to enlist. One can logically assume that these two variables are closely related as both variables measure volunteerism in terms of military service. The distinction between these variables lies in the circumstances in which youth would volunteer for military service. Volunteering for war suggests a national defense emergency and a limited period of service, whereas propensity to join the military likely takes place during periods of relative peace.

As expected, there are significant differences in youth propensity rates in terms of their attitudes toward a necessary war. The propensity rate for Joiners is over forty times larger for individuals definitely willing to join compared to those individuals unwilling to join in times of war, while the propensity rate for the Likely category is over fifteen times larger in a similar comparison. The measures of association for this

relationship reveal a strong, positive relationship between these two variables. Young people willing to probably or definitely join the military in times of war are also more likely to join the military in times of relative peace.

Table 5-8
Impact of Necessary War Attitudes On Youth Propensity
(1990-1996)

	Definitely Not	Probably Not	Probably	Definitely
Disinterested	86.8%	61.6%	34.9%	23.0%
Unlikely	10.9%	34.4%	44.3%	29.0%
Likely	2.0%	3.8%	18.4%	33.3%
Joiners	<u>.3%</u>	<u>.2%</u>	<u>2.4%</u>	<u>13.8%</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 39,637

χ^2 sign. = .000

Gamma = .628**

Somer's *d* = .460**

***p* = .000

Support for Military Intervention

The next series of questions continues to explore youth attitudes toward foreign policy issues, specifically examining U.S. military intervention in civil unrest around the world. The YATS database limited these questions to 1992 and 1993. During this time, political and military leaders were actively engaged in a debate concerned with

resolving the proper role of the U.S. military in peacekeeping missions.²⁸ Three specific questions explore whether youth supported or opposed U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations around the world.

The first and second questions, asked in 1992 and 1993, focused on Yugoslavia, while the third question explored youth attitudes toward Somalia. For example, Q527S asked, "In Yugoslavia, civil strife is destroying the homes and livelihoods of its citizens. Do you think the U.S. military should intervene in situations like this? Are you in favor, neither, opposed?"²⁹ Q527S1 asked the same question with the added phrase, "in coordination with UN."³⁰ The third question, Q644I, focused on the U.S. peacekeeping mission in Somalia.³¹ These questions provide additional insight into youth perspectives on the proper role of the U.S. military and the impact of these attitudes on youth propensity to enlist in the military.

The following tables display the responses to these questions in terms of the youth propensity categories. Tables 5-9 compares youth support for U.S. unilateral

²⁸ In May 1994, President Clinton signed the first comprehensive U.S. policy on multilateral peace operations in the post-Cold War era ending a standing policy debate over the proper role of the U.S. military in these type of operations. See Press Briefing: National Security Advisor Tony Lake and Director For Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley Clark, May 5, 1994. (www.pub.whitehouse.gov - accessed May 26, 1999).

²⁹ This question was recoded and renamed YUGO in both 1992 and 1993 to reflect a negative to positive scale.

³⁰ This question was recoded and renamed YUGOUN in both 1992 and 1993 to reflect a negative to positive scale.

³¹ This question, Q644I, stated, "U.S. armed forces are presently on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. They might also be involved in a similar mission in Haiti. Do you think U.S. military personnel should be used in peacekeeping missions in situations like this? Are you in favor, neither, or opposed? This question was recoded and renamed PEACEKEEP to reflect a negative to positive scale.

military intervention in 1992 to 1993, Table 5-10 compares youth support for U.S. military intervention in cooperation with the UN in 1992 to 1993, and Table 5-11 compares youth attitudes toward Somalia with their propensity categories. These tables demonstrate the impact of these kinds of missions on likely youth propensity.

Similar to previous findings, Table 5-9 demonstrates a small, positive relationship between youth attitudes toward the employment of military force in civil unrest situations and youth propensity as evidenced by the measures of association for both 1992 and 1993. Those individuals supportive of U.S. unilateral military action are more likely to join the military than those individuals who oppose military action. For example, in 1992, Joiners, who supported military action, were twice as likely to enlist in the military than those individuals who opposed military action. A similar pattern is found for those likely to join the military, although to a lesser degree (about one and one-half times more likely to join). These findings suggest that youth willing to join the military are more supportive of military action, even though these kinds of situations would likely put them into situations with some degree of danger. These youth may believe that the circumstances surrounding the situation in Yugoslavia warranted the use of military force to prevent further bloodshed. Alternatively, these youth may believe that it is necessary for the U.S. to exercise its leadership role in the international arena. One of the most visible and effective means available is the deployment of U.S. troops abroad, particularly in situations of civil unrest.

Table 5-9
Youth Support for U.S. Military Intervention
1992-1993

	Opposed	Neither	Support
1992			
Disinterested	57.7%	57.0%	48.6%
Unlikely	33.2%	33.8%	37.2%
Likely	7.5%	7.4%	10.7%
Joiners	1.6%	1.8%	3.5%
n = 1,766			
χ^2 sign = .000			
Gamma = .147			
Somer's <i>d</i> = .071			

	Opposed	Neither	Support
1993			
Disinterested	62.2%	58.8%	50.9%
Unlikely	30.0%	30.3%	35.2%
Likely	6.8%	9.6%	11.6%
Joiners	1.0%	1.3%	2.3%
n = 2,585			
χ^2 sign = .000			
Gamma = .148			
Somer's <i>d</i> = .099			

While the preceding analysis examined U.S. unilateral intervention, Table 5-10 summarizes the impact of youth attitudes toward U.S. collective action on youth propensity. Youth attitudes toward collective security have less of an impact on their propensity to enlist as evidenced by the measures of association. Further, while youth supportive of coordinated U.S./UN military action possess higher rates of enlistment in 1992, this is not the case in 1993. In 1993, attitudes appear to have a minimal impact

on youth propensity, with the exception of the Disinterested. This finding is likely a reflection of the growing weariness associated with UN peacekeeping missions, the various controversies surrounding the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, and the promised withdrawal of U.S. troops by President Clinton after six months which did not materialize.³²

Table 5-10
Youth Support for U.S. Military Intervention
In Coordination With the United Nations
1992-1993

	Opposed	Neither	Support
1992			
Disinterested	62.6%	53.0%	51.3%
Unlikely	28.7%	34.4%	33.3%
Likely	7.7%	10.7%	12.7%
Joiners	1.0%	1.9%	2.7%
n = 1,680			
χ^2 sign = .003			
Gamma = .143			
Somer's d = .095			
	Opposed	Neither	Support
1993			
Disinterested	60.9%	56.6%	52.6%
Unlikely	28.7%	33.0%	34.9%
Likely	8.1%	9.0%	10.1%
Joiners	2.3%	1.4%	2.4%
n = 2,494			
χ^2 sign = .023			
Gamma = .097			
Somer's d = .065			

³² The initial U.S. deployment of military troops to Bosnia for peacekeeping operations was expected to last six months. Today, several years after the promised withdrawal, U.S. troops remain deployed in the region. For the history of this deployment, see BOSNIALINK, located at www.defenselink.mil (accessed May 19, 1999).

The final table in this series examines youth attitudes toward U.S. peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti. Table 5-11 shows the impact of these attitudes on youth propensity. Once again, the measures of association suggest a minor, positive relationship between these attitudes and youth propensity. Still, there are few differences in the propensity of those who support this kind of military action and those who oppose these military operations, although these differences do follow the patterns seen in the previous two tables. Somalia and Haiti were frequently covered by the news media and these attitudes may reflect the volatile nature of the Somalia peacekeeping operation in which at least fifteen soldiers were killed and three Army helicopters were downed.³³ These incidents highlight the inherent dangers associated with peacekeeping missions, likely resulting in fewer young people supporting this kind of military action.

Table 5-11
Youth Support for U.S. Peacekeeping Missions
In Somalia and Haiti
1993

	Opposed	Neither	Support
Disinterested	64.4%	57.1%	53.4%
Unlikely	27.4%	34.5%	35.0%
Likely	7.0%	7.5%	10.0%
Joiners	1.2%	.9%	1.6%
n = 2,175			
χ^2 sign = .003			
Gamma = .127			
Somer's d = .084			

³³ "The Unmaking of Foreign Policy," Time, October 18, 1993, 30-32.

To briefly summarize, youth attitudes toward U.S. unilateral military action had the largest impact on likely propensity compared to youth attitudes toward joint U.S./UN military action. The lessening impact of youth attitudes on likely propensity evidenced in the analysis of the 1993 peacekeeping missions may be the result of various factors such as the inherent dangers and uncertainties associated with peacekeeping operations. While the previous tables compared specific youth attitudes and their propensity categories, one final measure of the relationship between these attitudes and youth propensity is necessary. While an OLS regression is not possible,³⁴ a bivariate correlation analysis was conducted to determine the extent of the relationship between these attitudes and youth propensity. Table 5-12 summarizes the results of the bivariate correlations between these attitudes and the propensity categories.

While all of these attitudinal variables are significant, almost all of the correlation coefficients reflect a weak linear relationship between these attitudes and youth propensity with one major exception. The correlation coefficient for WRSERV reflects a moderate relationship between volunteering for military service in a necessary war and youth propensity (.467). This is not surprising since both variables are capturing military service. The distinction between JOIN1 and WRSERV is the

³⁴ Several OLS regression analyses were attempted and the number of valid cases continued to decline to unacceptable levels. For example, using the 1992 file, an OLS regression was attempted to determine the additional explanatory power of YUGOUN and the number of valid cases fell below eighteen percent of the entire year's cases. The major problem remains in the design of the questionnaire in which not all of the relevant questions are asked of all the respondents.

circumstances under which military service would take place, rather than whether it would take place at all. Interestingly, the next largest coefficient is associated with whether the U.S. should retain its military superiority, suggesting a minor pro-military preference for those more likely to join the military (.130). Further, the next largest coefficients are associated with the 1992 peacekeeping operations. This finding suggests that, at least initially, youth were more willing to join the military and support these types of military operations. While the preceding analyses inferred the relationship between foreign policy attitudes and youth propensity, the YATS surveys provide a more direct route. The final section of this chapter directly explores the impact of various military roles and missions on youth propensity.

Table 5-12
Bivariate Correlations of Foreign Policy Attitudes
on Youth Propensity
1990-1996

	Pearson Correlation	Significance (2-tailed)	Number of cases
WRECON	.091	.000	39,816
WRRGTS	.090	.000	39,872
WRUSCTZ*	.067	.000	16,928
USMILPWR	.130	.000	39,826
WRSERV	.467	.000	39,637
YUGO (1992)	.109	.000	1,766
YUGO (1993)	.074	.000	2,585
YUGOUN (1992)	.102	.000	1,680
YUGOUN (1993)	.058	.004	2,494
PEACEKEEP (1993)	.076	.000	2,175
*1994-1996			

Attitudes And Propensity

To this point, statistical measures have been used to infer that attitudes do impact youth propensity. The final series of analyses explores youth attitudes toward specific military operations and missions in terms of their impact on enlistment. For example, in 1993, Q644J asked, "How does involvement of the armed forces in peacekeeping missions like Somalia, and potential involvement in Haiti, affect your attitude towards enlistment? Are you more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither?" These questions are less interested in youth attitudes toward foreign policy issues than the impact of specific foreign policies on youth propensity. This series of questions allows the researcher to directly examine whether attitudes toward specific missions and events impact propensity. Further, the direction of this impact of foreign policy issues on youth propensity can be measured.

As previously noted, these questions are divided into various kinds of missions. Table 5-13 summarizes the responses to these questions in order to determine whether the kind of military operation has a distinct impact on youth propensity. Table 5-14 summarizes each question and its net effect, but classifies these questions as either U.S. domestic missions/events or international missions/events. This allows the researcher to determine whether youth are more likely to enlist if these individuals can surmise a direct benefit to the United States. Net effect is calculated as the difference between the

less likely to enlist category and the more likely to enlist category. A positive net effect means youth are more likely to enlist, while a negative net effect reflects less willingness to enlist.

In general, American youth are much more willing to enlist in the military to support humanitarian relief efforts, particularly those oriented toward the United States. For example, the largest percentages within the more likely to enlist category can be found within the U.S. humanitarian relief missions in 1994 and 1995 (65.9% and 66.3% respectively). Further, all of the humanitarian missions mentioned in these surveys have a positive impact on youth enlistment, although the impact of humanitarian relief missions around the world was less influential than relief efforts within the United States. The second largest positive influences on youth enlistment can be found within the U.S. law enforcement category, suggesting that American youth are less familiar with the legal limits placed on the use of military force within the continental United States. All of these missions had a positive net effect on youth enlistment.

Further, traditional military missions had a negative impact on youth enlistment, with the exception of Desert Storm in 1991. This is likely the result of the overwhelming Allied victory in Desert Storm, although the effects of this successful mission appear to have dissipated over time as the impact of Desert Storm was negative just a year later. A review of the peacekeeping category revealed a somewhat mixed picture. While youth seem to slightly support UN peacekeeping missions in the

abstract, specific peacekeeping missions such as Haiti and Somalia had huge negative effects on youth attitudes toward enlistment (-42.9% for Haiti and -40.3% for Somalia).

Table 5-13
Foreign Policy Issues Affect Enlistment?
(1990-1996)

	Less Likely	No Effect	More Likely	Net Effect
Traditional Military Ops				
Iraq (1990) n = 9737	33.2%	53.5%	13.3%	- 19.9%
DStorm (1991) n = 4864	13.0%	65.3%	21.7%	+ 8.7%
DStorm (1992) n = 3507	24.2%	55.7%	20.0%	- 4.2%
Iraq (1996) n = 3946	34.5%	55.3%	10.2%	- 24.3%
Humanitarian Relief Missions				
Msfloods (1993) n = 5176	9.2%	37.3%	53.4%	+ 44.2%
USdisstr (1994) n = 4305	7.2%	26.9%	65.9%	+ 58.7%
USdisstr (1995) n = 7171	7.8%	26.0%	66.3%	+ 58.5%
USdisstr (1996) n = 5565	7.3%	30.4%	62.3%	+ 55.0%
Wlddisstr (1996) n = 5559	14.1%	40.2%	45.7%	+ 31.6%
U.S. Law Enforcement				
USdrugs (1994) n = 4291	12.6%	35.4%	52.0%	+ 39.4%
USdrugs (1995) n = 7144	13.3%	32.9%	53.8%	+ 40.5%
USdrugs (1996) n = 5558	12.7%	37.7%	49.6%	+ 36.9%
UScivil (1994) n = 4287	15.0%	41.7%	43.3%	+ 28.3%

	Less Likely	No Effect	More Likely	Net Effect
UScivil (1995) n = 7154	17.9%	40.1%	42.0%	+ 24.1%
UScivil (1996) n = 5554	15.8%	45.1%	39.1%	+ 23.3%
Peacekeeping Operations				
Somalia (1993) n = 2196	40.3%	50.2%	9.5%	- 30.8%
Haiti (1994) n = 2206	42.9%	49.9%	7.3%	- 35.6%
UNPeace (1994) n = 4289	26.3%	42.2%	31.5%	+ 5.2%
UNPeace (1995) n = 7155	27.7%	39.8%	32.5%	+ 4.8%
UNPeace (1996) n = 5557	24.1%	46.9%	29.0%	+ 4.9%
Bosnia (1996) n = 5478	39.3%	54.5%	6.2%	- 33.1%

As previously mentioned, Table 5-14 reorganizes the data into two broad categories: U.S. domestic missions/events and international missions/events. The most obvious finding in examining this table is that American youth are much more willing to join the military if they are supporting U.S. domestic missions rather than international missions. Youth likely view these missions as less life-threatening and may reflect a more isolationist approach to foreign policy. The only international mission with a significant positive effect on youth enlistment is worldwide humanitarian relief (+ 31.6% net effect). Youth attitudes toward drug interdiction and U.S. civil disturbances

support former Senator Sam Nunn's initiative in 1993 to encourage the military to become more involved in community work.³⁵

Cross-tabulations of these variables (not shown) with youth propensity categories revealed few surprises. As expected, the rate of youth propensity for Joiners was significantly higher than the propensity rate of individuals less likely to enlist with the exception of the 1996 Iraq and Bosnia missions. Similar results were found for those youth likely to join the military. These findings may represent a general decline in support for the use of military force among young people. Still, this conclusion requires further evidence to determine whether this is the beginning of a longer term trend or perhaps an isolated perspective. Finally, the impact of these attitudes on the propensity of those least likely to join the military suggests that these youth tend to be more isolationistic than Joiners, although a review of whether their lack of interest in the military is driving their attitudes or vice-versa revealed mixed findings.³⁶

³⁵ In the Defense Authorization Act of 1993, Congress encouraged the military to become active in a variety of community projects and Senator Nunn argued that, "While the Soviet threat is gone, at home we are still battling drugs, poverty, urban decay, lack of self-esteem, unemployment, and racism. The military certainly cannot solve these problems...But I am convinced that there is a proper and important role the Armed Forces can play in addressing these pressing issues." See, Mark J. Eitelberg, "The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years," in Professionals On The Front Line, edited by J. Eric Fredland and others, (New York: Brassey's, 1996): 83.

³⁶ All of the Somer's *d* statistics for the U.S. disaster relief missions, the traditional military operations, and the international events revealed that propensity was driving attitudes, while there were few differences between attitudes and propensity for U.S. civil disturbances, U.S. drug interdiction, and UN peacekeeping operations. For example, in 1995, the following Somer's *d* statistics revealed: .154 for Joiners as the dependent variable (.000 significance) compared to .131 for U.S. disaster relief as the dependent variable (.000 significance); .139 for Joiners as the dependent variable (.000 significance) compared to .142 for U.S. civil disturbances (.000 significance); .178 for Joiners as the dependent variable (.000 significance) compared to .172 for U.S. drug interdiction (.000 significance); and .145

Table 5-14
 Foreign Policy Impact on Youth Propensity
 U.S. Domestic and International Operations

	Year	Net Effect
U.S. Domestic Missions/Events		
U.S. Disaster Relief	1994	+ 58.7%
U.S. Disaster Relief	1995	+ 58.5%
U.S. Disaster Relief	1996	+ 55.0%
Mississippi Floods	1993	+ 44.2%
U.S. Drug Interdiction	1995	+ 40.5%
U.S. Drug Interdiction	1994	+ 39.4%
U.S. Drug Interdiction	1996	+ 36.9%
U.S. Civil Disturbances	1994	+ 28.3%
U.S. Civil Disturbances	1995	+ 24.1%
U.S. Civil Disturbances	1996	+ 23.3%
International Missions/Events		
Worldwide Disaster Relief	1996	+ 31.6%
Desert Storm	1991	+ 8.7%
UN Peacekeeping	1994	+ 5.2%
UN Peacekeeping	1996	+ 4.9%
UN Peacekeeping	1995	+ 4.8%
Desert Storm	1992	- 4.2%
Iraq	1990	- 19.9%
Iraq	1996	- 24.3%
Somalia	1993	- 30.8%
Bosnia	1996	- 33.1%
Haiti	1994	- 35.6%

for Joiners as the dependent variable (.000 significance) compared to .163 for UN peacekeeping as the dependent variable (.000 significance).

Summary

This chapter has explored youth attitudes toward general and specific foreign policy issues as well as their impact on youth propensity. Youth are overwhelmingly more supportive of using the military as an instrument of foreign policy to protect the rights of American citizens than protecting the rights of citizens around the world. American youth are slightly less supportive of employing military force to protect the economic interests of the U.S., although a majority of youth support this national security policy. In terms of military superiority, American youth are generally supportive of this national security goal, although there has been a decline in youth willingness to join the military for a necessary war.

In terms of youth propensity, young people are more willing to join the military if they can identify clear benefits for the United States. The rates of propensity for Joiners were significantly increased by their support for these potential situations, with the largest increase in propensity rates (three times higher) found supporting the use of military force in protecting the rights of American citizens. The second largest impact of these attitudes was found in protecting U.S. economic interests. Still, the most significant attitude affecting youth propensity was revealed in an analysis of the likelihood of youth to volunteer for a necessary war, suggesting that American youth

are willing to make personal sacrifices if they believe the danger to their nation necessitates such action.

Turning toward the expanded role of military intervention into areas of civil unrest, youth attitudes toward these missions were less likely to affect their rates of propensity than their attitudes toward going to war. Young people appear to make a distinction between which military missions are necessary and worth the potential loss of American lives. For example, rates of propensity were positively affected by the initial peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, although this influence waned over time. It is likely that this waning support was the result of the specific events that occurred in Somalia, in which American lives were lost and images of American flags being burned were repeatedly broadcast by the news media. These findings suggest that youth propensity rates are susceptible to specific events, an indication that U.S. policymakers may need to educate and clarify future peacekeeping missions for American youth in order to illicit their support.

Further, youth propensity rates are higher if the military is serving U.S. national interests at home rather than conducting military operations around the world. Youth are much more willing to enlist when the military is involved with humanitarian relief efforts, particularly when these missions assist U.S. citizens. Still, while these youth are slightly more likely to enlist for abstract peacekeeping missions, the affect of these missions on enlistment dissipates for specific peacekeeping operations. Yugoslavia,

Iraq, and Somalia had the largest negative net effects on youth enlistment. Finally, while these attitudes seem to suggest that American youth tend to be isolationistic in their approach to foreign policies, the final series of independent variables are tied to youth enlistment and may not be the best measure of their foreign policy perspectives.

Implications for the Future of the U.S. Military

Chapter Six

In a recent editorial in the *Washington Post*, Mark Shields stated that "the federal government of the United States effectively announced that this nation's 26-year experiment with an all-volunteer military service had failed."¹ Mr. Shields cited the recent announcement by the Pentagon to freeze the retirement plans of about 6,000 Air Force officers and enlisted personnel and the prevention of an additional 120,000 active duty personnel from leaving the force as evidence that the all-volunteer force is no longer based on volunteerism. While the all-volunteer military is certainly anemic and experiencing widespread problems of retention and recruitment, it is hardly a failure and no longer based on volunteerism. For example, recent Navy recruitment figures indicate that this branch of the military "has met or exceeded its goals every month since the fiscal year began in October. At this rate, the Navy expects to sign up the 53,224 sailors it needs this year."² Still, as noted in chapter one, personnel issues will likely remain the most important challenges for the U.S. military into the next millennium.

The goal of this dissertation has been to thoroughly explore youth propensity to enlist in the U.S. military and to answer the following questions. Which groups of

¹ Mark Shields, "When in Wartime," *Washington Post*, May 29, 1999, A27.

² Andrea Stone, "Staff, Ads, Cash Lure Recruits to the Navy," *USA Today*, May 24, 1999, 6.

American youth are more likely to enlist in the military? What are their motivations for enlisting in the military? Who influences these youth to join the military? With whom did they discuss this possible enlistment? How much thought did they give to considering military service? Are there distinct attitudes which increase youth likelihood of joining the military? This chapter summarizes the major findings and examines the implications of these findings in terms of the future viability of the AVF.

Major Findings

Since 1990, youth propensity to enlist in the military has been steadily declining and there does not appear to exist a single, simple causal explanation for this phenomenon. Some scholars attribute this decline in youth interest in the military to external factors such as the robust economy, low unemployment, and more high school graduates choosing college than ever before.³ Other military manpower experts cite long-term military commitments, military discipline, an erosion of military benefits such as health care and pensions, low pay, and the mounting number of peacekeeping missions in foreign countries raising the danger of military service as possible explanatory factors for declining youth proclivity to join the military.⁴ Other scholars

³ See Bradley Graham, "The Bugle Sounds, But Fewer Answer," *The Washington Post*, May 13, 1999, A3, Steven Komarow, "Army Hikes College Aid Amid Recruit Drop," *USA Today*, Nov. 13, 1998, A4, and Melvin Laird, "People, Not Hardware: The Highest Defense Priority," in William J. Taylor, Jr., Eric T. Olson, and Richard A. Schrader, eds., *Defense Manpower Planning Issues for the 1980s* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981): 61-79.

⁴ See remarks by Army Major General Evan Gladdis, Commander of Army Recruiting Command, in "Why Teens Balk At Joining Military," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 25, 1999: 1 and Steven

place the blame on declining youth interest in military service squarely on the shoulders of American youth. These scholars cite recent survey data indicating that "shifts in attitudes and values have distanced the nation's young people from the armed forces."⁵ Finally, some experts blame the current commander-in-chief, while some members of Congress favor reinstituting the military draft if military readiness and personnel problems continue to worsen.⁶

While it is likely there are a multiplicity of reasons for declining youth proclivity to join the military, there also exists a plethora of reasons for joining the military. Some youth are attracted to military service because of such unique benefits as job security, work skills, and money for future education. Others are enticed to join the military as a reflection of more abstract principles such as duty to country, national service, and/or obligation of citizenship. Some youth find the physical challenges and sense of adventure alluring.

Throughout this dissertation, the self-selection process of American youth to enlist has been examined through a variety of exogenous variables. Propensity to enlist has been conceptualized as the likelihood of young people to join the military in the next

Lee Myers, "Young People Choosing Fun Over Being All They Can Be," New York Times, November 3, 1998: 1.

⁵ Graham, 1.

⁶ U.S. Representatives Stephen Buyer, R-Ind. and Norman Sisisky, D-Va. recently discussed reviving the military draft during a House hearing in late October 1998. See "Recruiting, Retention Shortfalls Spark Talk of Reinstating Draft," San Antonio Express-News, November 23, 1998: 1. Also see and editorial by David McCormick, "The Draft Isn't the Answer," The New York Times, February 10, 1999: 16.

few years. Four distinct categories for likely propensity were created in order to better understand which youth were most attracted to military service. These categories included Joiners, the Likely, the Unlikely, and the Disinterested. The major findings of this research are broken down into four categories explaining likely propensity: youth conditional factors, key agencies of socialization, youth values, and youth attitudes.

Conditional Factors

The first category of exogenous variables examined the demographic characteristics of American youth and their impact on youth propensity to enlist in the military. These conditional factors included race, gender, age, region of the country, and parents' educational level. As expected, the strongest positive association between these variables and youth propensity was associated with gender. The U.S. military has traditionally been a male-dominated institution and continues to attract men more frequently than women. The second strongest association between these variables revealed a negative relationship between age and propensity to enlist, suggesting that by their senior year, most young people have already chosen between college, military service, or civilian employment. This negative correlation also suggests that military recruiters may be better able to influence youth propensity by targeting sophomore and junior high school students rather than concentrating on senior high school students.

Further, an analysis of youth propensity and race revealed that minorities are more likely to enlist as Whites. This finding suggests that military service appeals to minorities more frequently due to the unique opportunities and benefits inherent to military service such as steady employment and wages, medical benefits, opportunities for advanced education, and specific high-tech job training. While there were few differences in terms of likely youth propensity and region of the country, an examination of parents' education level revealed a slightly negative correlation. Those individuals whose parents possessed less than a high school diploma were among the most likely to enlist in the military, while individuals whose fathers were highly educated were the least likely to join the military.

Again, the likely reasons for higher enlistment rates among individuals with less educated parents are similar to those of minorities. These findings do suggest that certain groups have a greater tendency for military enlistment such as minorities, although this does not necessarily mean all minorities are more likely to join the military. Asian-Americans were also among the groups less likely to enlist in the military compared to Blacks and Hispanics, for whom military enlistment appears more likely. While individual characteristics such as race, gender, and age are likely indicators of youth propensity to enlist, these factors are not the sole determinants of youth propensity, nor are they likely the most important determinants. The next category of

independent variables demonstrates the influence of parents and peers on likely youth enlistment into the military.

Agencies of Influence

The second broad category of exogenous variables examined the impact of various agents of influence on youth propensity. As military service remains a voluntary pursuit for American youth, it is instructive to explore with whom these young people discussed the possibility of military service. This research found that about thirty percent of American youth discussed possible enlistment with someone other than a military recruiter and these discussions were modest predictors of likely enlistment. Young people were more likely to discuss military service with members of their immediate family, particularly their mothers, followed closely by peers. As previously noted, these findings are consistent with family communications research in which vocational decisions were primarily discussed and influenced by parents.

While these discussions inform us as to whom these young people talked with concerning possible military enlistment, these discussions do not provide much insight into whether these agencies of socialization were supportive of military service. An analysis of support for military enlistment revealed that those individuals more distant from youth such as coaches, teachers, employers, and other relatives were most supportive of military service, although this analysis was limited by the design of the

database.⁷ Fathers tended to be more supportive of military enlistment than mothers, while the majority of their friends held no definitive opinions. Perhaps more interestingly, there appears to be general support from all agencies of socialization, except mothers, for military service, even when youth were unlikely to enlist or disinterested in joining the military. This finding suggests that military service retains some degree of stature among the general public.

A review of the military experience of these agencies of socialization revealed no clear indication that those agencies with military experience were more supportive of youth military enlistment. Rather, this research demonstrates the amorphous nature of military experience and its impact on youth proclivity to join the military. For 1993 and 1994, those agencies with military experience were more supportive of youth military enlistment. In 1996, those agencies with military experience were less supportive of youth military enlistment, while in the remaining years no definitive patterns emerged. Determining the causes of military experience being more significant in some years as compared to their years remains a difficult challenge. The differences may lie with the agent of influence, with the young person considering military service, or possibly the interaction of these individuals during their discussion. Alternatively, the causal factors may lie in the quality of the agents' military experience.

⁷ As noted in chapter three, support for military enlistment could be analyzed only as a subset of the basic discussion question. This limits the ability of the researcher to articulate broad generalizations in terms of support for military enlistment.

Still, the most significant finding in this exploration of military experience was the rather large drop in the number of veterans between 1994 and 1995, likely the result of the end of the draft in 1973. These young people are the first generation in over fifty years whose fathers never had to face conscription. "According to recruiters, many parents tend to push their children in the direction of college and civilian careers, portraying the military less as a stepping stone than a stumbling block."⁸ If this general perception of the military holds true for most parents and continues in the future, the viability of an all-volunteer military force for the United States may be in grave danger. Still, this research has demonstrated widespread support for military enlistment by all agencies of socialization, although this general support cannot guarantee the viability of the AVF in the future if youth propensity continues to decline.

Youth Values

The third major category of independent variables examined the self-reported youth reasons for enlistment as well as an exploration into various attributes designated as important to these youth. In 1990, the primary explanations given by Joiners and Likely enlistees for their enlistment, in descending order, were: job training, service to country, and money for education. In 1991-1996, the primary reasons for Joiners to enlist remained the same, although the order of these reasons changed with money for

⁸ Graham, A3.

education replacing service to country as the second most frequently given response for possible enlistment. For likely enlistees in 1991-1996, the three primary explanations for their possible enlistment remained unchanged, although money for education was the most frequently given explanation of their possible enlistment, followed by job training and service to country. While military service appeals to American youth for various reasons (see Tables 4-5 and 4-6), these findings suggest that military service primarily appeals to these young people for three reasons: job training, duty to country, and money for education.

Still, these overt explanations for possible youth enlistment appear to be supported by several underlying aspects of military service that attract American youth. A factor analysis of what is most important to young people revealed that military service entices some enlistees due to its extraordinary physical challenges as well as the opportunity to do something for their country. Further, military service offers several unique opportunities such as leadership, teamwork, and working in a high-tech environment to American youth that may not be available to them through other vocational choices. For example, an examination of how important several attributes are to these youth revealed that individuals for whom doing something for your country is very/extremely important are much more likely to enlist in the military than those individuals for whom this attribute is less important. The findings in chapter four

suggest that the reasoning process for military enlistment by American youth is quite complex and the appeal of military service is multifaceted for American youth.

This conclusion is further supported by the percentages of American youth who gave some or serious consideration to military service. While there has been a slight decline in youth giving serious consideration to military service (see Table 4-2), the percentages of youth giving some consideration to military service has consistently remained around fifty percent from 1990 through 1996. Further, there has not been a significant increase in the number of youth never considering military service, suggesting that the status of the military has not declined among American youth.

Youth Attitudes

The final category of exogenous variables explored the impact of youth foreign policy attitudes on their propensity to enlist. A review of these attitudes revealed that there are significant differences among the various propensity categories in terms of their foreign policy perspectives. Joiners are more supportive of the use of military force than those young people less interested in military service. Specifically, Joiners are the most supportive of using military force to protect the rights of American citizens, to protect the economic interests of the U.S., and to protect the rights of other citizens around the world.⁹ Further, Joiners are the most supportive of volunteering for

⁹ The cumulative frequency distributions for those individuals who strongly agreed with the use of military force are: protect rights of U.S. citizens - Joiners = 80.8%, Likely = 74.1%, Unlikely = 70.5%.

a necessary war and believing that the U.S. should retain its military superiority over all other nations worldwide.¹⁰

Still, these general attitudes toward foreign policy provide little insight concerning their impact on youth propensity. Further analyses of these attitudes revealed small influences on youth propensity. American youth are more willing to join the military if they can observe clear benefits for the United States. This conclusion is supported by the increased propensity rates of those likely or definitely willing to join the military who strongly support military action to protect the rights of American citizens and U.S. economic interests. The largest impact on youth propensity rates was discovered when the question of volunteering for a necessary war was investigated. This finding suggests that youth are willing to make personal sacrifices for their nation if they believe such action is necessary.

Turning toward military intervention, youth attitudes were less likely to affect their propensity rates than their attitudes toward general foreign policy objectives. While youth rates of propensity were positively influenced by their attitudes toward military intervention in the former Yugoslavia, this influence dissipated over time.

Disinterested = 66.4% (n = 16,928); protect U.S. economic interests - Joiners = 52.8%, Likely = 41.7%, Unlikely = 33.1%, Disinterested = 31.5% (n = 39,813); and protect rights of other citizens - Joiners = 30.0%, Likely = 22.0%, Unlikely = 17.2%, and Disinterested = 13.1% (n = 39,872).

¹⁰ The cumulative frequency distribution for youth who responded probably or definitely volunteer for a necessary war is: Joiners - 92.4%, Likely - 81.6%, Unlikely - 51.6%, and Disinterested - 23.2% (n = 39,637). The cumulative frequency distribution for youth who responded "strongly agree" when asked about the U.S. having more military power than any other nation is: Joiners - 51.5%, Likely - 40.8%, Unlikely - 27.5%, and Disinterested - 25.4% (n = 39,841).

Findings in this area suggest that American youth are supportive of peacekeeping operations as an abstract concept, but specific negative events such as those that occurred in Mogadishu, Somalia can quickly alter their views and reduce their propensity to enlist in the military.

Finally, a direct examination of the impact of specific military roles and missions on youth enlistment revealed several interesting findings. American youth are much more willing to join the military if the roles and missions directly benefit the United States as evidenced by the large, positive net effects shown in Table 5-14. Further, the only international mission with a positive effect on youth enlistment is worldwide humanitarian relief, suggesting a tendency for these youth to support altruistic foreign policy goals. Most interestingly, all of the traditional military type missions in the past decade, with the exception of Desert Storm in 1991, had a negative net effect on youth enlistment, suggesting that American youth are more interested in using the military as an instrument of foreign policy only when there is a clear, national benefit to the United States. Also, these youth seem to support using the military in types of situations more fitting the Peace Corps than a military designed to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.

In general, this research has demonstrated modest linkages between youth attitudes and their likely propensity. The more likely youth are to support military operations in a variety of situations, the higher their rates of propensity. Conversely,

the less likely youth are to support employing military force as an instrument of national security, the lower their rates of propensity. While we know that each of these four categories of exogenous variables had an impact on likely youth propensity, the following question remains: what do these findings suggest in terms of the future of the all-volunteer military? Each year the Department of Defense requires approximately 200,000 youth for the active military and another 180,000 for the reserve components of the military.¹¹ Will the U.S. military be able to attract sufficient numbers of American youth in the future to meet these defense requirements? The final section of this chapter explores the implications of these findings in terms of potential recruitment strategies for the armed forces as well as the future of the AVF.

Implications

The findings of this research suggest several recruitment strategies for the armed forces. First and foremost, the armed forces may find it useful to re-examine their recruitment strategies. Their recruitment strategies throughout the 1990s have not been successful in attracting youth to military service as evidenced by the continuing, declining propensity of American youth to join the military. This research suggests that recruitment strategies that highlight certain attributes inherent to military service such as

¹¹ These figures can be found in The Annual Secretary of Defense Report to the President and Congress, 1998, Chapter 10 - Personnel, page 87.

physical challenges, teamwork, leadership, and duty to country may be more successful in attracting more youth into the military.

Further, this research highlights the significance of family discussions in determining likely youth propensity. Youth are more likely to enlist in the military if they have discussed this possibility with their family, particularly their mothers. As the number of veterans in American society continues to decline, recruiters are the most visible military presence in local communities, particularly in light of the declining number of military bases throughout the country. Recruiters may find it useful to hold informational seminars with parents and potential recruits to explain the benefits of military service and dispel possible misgivings held by those less familiar with military service.

In addition, this research suggests that recruiters may want to focus their attention on younger men and women as age had a profoundly negative impact on likely youth propensity. This finding suggests that there exists a certain window of opportunity in which high school students are exploring their future vocational choices. By the time these young people reach their senior year, many of them appear to have already rejected military service as a viable option for their future. This is not to suggest that young people cannot change their minds. Rather, recruiters may have more success if they hold informational meetings with tenth and eleventh grade students.

Further, as the number of veterans continues to decline and American youth have fewer personal sources of information about military service, military recruiters face an increasingly difficult challenge being the sole representative of the armed forces in many communities around the country. This lack of interaction between members of the military and the general public may lead to further recruitment problems as young people have few knowledgeable sources of information about military service, although the internet is one potential resource in which military recruiters could increase their access to American youth.

Finally, perhaps the most disturbing finding in this research is the attitude of American youth that the military is increasingly less relevant. It may be useful for leaders within the Department of Defense to develop strategies to increase the interaction between the armed forces and the general public as well as educate the American public about the various roles and missions of the armed forces. These strategies should include additional visibility events for the military such as open houses, air shows, and possibly educational tours. Further, members of the military should be encouraged to speak at local schools and local events. For example, Defense Secretary Cohen has adopted a middle school in which he frequently visits and discusses his role and responsibilities as the senior civilian defense official. It is likely that this kind of mentorship positively influences the next generation and highlights the relevancy of the armed forces, particularly in times of relative peace.

One final comment on the future of the AVF is required. The current national defense strategy of the United States requires a strong, viable military that can "shape, respond, prepare."¹² This strategy argues that the U.S. must *shape* the international environment in ways favorable to US interests, *respond* to acts of aggression, and *prepare* for the future by maintaining our military superiority.¹³ If the U.S. armed forces are serious about fulfilling this national security strategy, addressing the recruitment and retention problems of the armed forces must remain one of their first priorities. "The key to the success of today's full-spectrum force, both Active and Reserve, is the quality of its people. The men and women who comprise our all-volunteer Total Force are of the highest caliber; we must continue to attract and maintain this level of personnel."¹⁴ Understanding youth propensity to enlist is a beginning step in attracting quality people into the armed forces.

¹² Secretary of Defense William Cohen, DoD New Briefing, May 19, 1997, page 3. A full transcript of this news briefing can be found at www.defenselink.mil (accessed June 20, 1999).

¹³ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁴ Written Statement of Dr. Edward L. Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, Testimony to the House National Security Committee, Military Personnel Subcommittee, 29 January 1998.

Appendix 1
Listing of States by Region

NORTHEAST

Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
New Jersey

New York
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Vermont

MIDWEST

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Michigan
Minnesota

Missouri
Nebraska
North Dakota
Ohio
South Dakota
Wisconsin

SOUTH

Alabama
Arkansas
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland

Mississippi
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia

WEST

Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Hawaii
Idaho
Montana

Nevada
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Wyoming

Appendix 2
Frequency Distributions for Q528 series
How Important Is....?

Jobsecur	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9776)	92.8%	6.1%	1.1%
1992(n=1985)	94.4%	4.8%	.8%
1993(n=2353)	94.2%	4.8%	1.0%
1994(n=1794)	93.0%	6.2%	.8%
1995(n=2749)	92.1%	6.9%	1.0%
1996(n=2378)	92.5%	6.1%	1.4%
TOTAL: 21,035			

Pfreedom	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9782)	91.7%	7.6%	.7%
1992(n=2030)	93.6%	5.8%	.6%
1993(n=2366)	92.2%	7.0%	.8%
1994(n=1717)	94.2%	5.3%	.5%
1995(n=2830)	92.4%	7.1%	.5%
1996(n=2400)	94.1%	5.4%	.5%
TOTAL: 21,125			

Skill	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9769)	84.3%	13.4%	2.3%
1992(n=1990)	86.4%	11.5%	2.1%
1993(n=2371)	85.8%	12.0%	2.2%
1994(n=1756)	86.7%	10.8%	2.5%
1995(n=2686)	86.4%	11.5%	2.1%
1996(n=2416)	85.2%	12.6%	2.2%
TOTAL: 20,988			

Eqoppwmn	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9674)	78.7%	16.7%	4.5%
1992(n=1999)	82.0%	13.1%	3.9%
1993(n=2335)	81.4%	14.6%	4.0%
1994(n=1764)	82.4%	13.8%	3.8%
1995(n=2783)	83.6%	13.2%	3.2%
1996(n=2322)	84.4%	12.1%	3.5%
TOTAL: 20,877			

Leadership	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9747)	76.9%	18.0%	5.1%
1992(n=1955)	78.8%	19.1%	1.9%
1993(n=2292)	80.4%	17.2%	2.4%
1994(n=1768)	80.1%	16.7%	3.2%
1995(n=2835)	82.5%	15.0%	2.5%
1996(n=2469)	82.4%	14.5%	3.1%
TOTAL: 21,066			

Moneyedu	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9778)	71.1%	20.5%	8.4%
1992(n=2043)	85.0%	10.3%	4.7%
1993(n=2358)	85.1%	11.3%	3.6%
1994(n=1726)	81.8%	11.5%	6.7%
1995(n=2855)	79.4%	13.6%	7.0%
1996(n=2512)	77.1%	15.5%	7.4%
TOTAL: 21,272			

Teamwork	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9769)	67.5%	25.5%	7.0%
1992(n=1993)	72.7%	21.1%	6.2%
1993(n=2241)	75.9%	18.2%	5.9%
1994(n=1691)	77.0%	17.7%	5.3%
1995(n=2801)	78.0%	16.5%	5.5%
1996(n=2433)	78.5%	17.3%	4.2%
TOTAL: 20,928			

Country	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9719)	70.3%	26.5%	3.2%
1992(n=1959)	68.7%	28.4%	2.9%
1993(n=2294)	68.9%	27.8%	3.3%
1994(n=1715)	66.1%	29.1%	4.8%
1995(n=2871)	65.5%	29.2%	5.3%
1996(n=2357)	63.1%	31.4%	5.5%
TOTAL: 20,915			

Parentap	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9743)	53.1%	34.6%	12.3%
1992(n=1991)	57.1%	31.9%	10.9%
1993(n=2304)	55.4%	32.4%	12.2%
1994(n=1635)	54.8%	32.7%	12.5%
1995(n=2738)	57.8%	28.5%	13.7%
1996(n=2400)	61.4%	26.6%	12%
TOTAL: 20,811			

Famlocat	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9784)	54.3%	33.5%	12.2%
1992(n=2009)	56.7%	31.5%	11.8%
1993(n=2312)	53.0%	33.7%	13.3%
1994(n=1759)	56.7%	31.9%	11.4%
1995(n=2743)	56.6%	30.3%	13.1%
1996(n=2383)	59.3%	28.9%	11.8%
TOTAL: 20,990			

Hightech	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9723)	47.7%	33.6%	18.7%
1992(n=2005)	50.4%	34.6%	15.0%
1993(n=2254)	46.8%	35.4%	17.8%
1994(n=1695)	49.7%	32.1%	18.2%
1995(n=2826)	51.0%	33%	16%
1996(n=2383)	53.4%	31.3%	15.3%
TOTAL: 20,886			

Physchal	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990(n=9680)	45.9%	36.3%	17.8%
1992(n=2014)	51.1%	35.7%	13.2%
1993(n=2293)	48.7%	38.2%	13.1%
1994(n=1624)	49.5%	37.4%	13.1%
1995(n=2793)	49.8%	35.8%	14.4%
1996(n=2395)	52.9%	35.5%	11.6%
TOTAL: 20,799			

Appendix 3
Cross-Tabulations of Attitudes By Propensity Category

Job Security (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	93.2%	6.0%	.8%
1992	96.9%	3.1%	0%
1993	97%	0%	3%
1994	88.9%	11.1%	0%
1995	92.7%	5.5%	1.8%
1996	92.7%	7.3%	0%

Job Security (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	94.2%	5.1%	1.5%
1992	93.0%	6.4%	.6%
1993	94.7%	3.8%	1.4%
1994	96.0%	2.6%	1.4%
1995	91.8%	6.8%	1.4%
1996	94.3%	4.4%	1.3%

Job Security (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	93.8%	5.4%	.8%
1992	95.7%	3.8%	.5%
1993	93.8%	5.7%	.5%
1994	93.6%	6.2%	.2%
1995	92.3%	7.2%	.5%
1996	92.4%	6.3%	1.3%

Job Security (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	92.1%	6.6%	1.3%
1992	94.2%	4.9%	.9%
1993	94.2%	4.7%	1.1%
1994	92.3%	6.7%	1.0%
1995	92.0%	6.8%	1.2%
1996	92.2%	6.3%	1.5%

Pfreedom (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	79.5%	16.2%	4.3%
1992	89.5%	10.5%	0%
1993	84.8%	13.0%	2.2%
1994	75%	25%	0%
1995	83%	13.2%	3.8%
1996			

Pfreedom (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	84.4%	14.1%	1.5%
1992	91.6%	8.4%	0%
1993	86.7%	11.5%	1.8%
1994	89.8%	9.4%	.8%
1995	82.7%	15.5%	1.8%
1996	95.3%	4.3%	.4%

Pfreedom (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	91.7%	7.7%	.6%
1992	93.3%	5.9%	.8%
1993	92.1%	7.1%	.8%
1994	94.6%	4.6%	.8%
1995	91.2%	8.6%	.2%
1996	94.4%	5.2%	.4%

Pfreedom (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	94.2%	5.4%	.4%
1992	94.2%	5.3%	.5%
1993	93.5%	6.0%	.5%
1994	94.9%	4.9%	.2%
1995	95.2%	4.6%	.2%
1996	94.0%	5.5%	.5%

Skill (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	95.3%	3.8%	.9%
1992	96.6%	3.4%	0%
1993	97.2%	2.8%	0%
1994	90.9%	9.1%	0%
1995	94.5%	3.6%	1.9%
1996	87.5%	12.5%	0%

Skill (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	88.5%	10.7%	.8%
1992	88.2%	10.6%	1.2%
1993	91.4%	7.7%	.9%
1994	90.1%	8.5%	1.4%
1995	91.3%	8.0%	.7%
1996	82.5%	15.9%	1.6%

Skill (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	84.7%	13.7%	1.6%
1992	85.5%	13.1%	1.4%
1993	86.0%	12.0%	2.0%
1994	86.9%	10.6%	2.5%
1995	87.8%	11.2%	1.0%
1996	86.7%	10.7%	2.6%

Skill (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	82.6%	14.2%	3.2%
1992	86.5%	11.3%	2.2%
1993	84.3%	13.0%	2.7%
1994	86.1%	11.2%	2.7%
1995	84.4%	12.6%	3.0%
1996	84.8%	13.1%	2.1%

Egoppwmn (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	76.4%	17.9%	5.7%
1992	89.2%	7.1%	3.6%
1993	84.8%	10.9%	4.3%
1994	90.5%	9.5%	0%
1995	73.1%	19.5%	7.4%
1996	75.0%	25.0%	0%

Egoppwmn (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	76.6%	18.9%	4.5%
1992	80.7%	15.6%	3.7%
1993	78.9%	14.1%	7.0%
1994	81.5%	13.4%	5.1%
1995	83.7%	13.3%	3.0%
1996	85.9%	11.1%	3.0%

Egoppwmn (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	77.2%	18.1%	4.7%
1992	82.9%	14.5%	2.6%
1993	80.2%	16.4%	3.4%
1994	76.9%	19.0%	4.1%
1995	83.9%	13.0%	3.1%
1996	83.4%	12.1%	3.5%

Egoppwmn (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	80.5%	15.2%	4.3%
1992	83.3%	12.7%	4.0%
1993	82.5%	13.8%	3.7%
1994	84.9%	11.5%	3.6%
1995	83.7%	13.3%	3.0%
1996	84.6%	11.9%	3.5%

Leadership (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	87.6%	10.3%	2.1%
1992	78.4%	18.9%	2.7%
1993	90.2%	9.8%	0%
1994	96.7%	3.3%	0%
1995	90.2%	9.8%	0%
1996	89.3%	8.5%	2.2%

Leadership (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	83.2%	13.4%	3.4%
1992	86.4%	12.3%	1.3%
1993	83.6%	14.1%	2.3%
1994	89.6%	9.8%	.6%
1995	88.7%	9.4%	1.9%
1996	83.2%	12.5%	4.3%

Leadership (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	78.0%	17.8%	4.2%
1992	80.3%	17.3%	2.4%
1993	81.3%	17.0%	1.7%
1994	81.7%	15.5%	2.8%
1995	82.7%	15.7%	1.6%
1996	80.8%	15.7%	3.5%

Leadership (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	74.4%	19.5%	6.1%
1992	77.1%	21.2%	1.7%
1993	79.1%	17.8%	3.1%
1994	77.5%	18.7%	3.8%
1995	80.9%	16.1%	3.0%
1996	82.9%	14.4%	2.7%

Moneyedu (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	85.4%	7.8%	6.8%
1992	87.9%	12.1%	0%
1993	80.5%	15.2%	4.3%
1994	76.9%	19.2%	3.9%
1995	81.8%	10.9%	7.3%
1996	80.0%	6.7%	13.3%

Moneyedu (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	78.2%	16.8%	5.0%
1992	90.2%	5.9%	3.9%
1993	90.7%	7.1%	2.2%
1994	92.0%	5.8%	2.2%
1995	85.9%	9.2%	4.9%
1996	76.4%	16.0%	7.6%

Moneyedu (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	71.3%	21.7%	7.0%
1992	83.4%	11.8%	4.8%
1993	85.5%	12.2%	2.3%
1994	82.9%	11.3%	5.8%
1995	80.8%	13.4%	5.8%
1996	76.8%	15.2%	8.0%

Moneyedu (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	68.7%	21.2%	10.1%
1992	84.8%	10.6%	4.6%
1993	84.2%	11.3%	4.5%
1994	80.2%	12.0%	7.8%
1995	77.1%	14.9%	8.0%
1996	77.1%	16.0%	6.9%

Teamwork (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	88.5%	9.4%	2.1%
1992	76.1%	19.0%	4.9%
1993	95.0%	2.5%	2.5%
1994	81.4%	14.8%	3.8%
1995	93.0%	4.7%	2.3%
1996*	65.2%	21.7%	13.1%
(only 1% vs 1.6%)			

Teamwork (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	81.1%	15.4%	3.5%
1992	75.1%	21.5%	3.4%
1993	85.3%	11.1%	3.6%
1994	93.9%	4.9%	1.2%
1995	86.4%	12.2%	1.4%
1996	79.0%	16.7%	4.3%

Teamwork (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	68.4%	25.6%	6.0%
1992	73.1%	21.6%	5.3%
1993	78.6%	17.7%	3.7%
1994	77.0%	18.5%	4.5%
1995	78.6%	16.9%	4.5%
1996	80.9%	15.2%	3.9%

Teamwork (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	63.0%	28.5%	8.5%
1992	72.5%	20.5%	7.0%
1993	72.0%	20.3%	7.7%
1994	74.0%	19.6%	6.4%
1995	75.8%	17.1%	7.1%
1996	77.4%	18.4%	4.2%

Country (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	92.7%	6.4%	.9%
1992	81.1%	16.2%	2.7%
1993	97.7%	2.3%	0%
1994	89.3%	7.1%	3.6%
1995	81.1%	13.2%	5.7%
1996	74.3%	22.9%	2.8%

Country (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	87.2%	12.2%	.6%
1992	74.%	26.%	0%
1993	87.5%	11.5%	1.0%
1994	85.5%	12.7%	1.8%
1995	80.1%	17.9%	2.0%
1996	71.1%	23.4%	5.5%

Country (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	76.3%	22.2%	1.5%
1992	72.2%	25.8%	2.0%
1993	72.9%	25.9%	1.2%
1994	68.9%	28.6%	2.5%
1995	73.2%	24.5%	2.3%
1996	59.4%	33.4%	7.2%

Country (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	61.4%	33.4%	5.2%
1992	66.0%	30.2%	3.8%
1993	62.8%	32.2%	5.0%
1994	60.6%	32.7%	6.7%
1995	58.1%	34.3%	7.6%
1996	63.3%	32.0%	4.7%

Parentap (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	59.4%	29.1%	11.5%
1992	42.1%	39.5%	18.4%
1993	51.5%	21.2%	27.3%
1994	50.0%	34.6%	15.4%
1995	68.7%	21.6%	9.7%
1996	60.0%	32.5%	7.5%

Parentap (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	56.2%	30.4%	13.4%
1992	57.0%	33.3%	9.7%
1993	51.7%	33.8%	14.5%
1994	59.2%	27.4%	13.4%
1995	58.0%	28.0%	14.0%
1996	60.8%	28.4%	10.8%

Parentap (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	51.2%	37.2%	11.6%
1992	58.9%	30.8%	10.3%
1993	56.2%	32.8%	11.0%
1994	56.8%	32.3%	10.9%
1995	57.2%	31.3%	11.5%
1996	63.2%	25.2%	11.6%

Parentap (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	53.6%	33.9%	12.5%
1992	55.5%	33.5%	11.0%
1993	55.9%	32.1%	12.0%
1994	53.3%	33.6%	13.1%
1995	57.5%	27.7%	14.5%
1996	60.3%	27.1%	12.6%

Famlocat (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	37.2%	39.7%	23.1%
1992	35.5%	51.6%	12.9%
1993	39.5%	34.9%	25.6%
1994	45.4%	31.8%	22.8%
1995	32.0%	43.4%	24.6%
1996	65.8%	17.1%	17.1%

Famlocat (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	46.8%	37.3%	15.9%
1992	51.5%	38.0%	10.5%
1993	39.4%	37.2%	23.4%
1994	46.0%	36.8%	17.2%
1995	48.0%	33.1%	18.9%
1996	51.8%	36.6%	11.6%

Famlocat (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	50.7%	36.5%	12.8%
1992	55%	32.5%	12.5%
1993	50.7%	37.6%	11.7%
1994	51.9%	35.8%	12.3%
1995	52.8%	34.1%	13.1%
1996	57.4%	30.7%	11.9%

Famlocat (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	59.1%	30.3%	10.6%
1992	58.1%	30.3%	11.6%
1993	57.2%	30.9%	11.9%
1994	61.2%	29.2%	9.6%
1995	61.3%	27.3%	11.4%
1996	61.4%	26.9%	11.7%

Hightech (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	67.8%	21.9%	10.3%
1992	61.5%	30.8%	7.7%
1993	61.6%	30.8%	7.6%
1994	70.9%	19.4%	9.7%
1995	70.2%	25.5%	4.3%
1996	35.0%	37.5%	27.5%

Hightech (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	61.4%	27.2%	11.4%
1992	61.8%	27.9%	10.3%
1993	68.4%	22.3%	9.3%
1994	67.1%	25.1%	7.8%
1995	66.7%	25.3%	8.0%
1996	58.1%	28.1%	13.8%

Hightech (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	49.5%	34.8%	15.7%
1992	48.5%	39.3%	12.2%
1993	51.4%	36.4%	12.2%
1994	50.5%	32.6%	16.9%
1995	51.9%	34.7%	13.4%
1996	53.8%	31.3%	14.9%

Hightech (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	42.5%	34.9%	22.6%
1992	49.4%	33.0%	17.6%
1993	40.2%	37.1%	22.7%
1994	45.5%	33.5%	21.0%
1995	46.9%	34.0%	19.1%
1996	53.0%	31.7%	15.3%

Physical Challenge (JOINERS)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	80.6%	14.7%	4.7%
1992	62.5%	29.2%	8.3%
1993	74.3%	20.5%	5.2%
1994	75.9%	24.1%	0%
1995	73%	22.9%	4.1%
1996	61.3%	30.5%	8.2%

Physical Challenge (LIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	68.9%	24.2%	6.9%
1992	58.8%	32.0%	9.2%
1993	69.2%	26.8%	4.0%
1994	72.4%	22.1%	5.5%
1995	78.1%	17.9%	4.0%
1996	55.1%	33.8%	11.1%

Physical Challenge (UNLIKELY)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	48.3%	38.5%	13.2%
1992	53.7%	36.2%	10.1%
1993	54.1%	37.3%	8.6%
1994	53.5%	38.7%	7.8%
1995	54.4%	35.2%	10.4%
1996	56.0%	32.3%	11.7%

Physical Challenge (DISINTERESTED)	Extremely/Very	Somewhat	Not Important
1990	37.7%	38.4%	23.9%
1992	48.4%	36.3%	15.3%
1993	41.7%	41.2%	17.1%
1994	43.3%	39.6%	17.1%
1995	41.4%	40.0%	18.6%
1996	50.8%	37.5%	11.7%

Appendix Four

This appendix lists the specific questions drawn from the YATS survey for chapter five. This appendix is divided into two sections: first, the general and specific foreign policy issues; and, second, the specific events or missions affecting enlistment. The year(s) the questions were asked are contained within the parentheses as well as the variable name given to each question.

FIRST GROUP: This section of the survey begins: Now, I'm going to ask for your opinions on government and public affairs issues. Please tell me to what extent you either agree or disagree with the following statements.

1. Q527A: Do you think there are times when the US should go to war to protect the rights of other countries? Would you say you strongly agree, mostly agree, neither, mostly disagree, strongly disagree?
(1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996) (WRRGTS)
2. Q527B: Do you think the US should go to war to defend its own economic interests? Would you say you strongly agree, mostly agree, neither, mostly disagree, strongly disagree? (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996)
(WRECON)
3. Q527A1: Do you think the US should go to war to protect the rights of US citizens? Would you say you strongly agree, mostly agree, neither, mostly disagree, strongly disagree? (1994,95,96) (WRUSCTZ)
4. Q527C: Do you think the US ought to have much more military power than any other nation in the world? Would you say you strongly agree, mostly agree, neither, mostly disagree, strongly disagree?
(1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996) (USMILPWR)
5. Q527D: If you felt it was necessary for the US to fight in some future war, what would be the likelihood you would volunteer to serve in the military? Would you definitely volunteer, probably volunteer, probably not volunteer, definitely not volunteer? (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996)
(WRSERV)
6. Q527S: In Yugoslavia, civil strife is destroying the homes and livelihoods of its citizens. Do you think the US military should intervene in situations like this? Are you in favor, neither or opposed? (1992,93) (YUGO)

7. Q527S1: In Yugoslavia, civil strife is destroying the homes and livelihoods of its citizens. Do you think the US military, in coordination with the UN, should intervene in situations like this? Are you in favor, neither or opposed? (1992,93) (YUGOUN)

8. Q644I: US Armed Forces are presently on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. They might also be involved in a similar mission in Haiti. Do you think US military personnel should be used in peacekeeping missions in situations like this? Are you in favor, neither, or opposed? (1993) (PEACEKEEP)

SECOND GROUP: This series of questions begins, "I will now ask you about some current and possible roles of the US armed forces. For each role, I'd like to know how it would affect your attitude toward enlistment.

1. Q527H: Finally, a few months ago, the US reacted to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by moving a sizable military force into the Gulf area. How does this affect your attitude towards enlistment? Are you more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1990) (IRAQ)

2. Q527I: The US is considered to have been successful in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. How does this affect your attitude toward enlistment? Are you more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1992, 1993) (DSTORM)

3. Q527R: One role of the US Armed Forces is to protect and assist people in this country against natural disasters, such as last summer's floods along the Mississippi River. If you knew that joining the military would mean that you would be called to help in emergencies of this type, would you be more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1993) (MSFLOODS)

4. Q527J: How does involvement of the Armed Forces in peacekeeping missions like Somalia, and potential involvement in Haiti, affect your attitude toward enlistment? Are you more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1993) (PEACENL)

5. Q527X: If military enlistment meant you might assist in stopping drugs from coming into this country, would you be more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1994, 1995, 1996) (USDRUGS)

6. Q527Y: If military enlistment meant you might assist in controlling civil disturbances and maintaining law and order in this country, would you be more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1994, 1995, 1996) (USCIVIL)
7. Q527Z: If military enlistment meant you might participate in UN peacekeeping missions in other parts of the world, would you be more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1994, 1995, 1996) (UNPEACE)
8. Q527R1: If military enlistment meant you might protect and assist people in this country against natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc., would you be more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1994, 1995, 1996) (USDISSTR)
9. Q527W: How does US involvement in Haiti affect your attitudes toward enlistment? Does it make you more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1994) (HAITI)
10. Q527K: How does US military involvement in Bosnia affect your attitude toward enlistment, does it make you more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1996) (BOSNIAEL)
11. Q527K1: How does the current US military involvement in Iraq affect your attitude toward enlistment, does it make you more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1996) (IRAQENLT)
12. Q527AB: If military enlistment meant you might assist people in other parts of the world suffering from conditions such as famine and natural disasters, would you be more likely to enlist, less likely to enlist, or neither? (1996) (WLDDISEN)

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